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The PhD outlines criteria under which a psychiatric classification merits belief and, as
a case study, establishes that autism merits belief. Three chapters respond to anti-
realist arguments, three chapters establish conditions under which psychiatric 
classifications merit belief.
Chapter one addresses the pessimistic meta-induction. I historically analyse 
autism to show there has been sufficient historical continuity to avoid the pessimistic 
meta induction. 
Chapter two considers arguments from underdetermination. I consider the 
strongest candidate for an alternative to autism, classificatory changes which occurred
between 1980 and 1985. I argue this does not constitute underdetermination because 
those changes were methodologically and evidentially flawed. 
Chapter three considers theory-ladenness. I consider the two strongest 
candidates for background theories which might have a negative epistemic effect 
(cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis). I show these have little influence on what 
symptoms are formulated or how symptoms are grouped together.
Chapter four argues against psychiatric classifications as natural kinds and  
against notions that inductive knowledge of psychiatric classifications requires robust 
causes. I outline psychiatric classifications as scientific laws. They are high level 
idealised models which guide construction of lower level, more specific, models. This
opens alternative routes to belief for psychiatric classification lacking robust causes. 
Chapter five shows that psychiatric classifications can set relevant populations 
for deriving statistically significant symptoms. The same behaviour can count as 
statistically significant for one psychiatric classification but not another. I argue this 
process strengthens psychiatric classifications inductively, thus contributing to belief.
Chapter six bases belief on theoretical virtues. Unifications and causation are 
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the two main theoretical virtues. Autism strongly exhibits unifications, stringently 
covering a wide range of otherwise unrelated symptoms. Additionally, emphasising 
causation may reduce unifications and thus reduce belief. Attributing unifications is 
reliable because autism is accessible without employing extremely complicated 
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Publications and Submission Statement
I declare that this thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially 
the same form for the award of a higher degree elsewhere.
Significant elements of sections of this thesis will be published in a forthcoming 
article: Fellowes, Sam. (2016). A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky's account of 
validity, Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practise. These sections are 4.3.1 Physical 
Systems and phenomena, 6.5.1.5 Balancing IBEs, 6.4.4 Validity.
Significant elements of sections of this thesis formed the essay, RDoC should not 
always see symptoms as independent of psychiatric categories, which was one of two 
winners of the 2016 Jaspers Award from the Association for the Advancement of 
Philosophy and Psychiatry. These sections are 5.2 Classifications and symptoms, 
5.2.1 Classifications, 5.2.2 Symptoms, 5.3 Systematicity, 5.3.1 Constructing 
symptoms, 5.3.2 Employing classifications to systematise symptoms.
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Acronyms
IBE: Inference to the best explanation, inferring one explanation as better than 
another.
PMI: Pessimistic meta induction, scientists historically believed in theories in the past 
yet the theories turned out false, suggesting belief over existing theories is undeserved.
NMA: No miracles argument, the only explanation of the success of science is 
miracles or the truth, since miracles are not allowed in philosophy then truth is the 
only explanation.
RDoC: Research Domain Criteria, a project started in 2009 by the National Institute 
for Mental Health. This is part of the National Institute of Health, an agency of the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services. Rather than link 
classifications to causes as typically occurs in DSM based casual research RDoC 
researchers intend to base causal investigation on directly linking causes to symptoms.
The hope is that causal investigation will no longer be held back by the potential 




“Under what circumstances should we chuck the whole thing out and start over?” 
(Kendler 2012a, p.xiv). Kendler asks this question of psychiatric classifications and, 
despite being one of the less pessimistic philosophers of psychiatry, his best reason for
keeping existing classifications is a lack of alternatives rather than the inherent virtues
of existing classifications (Kendler & First 2010, p.265). Scepticism over psychiatric 
classifications is widespread. Attending an autistic advocacy conference, I observed 
one autistic speaker criticise many different institutions and services associated with 
autism before turning on the classification itself. “What is it actually doing?”, she 
asked in an exasperated manner, questioning what the diagnosis actually contributed. 
Similarly, many mental health workers take an “everyone is different” approach, 
preferring to treat people rather than labels. Most philosophers of psychiatry and 
psychiatrists accept psychiatric classifications cannot be fully dispensed with but 
many are concerned about current classifications. Some see most psychiatric 
classifications as arbitrary (Horwitz 2002, p.5; Kendell & Jablensky 2003, p.7) or not 
meriting belief (Cooper 2005, p.150; Murphy 2006, p.10). Psychiatry is currently 
facing a crisis of confidence because over thirty years of investigation has not 
established causes or corroborative factors for most psychiatric classifications, leaving
them unvalidated (Zachar & Jablensky 2014, p.9). Major figures involved in 
formulating DSM-5 wished “to transcend the limitations of the current DSM paradigm
and encourage a research agenda that goes beyond our current ways of thinking” 
(Kupfer, First & Regier 2002, p.xix).1 Many other sources could be drawn upon to 
highlight such concerns. 
1 DSM refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. It is published by the American Psychiatric 
Association, and is currently in its 5th edition. DSM lists many individual psychiatric classifications, 
providing diagnostic criteria and describing other information like treatment responses, course and 
family studies. It is employed in many different countries and the World Health Organisation 
diagnostic manual, the International Classification of Diseases, generally reflects DSM. 
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0.2 Importance of the Problem
Questions of belief in scientific concepts are especially important for psychiatry 
compared to most sciences. Anti-realist philosophers of science may disbelieve in 
electrons but do not argue notions of electrons need immediate replacement, taking 
electrons as adequate provisional mathematical models accounting for phenomena. In 
contrast, psychiatric classifications not meriting belief could have huge ramifications. 
A psychiatric classification can influence decisions over treatment, over termination of
foetuses and over sectioning an individual. Being diagnosed can influence an 
individual's self-perception and perception of how they relate to others. Psychiatric 
classifications being somehow false or untrue would raise serious questions over how 
much they should influence decision making. More is at stake when worries are raised
regarding psychiatric classifications compared to concerns over the reality of 
electrons.
Many advocate the replacement of existing psychiatric classifications with new
and superior ones. This has a long history (see Aragona (2014)) but is most prominent 
today with RDoC [Research Domain Criteria]. RDoC fears falsity of existing 
psychiatric classifications negatively influences causal investigation. Consequently, 
RDoC seeks to circumnavigate existing classifications by directly investigating 
connections between causes and symptoms, with the long term intent of producing 
new and superior classifications (Cuthbert & Insel 2013, p.4). RDoC is run by the 
National Institute for Mental Health. This is part of the National Institute of Health, an
agency of the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Thus, a major 
governmental organisation of the country which typically sets worldwide trends in 
psychiatry is funding a project specifically intending to replace existing psychiatric 
classifications. It is reorienting research grants away from DSM based research to 
RDoC based research (Casey et al 2013, p.813). The major assumptions driving 
RDoC's methodology is that existing psychiatric classifications are deeply flawed. 
Scepticism over psychiatric classifications has major implications for policy relating 
to psychiatric research.
0.3 Major aim of thesis
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I will establish criteria under which an individual psychiatric classification (rather 
than a classificatory scheme like DSM) merits belief and show autism meets those 
criteria. I frame my discussion in terms of scientific realism, aiming to establish 
criteria under which we should consider a psychiatric classification as true (or 
approximately true) and hence worthy of belief. I primarily focus upon one psychiatric
classification, autism, as a case study of where belief is justified under the approach I 
develop. 
I employ notions of scientific realism rather than validity. Generally, notions of
validity are not defined. In rare instances where definitions are provided they are 
typically based around notions of causation (for example, Kendell & Jablensky (2003, 
p.7) and Murphy (2014a, p.62)). This is problematic because those advocating such 
definitions typically do not explain why causation is important for belief. In contrast, 
the scientific realism I employ sees causation as important, but not all important, for 
belief. Additionally, which notions of causation are employed is not typically 
discussed by those offering such definitions but, I will argue, this has important 
consequences for what is considered real. The particular type of causation and notions 
of scientific realism I endorse will be fully outlined; nothing is gained by framing my 
argument in terms of validity since validation is both imprecise and implicitly seems 
to make claims which I do not commit to.
I will explore arguments that suggest we should be sceptical about psychiatric 
classifications and qualify them, describing situations under which those arguments 
are inapplicable. I will employ autism as a case study to show an instance where 
sceptical arguments are inapplicable. Doing this only counters scepticism rather than 
actually establishing grounds for belief. Consequently, I shall develop new criteria 
under which a psychiatric classification would merit belief, under which it should be 
taken as true. I will then show these criteria are applicable to autism. I do not claim 
my criteria for belief will be met by all psychiatric classifications and do not claim 
they will only be met by autism. The criteria will justify belief for some existing 
psychiatric classifications and not others, equally, it will likely justify belief over some
future yet to be developed psychiatric classifications but not for others. It is a new 
route to belief and shown to be applicable to autism; its applicability elsewhere will 
need investigation outside these pages. 
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0.4 Initial hunch and initial development
I first contemplated that autism merits belief after reading The Siege by Clara 
Clarebourne Park (1967). Park’s daughter was diagnosed with autism in 1961 and The
Siege recounts Park's attempts to cure her. Park developed the theory that autism was a
severe psychological inability to cope with disappointment. By never trying anything 
new the daughter would never face disappointment, so she lived in her own world and 
the family conducted their siege to break her out of that world. Describing events of 
50 years ago when the concept of autism was relatively new, written by someone with 
no scientific or medical training and by someone who holds clearly false beliefs about 
autism, intuitively, one would consider The Siege a historical curiosity rather than 
credible scientific text. Despite this, I was deeply struck by how recognisable the 
symptoms mentioned were to the modern eye. Park appeared to be describing the 
modern symptoms associated with autism despite having discredited beliefs about 
autism. I drew parallels with 1700s theories about electricity. Scientists in Russia and 
Britain endorsed a Newtonian understanding of electricity whilst the European 
continent largely endorsed a radically ontologically different Cartesian understanding 
of electricity. Despite having radically different explanations of what electricity was, 
what made up electricity and how electricity worked, they all came up with the same 
experimental results (Christie 2006). I wondered if autism was similarly epistemically 
robust, the psychiatric classification not being influenced by the changing 
explanations of autism which come and go with each generation. Was this the case 
then, I wondered, might this be because the concept of autism is not theoretical in the 
manner which speculative theories like psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology are?
Unfortunately, a strict demarcation between theory and non-theory is 
untenable; we cannot take the concept of autism as a-theoretical and therefore 
epistemically superior to theoretical explanations like psychoanalysis. The 
operationalism of the DSM-III (1980) famously aimed for a theory neutral psychiatry, 
aiming to base psychiatry on logical positivism (though operationalism was severely 
misunderstood (Aragona 2014, p.30; Green 1992, p.308; Zachar & Jablensky 2014, 
p.5)). The logical positivists argued only observations and statements purely derived 
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from observations were meaningful whilst all other claims were literally nonsense and
did not merit belief (Carnap 1932). However, it has been long established that 
scientific claims cannot be directly derived from observation; scientific claims are first
derived from theory rather than a-theoretical observation (Hempel 1973, p.70; Popper 
1959, p.106; Quine 1951). Also well established is that observations themselves are 
theoretical so a divide between a-theoretical observations and theoretical claims fails 
(Feyerabend 1975, p.212; Kuhn 1996, p.4). The impossibility of a theory neutral 
psychiatry is almost universally agreed upon by philosophers of psychiatry (Cooper 
2005, p.101; Murphy 2006, p.226). Given the failure of the observation – theory 
distinction, the symptoms of autism are theoretical. Claiming autism is epistemically 
superior to Park's belief in her daughter's fear of disappointment requires alternative 
grounds than presence or absence of theory. I was deeply acquainted with the 
impossibility of a theory-neutral science yet still felt committed to the notion that 
autism somehow had a different theoretical status to many scientific theories. 
The solution came from exploring scientific realism. Rather than trying to 
avoid or discount theories, scientific realists argue belief in science is justified if 
scientific claims are based upon sufficiently good theories (Psillos 1999, p.189). 
Rather than see autism as less theoretical, I wondered if instead we should see autism 
as a good theory. Of course, critics of psychiatry would deny psychiatry has good 
theories. Even if Park's theories were especially weak few would claim modern 
theories about autism are as good as theories in mature sciences like physics. If belief 
in science requires good theories then intuitively physics would pass and psychiatry 
would fail. Many philosophers, psychiatrists, psychologists, scientists and members of
the general public would endorse this precise view: psychiatry does not generally 
merit belief because it is based upon unscientific claims or bad scientific claims. The 
only way autism would merit scientific realism is if most such criticisms are 
inapplicable to autism. Symptoms and classification of autism need be based on good 
theories to merit belief, including escaping various sceptical arguments.
0.5 Identifying Arguments
Let’s formally identify the main arguments against belief in psychiatric classifications 
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that I need respond to. These take two interrelated forms. Firstly, arguments against 
belief in psychiatric classifications. Secondly, the failure of arguments which aim to 
establish belief in psychiatric classifications.
0.5.1 Three arguments against belief in psychiatric classifications
There are three main anti-realist arguments in philosophy of science. They are 
intended, where applicable, to show scientific realism (belief in scientific concepts) is 
not justified. 
The first argument against belief is the pessimistic meta induction. Past and 
potential future changes suggest modern psychiatric classifications are on shaky 
ground and are likely to change. This likelihood of being abandoned undermines 
reliable belief in them. Throughout history scientists have believed in theories, often 
on extremely good evidence, which turned out false, suggesting good evidence is 
insufficient for belief and our current theories will turn out false (Laudan 1981, p.33). 
Related arguments in philosophy of psychiatry are common, with regular complaints 
that psychiatric classification keeps changing. Historians of psychiatry have outlined 
numerous historical changes to classifications. For example, historical study of 
schizophrenia suggests psychiatric classifications are often initially conceptualized on 
weak grounds (Bentall 1992a, p.49; Boyle 1990, p.169) and undergo many changes 
(Bentall 2004, p.39; Boyle 1990, p.169). Such changes are likely to continue.
“There is no reason to suppose that this process of grouping and re-
grouping phenomena, of enriching, abandoning and adding constructs 
[classifications], will not continue indefinitely... The twenty-second 
century’s medical constructs will no doubt have as varied conceptual 
bases as have ours” (Boyle 1990, p.79). 
Schizophrenia may be abandoned like phlogiston or the aether (Bentall 1992b, p.287) 
and Bentall suggests changing notions of schizophrenia reduces confidence that 
psychiatrists are getting things right (2004, p.39). Berrios suggests the changing 
history of psychiatric classifications raises questions about them being natural kinds 
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(2015, p.31). Advances in genetics and neuroscience may mean we abandon 
schizophrenia and manic depression (Schaffner 2012, p.181). Current categorical 
approaches of DSM may not last due to gene research and changes in socio-economic 
environment (Horwitz 2002, p.228). Past and potential future changes are often taken 
to suggest current psychiatric classification do not merit belief.
The second argument against belief is underdetermination. This is where two 
different theories can equally well explain the evidence; therefore there is no 
justification for assigning belief to one theory rather than the other (Stanford 2006, 
p.8). If more than one theory is equally compatible with the evidence then scientists 
cannot employ evidence to decide which theory is correct. Related arguments in 
philosophy of psychiatry are common, with the suggestion that current psychiatric 
classifications are just one way of classifying mentally ill people. Murphy writes, 
“what evidence do we have that current practice in psychiatry produces good 
outcomes, outcomes that couldn't be matched by alternative nosologies that start from 
a completely different set of premises?” (Murphy 2006, p.10). Giere notes that 
underdetermination fits the social constructivist argument well (Giere, 1999 p.237) 
and philosophers of psychiatry have indeed often suggested psychiatric classifications 
are arbitrary constructs, formulated on personal opinion rather than clear scientific 
evidence. Pointing to the multiple possible approaches to schizophrenia, Bentall writes
that “[i]f schizophrenia is a valid scientific concept, then at the very least psychiatrists 
will need to answer the question. Which set of criteria [symptoms forming a 
classification] are the right ones?” (1992a, p.28). However, there is little means of 
determining which classification is correct (Bentall 2004, p.65). The possibility of 
constructing alternative psychiatric classifications is taken to suggest we lack reason 
to believe current psychiatric classifications are the correct ones. 
The third argument against belief is theory-laden nature of evidence. This is 
where evidence employed to construct scientific theories itself partly depends upon 
scientific theories, potentially mistaken ones, which can result in substantial negative 
epistemic consequences (Bogen 2013). Note that it is generally accepted most or 
perhaps all science is theory-laden.  This is only concerning when the theories 
involved are weak or when the process of interpreting evidence from (good or bad) 
theories is unreliable. This also has parallels in philosophy of psychiatry, it being 
commonly argued that psychiatric classifications are overly reliant upon false theories.
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Paul Hoff describes psychiatry as historically a series of “repeated collapses into 
“single message mythologies” ” (Fulford et al 2013, p.2). There are many competing 
theoretical approaches to mental illness, such as psychoanalysis, cognitive 
psychology, neuroscience and genetics. Kendler asks, if psychiatry is going to be 
based upon a theory then which of the above theories do we go with (2012, p.xv; also 
Bentall 1992a, p.28). Not only are we unsure which theory is correct, potentially all of
them are false. Cooper believes “it is likely that much current psychiatric theory is 
mistaken” (2005, p.77). Most psychiatric theories have major flaws, making them 
highly limited or completely false. Alternatively, more than one theory may be correct 
but this situation would create immense challenges: very few psychiatric 
classifications have a single, clear theoretical explanation (Kendler 2005a, p.434). 
Instead, we must employ multiple theories, being sure each theory is applied only to 
its relevant domain alongside needing understand how phenomena described by 
different theories interact, the “difficulty of which is hard to overestimate” (Kendler 
2005b, p.438). The worrying consequence is that false or inadequate theories might 
cause psychiatrists to make false observations, theory influencing and thus distorting 
the observations used to form classifications. “[P]sychiatrists' false beliefs can be 
expected to distort their observations of their patients and prevent them from seeing 
the true similarities and differences between types of mental disorder” (Cooper 2005, 
p.77). For example, Bentall thinks the multiplicity of theories about schizophrenia 
suggests we should not be confident over notions of schizophrenia (Bentall 2004, 
p.xiv). Reliance upon false theories undermines belief in existing psychiatric 
classifications.
0.5.2 The inapplicability of arguments for belief in psychiatric classifications 
I will now consider two arguments employed by psychiatrists and philosophers of 
psychiatry which suggest conditions under which psychiatric classifications merit 
belief. As is recognised by those who employ such arguments, these conditions are 
rarely met in psychiatry. Hence the absence of their success can be taken as reason to 
disbelieve in (or at least remain agnostic about) psychiatric classifications.
The first, and most popular, argument for belief is that psychiatric 
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classifications might be based on causal knowledge. Murphy thinks “nosology must 
be based on causal explanations of what is being classified” (2006, p.5). Claiming 
psychiatry currently is unsuccessful, he says
“my solution [to the lack of success], in essence, is to borrow from the 
neighboring science[s]... my basic project assumes that they [other 
sciences] are in good enough shape for us to conclude that if psychiatry,
which studies the same subject matter (human beings), aims for 
consilience with the sciences of the mind/brain, and adopts their best 
practices, it will be on a sounder footing” (Murphy 2006, p.11).
Modern psychiatrists often also believe weaknesses with classifications mean we 
should base psychiatry on explanations, such as genetics (Andreasen 1995, p. 162; 
Pies 2008, p.49; Smolik 1999  p.188). Psychologists like Baron-Cohen (1997, p.137) 
and Happé (1994, p.98) believe autism should be formulated on causes. A related 
argument is taking corroborations between psychiatric classifications and other 
factors, such as from treatment responses and family studies, as a means to belief 
(Kincaird 2014, p.151; Meehl  1995, p.273). The greater the responses to specific 
treatment and the greater co-occurrence in families, the more likelihood diagnosed 
individuals have shared underlying causes. However, almost all who endorse this 
causal or corroborative argument believe adequately strong causes or corroborative 
evidence have not been sufficiently found to establish belief over most existing 
psychiatric classifications.
The second argument is that psychiatric classifications which take a particular 
form merit belief. For Cooper, psychiatric classifications ideally group patients based 
upon similar symptoms and sometimes 
“these similarities will be theoretically important, and in some cases 
patients who are grouped together will be alike in fundamental ways… 
If we take cases of mental disorders as our domain and plot them onto a
multidimensional quality space (as in cluster analysis) then we will find
clusters of similar cases. If we focus on the right properties, then the 
clusters that such a process generates will be inductively powerful” 
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Psychiatric classifications like this she calls natural kinds and considers these as 
meriting belief. Additionally, we can believe something is a natural kind without 
identifying its causes. Psychiatric classifications which are natural kinds mean 
individuals with the psychiatric classification (when properly diagnosed) have some 
fundamental similarities, grounding further inductive and explanatory claims. Cooper 
takes biological species to be paradigmatic examples of natural kinds; biological 
species are real because members of a species have theoretically important similarity 
due to shared causes. She similarly links kinds with being real in psychiatry (Cooper 
2012b, p.38); psychiatric classification resembling biological species will be getting 
something right about the world so merit belief. However, Cooper believes 
weaknesses in psychiatric practice means most psychiatric classifications do not 
describe natural kinds. Related ideas are expressed by Kendell and Jablensky. They 
see psychiatric classification with a zone of rarity – where the symptom pattern of one
psychiatric classification has little overlap with other psychiatric classifications – as 
meriting belief (Kendell & Jablensky 2003, p.8). A zone of rarity allows an inference 
that the underlying biology of the psychiatric classification is unique, not present in 
other psychiatric classifications, which legitimises belief. However, very few 
psychiatric classifications have zones of rarity (Kendell & Jablensky 2003, p.8).
0.5.3 Suitability of autism as an example of a contested psychiatric diagnosis
This thesis takes autism as a case study for exploring questions of scientific realism in 
psychiatry. DSM-V takes autism as a disorder with symptoms present from early 
development which impair areas of functioning of the child or adult. The symptoms of
autism are broken down into two main areas. Firstly, deficient social communication 
and interaction, including both verbal and non-verbal communications. Secondly, 
repetitive behaviour, interests and activities, including rigid thinking and hyperactive 
or hyporeactive sensory input. The symptoms must be not better accounted for by 
intellectual disability though intellectual disability can co-occur with autism (APA 
2013, p.50-51). 
Autism is a major psychiatric classification and, as is well known, autism does 
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not have one single identified cause. For example, it is currently being linked to 
hundreds of genes (Devlin & Scherer 2012, p.233). Recent commentators have 
expressed disbelief over autism on similar grounds to those listed above. For example,
the first article of a recent collection of papers entitled The Philosophy of Autism, 
written by an editor of the book, highlights this clearly. Cushing points out that not all 
autistic people have all the symptoms of autism and some non-autistic people have 
some symptoms of autism (Cushing 2013, p.19). Therefore, the symptoms alone are 
not enough to determine who is autistic and it is an assumption that all people labeled 
autistic share the same syndrome (Cushing 2013, p.22). Cushing suggests there needs 
to be something deeper to autism than just behaviour (2013, p.23) but he shows that 
psychology, genetics and neuroscience all fail to provide something deeper (2013, 
p.25-38). Lacking any other candidate for what autism might be, he sees the DSM-5 
notion of autism as “either arbitrary or solely politically/economically motivated” 
(2013, p.38). On this basis, 
“there is no such thing as “autism” if we are to understand it on the 
model of something like Down syndrome. At best there are several 
conditions that can occur independently of each other but seem to co-
occur, that can vary significantly in severity, and that seem to cluster in 
families, but not necessarily always” (Cushing 2013, p.38-39). 
From this he claims that “progress can only come from abandoning it [the 
classification of autism] and starting from scratch” (Cushing 2013, p.41). Cushing 
“propose[s] that we focus instead on specific deficiencies, like sensory 
processing disorders, communication difficulties or food sensitivities 
and stop trying to cluster them together as something called “autism” ” 
(2013, p.39). 
Similar ideas are expressed in Sammi Timimi's recent book The Myth of Autism. The 
lack of a causal basis for autism (Timimi et al 2011, p.139) means “the field of autism 
rests on ideological assumptions, not scientific evidence” (Timimi et al 2011, p.4, 
emphasis original). Instead, 
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“the autism spectrum has become a catch-all metaphor for focusing on 
a disparate range of behaviours that suggest a lack of the type of social 
and emotional competences thought to be necessary for the functioning 
of society dominated by neo-liberal economic and political 
foundations” (Timimi et al 2011, p.7)
Again, the absent causal basis means some extra-scientific factors are used to 
formulate autism, leaving autism illegitimate science. Autism thus serves well as a 
case study for my project; it’s an important psychiatric classification and its legitimacy
is contested.
0.6 Alternative starting point and argument
My argument will require a novel account of what symptoms are. I draw upon an 
important late 20th century development in philosophy of science, one not yet applied 
to philosophy of psychiatry. Traditionally, philosophy of science demarcates sharply 
between data and theory. Data is the product of experiments and traditionally theories 
were portrayed as inductive summaries of that data (even if they often or always also 
included elements beyond the data). An influential 1988 paper by Bogen & Woodward
argued this picture missed out an important step. Bogen & Woodward claim theories 
do not summarise data but instead describe something else which they call 
phenomena. Typically, data is the product of many different causal factors which are 
specific to that moment. For example, 
“the outcome of any given application of a thermometer to a lead 
sample depends not only on the melting point of lead, but also on its 
purity, on the workings of the thermometer, on the way it applied and 
read, on interactions between the initial temperature of the thermometer
and that of the sample, and a variety of other background conditions” 
(Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.309).
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When building theories we desire a more general figure than is provided by specific 
experiments, one not tied to specific causal factors present in specific instances of the 
experiment. Bogen & Woodward suggest the traditional picture of data and theories 
needs to be supplemented by phenomena, an additional step lying between them. This 
notion of phenomena is a more abstracted, more generalised notion than is given by 
individual experiments. Thus whilst different experiments might provide results of 
3.28, 3.21, 3.33, etc., scientists might agree upon phenomena as 3.27, a general figure 
abstracted away from specific experiments. Theories account for this more generalised
notion of phenomena rather than specific instances of data. 
Following numerous philosophers of science (Psillos 2011a, p.7; Teller 2010, 
p.825) I link this picture of data, phenomena and theories with Giere’s account of 
theories as high level models (Giere 1994, p.293). According to Giere, scientific 
theories (a term which includes scientific laws) provide very abstract probabilistic 
descriptions of phenomena, detailing how under various conditions probabilities of 
which and to what magnitude phenomena will occur. This abstract model of 
phenomena can be applied to specific situations which reduces the generality and 
narrows down the probabilities of what phenomena will occur and to what magnitude. 
Thus phenomena is a link in a chain of levels of abstraction. Data is tied to specific 
instances thus lacks abstractness, phenomena is a generalised summary which lacks 
the specificity of data and theories are more generalised probabilistic statements about
phenomena.
Phenomena can be derived from a data driven bottom up approach or a theory 
driven top down approach. Many different individual instances of data can be 
analysed statistically to derive an abstracted and generalised phenomena. 
Alternatively, one can use theory to derive phenomena. For example, theories about 
molecules suggest that, when arranged into the configuration we call lead, the 
intermolecular bonds will require 327.5 degrees to break them. 
I apply all this to psychiatry. People exhibit instances of behaviour, we should 
consider these as data. However, these instances of data are not identical to symptoms.
Different specific situations will cause low social skills to manifest and each 
manifestation will involve different words being spoken. In contrast, the symptom low
social skills has an abstracted generality not present in specific behavioural 
manifestations of low social skills. We should therefore see symptoms as phenomena, 
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an abstracted generalised notion lacking the specific details of behavioural instances. I
then argue we should understand psychiatric classifications on Giere’s account of 
scientific theories, high level abstract models with abstract probabilistic statements 
about symptoms. Formulating symptoms can be bottom up behaviour driven through 
statistical analysis of behaviour. This is the typical understanding of how we formulate
symptoms. However, I also argue symptoms can be formulated through a top down 
classification driven approach. I show classifications can set populations from which 
statistically significant behaviour is derived. Different behaviour can reach statistical 
significance when employing different classifications, thereby entailing different 
symptoms. I argue this approach produces symptoms of greater relevance and 
therefore increases their inductiveness. This strengthens psychiatric classifications 
inductively, making them more theoretically virtuous and therefore more greatly 
meriting belief.
This alternative picture of what symptoms are and how they can be formulated 
shows symptoms can be inductive without strong underlying causes. This removes the
need for psychiatric classifications to have strong underlying causes to be scientific 
models of significant worth. This opens up the possibility of psychiatric classifications
meriting belief in the absence of strong underlying causes.
I re-orientate questions of the grounds of belief away from existing approaches
found in psychiatry and philosophy of psychiatry. Existing approaches often see 
causes (directly found or inferred) as the sole means to legitimise belief over 
psychiatric classifications. This is a cause first approach, whereby belief primarily 
depends upon establishing what has been caused by the causal structure of the world. I
offer an alternative notion of reality. I see reality as a series of regularities (see Psillos 
2002, p.293) . These regularities have probabilistic relationships between them. 
Scientific theories are worthy of belief to the degree they maximise information about 
these regularities. Information is maximised by theoretical virtues. There are two main
theoretical virtues, unifications and causation (see Psillos 2002, p.149 & p.281-283) 
which encapsulate other theoretical virtues like simplicity, mechanisms and coherence
with background beliefs. In some situations either or both of these can deliver belief 
over a scientific theory. Thus philosophers of psychiatry have been right to believe 
causes are a route to belief. They are wrong, however, to believe they are the sole 
route to belief. Unifications, whereby as few theories as possible cover as much 
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phenomena as possible as stringently as possible, are also routes to belief. Unifications
take seemingly otherwise dissimilar phenomena and show 
“connections, common patterns, in what initially appeared to be 
different situations... Science advances our understanding of nature by 
showing us how to derive descriptions of many phenomena, using the 
same patterns of derivation again and again, and, in demonstrating 
this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of types of facts we have to
accept as ultimate (or brute [unexplained])” (Kitcher 1989, p.432 
emphasis original).
By using theories to link together phenomena we reduce the number of unconnected 
facts, increasing “systemitization of our beliefs” (Kitcher 1989, p.476; also Psillos 
2002, p.11). Systemitization via unifications is increased by explaining as much as 
possible by as few theories as possible; theories significantly contributing to high 
systematisation merit belief (providing our attribution of the unification is 
epistemologically reliable, as discussed below). Additionally, sometimes unifications 
and causation often conflict with one another. This means focusing heavily on 
causation can actually reduce the strength of the theoretical virtues exhibited, thus 
reducing belief. I will support these claims by discussing various metaphysical 
positions. I suggest much discussion over belief in psychiatric classifications has 
adopted an implicit neo-Aristoleanism whereas the notion of belief I discuss is 
compatible with neo-Humeanism, neo-Kantianism and pragmatism. Also, I shall show
that modern scientific evidence does not usually support notions of psychiatric 
classifications as having strong, unique causes. I claim an unification approach fits 
much better with the nature of reality in the domain of psychiatry.
Existing approaches have also focused more on metaphysical questions rather 
than epistemic questions. I show the importance of epistemic questions, showing how 
inferences are only justified when made under conditions that generally produce 
reliable beliefs. Establishing this situation requires two things. Firstly, we must be sure
certain problems will not arise, via combating the three main anti-realist arguments 
(these are the pessimistic meta induction, underdetermination and (where weak 
background theories are involved) theory laden-nature of evidence). We also must be 
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sure certain conditions are present, namely epistemologically reliable ones. Typically, 
realists employ the no miracles argument as evidence that these conditions are present.
This argues that there are only two explanations of miracle like predictions, either the 
theory is true or a miracle has occurred. Since miracles are not allowed in philosophy, 
the theory must be true. Given the rarity of miracle like predictions in psychiatry the 
argument has little applicability in philosophy of psychiatry. Instead, I consider the 
specific conditions under which inferences in psychiatry are made and show they 
often carry relatively little epistemic risk. 
Philosophers disagree about the status of theoretical virtues, disagreeing over 
whether theoretical virtues are testable and, if so, whether they relate to the mind-
independent structure of the world. These issues relate to whether a neo-Humean, neo-
Kantian or pragmatist perspective is adopted; I remain neutral on this question and so 
my argument can fit all three perspectives. Rather, I merely argue we have good 
epistemological reasons to believe the theoretical virtues are present. Scientists can be 
mistaken about the presence of theoretical virtues. For example, they might believe a 
theory is simple only because they failed to gather evidence or disregarded evidence 
which a simple theory could not accommodate. This problem can be the case 
regardless of whether one takes a neo-Humean, neo-Kantian or pragmatist approach to
theoretical virtues (though this is not necessarily true of neo-Aristoleanism). Beyond 
providing alternative approaches to the currently popular implicit neo-Aristoleanism 
in philosophy of psychiatry I do not need establish the metaphysical status of 
theoretical virtues to provide argument that theoretical virtues are present rather than 
merely apparent. 
I argue modern autism merits belief because (we have good reason to believe) 
it strongly exhibits the theoretical virtue unification. The psychiatric classification 
autism substantially reduces the number of symptoms, and probabilistic relationships 
between symptoms, which would otherwise remain unconnected by modern 
psychiatry. Autism strongly exhibits the theoretical virtue unification because it 
unifies together so many symptoms which significantly probabilistically co-occur and 
does so through a single classification. It increases the systematisation of psychiatry 
by unifying many symptoms, and their probabilistic relationships, whilst only adding 
a single additional classification. Also, since theoretical virtues can conflict, 
modifying the classification to greater increase the strength of causes may greater 
27
decrease strength of unifications, resulting in a classification or classifications which 
are overall less theoretically virtuous. I do not, however, claim modern autism is the 
ultimate best possible unification. The highest truth is given by the theory with the 
best possible balance of theoretical virtues. Modern autism has approximate truth to 
the degree to which its unification is part of the best possible balance of theoretical 
virtues. By modern autism I mean both DSM-IV autism (an overarching classification 
plus specific subtypes like Asperger's syndrome and childhood disintegrative disorder)
and DSM-5 autism (a single classification without subtypes). Both DSM-IV and 
DSM-5 autism merit belief because both attain significant approximate truth through 
unifications; establishing which has higher approximate truth will require far more 
clinical and scientific studies of DSM-5 (only published in 2013). The DSM-IV and 
DSM-5 approaches respectively resemble two earlier approaches commonly employed
between the late 1940s to the late 1970s. Kanner's approach resembles DSM-IV and 
Bender's resembles DSM-5. Both these also merit belief, to an extent close to that 
merited by modern autism. I will suggest their approximate truth is slightly lower than
modern autism but more scientific evidence needs gathering to firmly establish this. 
None of this compromises belief over DSM-5 autism; assuming Kanner's approach, 
Bender's approach or DSM-IV autism has higher approximate truth than DSM-5 
autism then this just entails that DSM-5 has slightly lower approximate truth than a 
very similar alternative approach. 
To summarise, reality is a series of regularities and the probabilistic 
relationships between them. Scientific theories deserve greater belief the greater they 
exhibit theoretical virtues which maximise information about those regularities and 
their probabilistic relationships. We also need suitable epistemic conditions to reliably 
believe we have accurately detected those probabilistic relationships. I will apply 
these arguments to autism. I show autism strongly exhibits unifications, covering a 
wide range of symptoms in a stringent way. I will show we have good epistemological
reasons to believe autism is informative of those regularities. I also show it 
successfully avoids arguments which threaten epistemic doubt, specifically showing it 
avoids the pessimistic meta-induction, underdetermination and negative effect of 
theory laden nature of evidence. Reformulating autism on causes would increase the 
strength of the theoretical virtue causation but may, depending on the causes 
established, reduce the strength of the theoretical virtue unification by splitting autism 
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into numerous classification, potentially an epistemologically worse situation. Autism 
shows how a psychiatric classification can merit belief in the absence of causes.
0.7 Chapter summaries
Chapter one analyses the history of autism, from the mid-1930s to the late 1970s, to 
establish if sufficient historical continuity is present to avoid the pessimistic meta 
induction. From around the late 1940s clusters of symptoms are described which look 
highly recognisable from a modern perspective. These clustered in both less severe 
and more severe forms, the less severe form was associated with social deficits and 
the more severe was associated with low intellect. Many psychiatrists at the time also 
envisaged these as lying on a continuum, notions analogous to an autistic spectrum. 
The two most important figures, Kanner and Bender, employed classificatory 
approaches which respectively had great similarity to DSM-IV autism and DSM-V. 
This leaves the pessimistic meta induction largely inapplicable.
Chapter two covers the late 1970s to the mid-1980s and uses material from that
era to show that avoids the underdetermination argument. During this period DSM-III 
autism was formulated and implemented. This approach to autism is very different to 
notions employed before hand and very different to notions employed from DSM-III-
R onwards, potentially raising an underdetermination worry. Underdetermination 
requires two theories which are equally successful empirically and theoretically. 
Showing flaws in the development of DSM-III autism and showing its inadequacies as
a classification means it is not an instance of underdetermination. Additionally, I 
briefly describe why these historical changes do not entail the pessimistic meta 
induction.  
Chapter three addresses the theory-laden nature of evidence by comparing the 
symptoms and classifications employed under psychoanalytical and cognitive 
psychological accounts of autism. These are the two best candidates for a classic 
theory-laden account where changing theoretical views modify observations. I argue 
most symptoms of autism were described and quite similar approaches to the 
classification were employed by both psychoanalysts and cognitive psychologists. 
This means we lack reason to believe either the symptoms or the classification is 
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theory laden by either theory. In contrast, many causal claims are theory-laden by one 
of the theories, leaving those causal claims resting on potentially flawed theories.
Chapter four outlines an alternative metaphysical picture. Metaphysical 
accounts influence epistemic accounts. Some philosophers employ metaphysical 
accounts which emphasise causes and consequently demand epistemological 
arguments showing psychiatric classifications have high causal unity. Such 
epistemological arguments are largely inapplicable to most psychiatric classification. I
provide an alternative metaphysical picture of how things exist, taking regularities as 
real regardless of whether those regularities have high causal unity. By not demanding
high causal unity metaphysically there is also no requirement to demand it 
epistemologically. Consequently, psychiatric classifications can merit belief despite 
lacking a strong causal basis. I draw upon accounts of scientific laws whereby laws 
describe regularities without having to account for causes. Similarly, I portray 
psychiatric classifications as a form of scientific law, whereby abstract high level laws
guide assigning the regularities of less abstract lower level laws, each more detailed 
law sharpening descriptions of probabilistic relationships between symptoms. Note 
that I do not employ laws as exceptionless regularities true in all possible worlds. My 
alternative metaphysical picture of reality as regularities gives psychiatric 
classification the role of scientific laws and opens up new epistemic arguments.
Chapter fives highlights a previously unnoticed role that psychiatric 
classifications can play. Generally, it is believed psychiatric symptoms can be known 
independently of psychiatric classifications. Psychiatric classification group symptoms
but we can formulate symptoms without employing psychiatric classifications. I show 
this is not always the case, how identical behaviour can be formulated as different 
symptoms depending upon which classifications an individual has. Additionally, I 
argue this process strengthens psychiatric classifications inductively, thereby making 
psychiatric classifications stronger laws. It also makes attempts to circumnavigate 
psychiatric classifications by just focusing on symptoms problematic. 
Chapter six supplies the epistemological arguments which legitimate belief 
over autism. I suggest the current focus on causes is based in an implicit neo-
Aristotelianism, whereas my focus on regularities allows realism through neo-
Humeanism, neo-Kantian and pragmatism. I outline three steps to belief, firstly an 
inference to the best explanation, secondly, the inference to the best explanation being 
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made under reliable conditions and thirdly not exceeding a personal limit on epistemic
risk. The strength of unifications means autism passes the inference to the best 
explanation. Also, since unifications and causal knowledge can conflict, strengthening
causal knowledge may actually decrease the strength of unifications, meaning 
focusing on causes may leave a psychiatric classification no longer the best 
explanation. Inferences to the best explanation are justified when made under reliable 
conditions. The level of access psychiatrists have to autism, the scale of the inferences
involved and the level of idealisation present are much less than often occurs in other 
sciences. We can take the inference to the best explanation as reliable because it is 
made on safe grounds, involving good access and unproblematic inferential 
approaches. I outline a plausible, moderate stance on epistemic risk, one between an 
optimist and a pessimist, and argue autism does not exceed that level of epistemic risk.
This means autism merits belief. 
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1.0 Chapter 1 – Historical Continuities 
of Autism
1.1 Introduction
The pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) argues scientists historically believed in their 
theories, often on extremely good evidence, yet those theories turned out false. 
Inductively, this suggests modern theories will also turn out to be false. In this chapter 
I show autism has sufficient historical continuity to make the pessimistic meta 
induction inapplicable.
This chapter will need counter many recent histories of autism which argue for
conceptual discontinuity across the history of thinking about autism (Evans 2013, 
p.15; Eyal et al 2010, p.236; Jacobson 2010, p.442; Verheoff 2013, p.452). They 
correctly show that ideas of autism from the 1940s to the 1970s involved many 
concepts now abandoned, specifically causal and theoretical claims. Also, they have 
shown major changes to the socio-medical environment. None of this I challenge. 
Rather, I focus upon their account of changing clinical pictures (descriptions of 
symptoms and descriptions of how symptoms cluster). These authors argue that 
autism was re-conceptualised in the 1980s; DSM-III (1980) linked autism with mental
retardation and the DSM-III-R (1987) conceptualised high functioning autism as 
social impairment. Also, both low and high functioning autism came to be linked 
together by the idea of an autistic spectrum where autism varied in severity. Some 
historians argue these three concepts, still very central to notions of autism today, were
absent or far from central in thinking about autism from the 1940s to the 1970s. By 
contrast, I will argue autism as social impairment, autism coexisting with mental 
retardation and autism as varying massively in severity are concepts with deeper 
historical roots. I will show these three concepts were widely employed and very 
important from the early 1950s, at least two decades earlier than historians typically 
describe, and pre-dating many of the theoretical, classificatory and socio-economic 
changes of the late 1970s or early 1980s that historians often claim produced or 
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heavily influenced 1980s concepts of autism.
The chapter looks at two historical periods. Firstly, 1925 to 1943. I consider 
the classifications employed prior to autism being conceptualised in 1943 and 
highlight how autism filled a gap within the existing classificatory schemes. The 
introduction of autism made it possible to better diagnose some patients. Secondly, 
1943 to 1978. Here autism, alongside childhood schizophrenia, underwent 
development and from around the early 1950s both classifications have substantial 
continuities with modern autism. This period is especially important because many 
recent histories argue for discontinuity by comparing Leo Kanner's 1943 account of 
autism with modern autism. I argue these historians have overlooked important 
evidence when analysing Kanner. While historians correctly highlight substantial 
differences between Kanner's 1943 initial account of autism and modern autism, 
Kanner's account of autism changed and his 1943 paper is not representative of his 
later writings which are largely unexplored by recent histories of autism. These link 
autism with social impairment and mental retardation. Additionally, childhood 
schizophrenia was diagnosed far more than autism and provided clinical pictures 
remarkably similar to modern autism, something also largely unexplored by recent 
histories of autism. Finally, both autism and childhood schizophrenia were widely 
recognized as varying greatly in severity and some child psychiatrists explicitly 
conceptualised autism and childhood schizophrenia as lying on a spectrum. Thus 
many concepts typically considered to only become central in the 1980s were present 
and widely employed by Kanner and others during the 1950s to 1970s. This matters 
because the PMI requires there to be discontinuities in mature scientific theories. 
Though the classifications from the 1950s to late 1970s are not identical with modern 
autism, they have sufficient similarity to escape PMI.  
I start by outlining the pessimistic meta induction, conceptual continuity and 
discontinuity. I then take both historical phases in turn. I discuss how the PMI relates 
to each historical period. I then clarify PMI to show it is a limited threat. Finally, I 
consider the implications of Hacking's looping affect for a PMI over autism. 
1.2 Discontinuity and the Pessimistic Meta Induction
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1.2.1 Discontinuity and history of autism
Whilst historians have convincingly argued for discontinuity over many aspects of the 
history of autism I aim to show discontinuity arguments fail for three central concepts 
of autism in the 1980s.2 Autism as social disability, autism coexisting with mental 
retardation and autism varying greatly in severity are central to modern autism and all 
three have been recently targeted by historians making discontinuity arguments. In 
contrast, I argue all three were all present, widely employed and very important from 
the early 1950s. These were not revolutionary additions in the 1980s, rather, they were
present and very important from the 1950s and gained additional importance in the 
1980s through the subtractions of many now abandoned notions. Additionally, 1950s 
to 1970s childhood schizophrenia – which was closely associated with autism – 
covered a significantly broader clinical picture than modern autism but within that 
diversity often occurred clinical pictures very similar to modern low and high 
functioning autism. Naive continuity over all aspects of autism adopted by many 
scientific textbooks is certainly untenable. Nonetheless, the importance of those three 
concepts from the early 1950s means they are not discontinuous with earlier decades 
in spite of the other changes which occurred in the 1980s. 
Historians often employ discontinuity accounts to question current approaches 
to autism. Verheoff takes discontinuity accounts as showing “the historicity, 
proportionality and plurality of knowledge and truth about autism... [acknowledging 
this] creates space for other possible perspectives and conceptualizations of autism in 
the present and future” (2013, p.455). This approach also seems present, if stated less 
directly, in the other recent histories of autism, specifically Evans (2013, p.24), 
Jacobsen (2010, p.447) and Eyal et al (2010, p.263). This is especially relevant if 
current concepts were (consciously or unconsciously) chosen due to changes in wider 
theoretical, classificatory or socio-economic trends rather than firm evidence. This 
scenario is argued for by many recent histories of autism (Evans 2013, p.15; Eyal et al
2010, p.236; Jacobson 2010, p.442; Nadesan 2005, p.184; Verheoff 2013, p.452). 
2 See Hollin (2014) for development of cognitive psychological theories, Raz (2014) for influence of 
notions of sensory deprivations; Evans (2013) for changing notions about abnormal thinking; 
Verheoff (2013) for changing views on perceptual and cognitive differences; see Verhoeff (2014), 
Silverman (2012), Jacobson (2010), Evans (2013) Feinstein (2010), Gil el at (2010), Nadesan 
(2005) for both changing views on causal factors and for wider changes to the socio-cultural-
political medical setting.
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Social constructivists have made such arguments about psychiatric classifications 
more generally (Bentall 2004, p.39; Boyle 1990, p.169). Whilst such discontinuity 
arguments are certainly applicable to many concepts of autism, my history shows that 
such discontinuity arguments are much harder to apply to the three central concepts I 
focus upon. This is not to suggest wider theoretical, classificatory or socio-economic 
trends have not been influential, only that the influence has not prevented continuity 
occurring over some parts of autism. If changes to, for example, theoretical beliefs 
over what causes autism or changes to funding of diagnostic services did not result in 
changes to symptoms descriptions then those changes would not be relevant for 
historical continuity over symptoms. 
1.2.2 Pessimistic Meta Induction
Let’s consider this philosophically. Laudan writes that 
“what the history of science offers us is a plethora of theories which 
were both successful and (so far as we can judge) non-referential with 
respect to many of their central explanatory concepts” (1981, p.33).  
He provides many examples, including the crystalline spheres, phlogiston, caloric 
theory of heat, electromagnetic aether and optical aether. There exist many instances 
where scientists believed in extremely successful theories yet those theories turned out
wrong, suggesting inductively successful theories we believe in will also turn out false
(a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI)), therefore modern theories do not merit belief.
There are some common responses to PMI. Firstly, deny it works inductively 
by reducing the inductive base. Laudan says his infamous list of false theories “could 
be extended ad nauseam” (Laudan 1981, p.33 emphasis original) whereas Psillos 
claims “theoretical discontinuities in theory-change were neither as widespread nor as 
radical as Laudan has suggested” (Psillos 1999, p.103). If few theories were mistaken 
historically then the induction fails. Unfortunately, the ratio between historically false 
theories and existing successful theories is unknown, leaving the size of the inductive 
basis unknown (Magnus & Callendar 2004, p.331). PMI remains an active threat 
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which cannot be countered by simply denying it has a strong inductive base. More 
promising is limiting the inductive base by demanding only mature scientific theories 
count, accepting scientists make errors as they develop theories (Psillos 1999, p.105). 
Secondly, we can move from considering the inductive base of science to considering 
the history of specific theories, no longer wielding PMI as applying to all science. 
Scientists often produce theories with a limited life span but some theories have 
extended well beyond that life span without refutation whereas others are yet to reach 
the life span. If an individual theory has a long history which shows large historical 
continuity then PMI fails over that theory. Additionally, we can look at individual 
theories and establish which aspects account for phenomena and which are idle 
theoretical baggage. If we limit belief only to parts playing an important role and if 
only the idle theoretical baggage were mistaken historically then PMI fails (Psillos 
1999, p.109). One might only defend a specific type of claim, such as only defending 
scientific laws or causal claims. 
We need consider the history of autism to establish its level of historical 
continuity. We will only need historical continuity once a theory has become mature. 
Additionally, we only defend the symptoms and classification of autism but do not 
defend causal claims. Discussed in more detail in later chapters, there have been many
different causal claims associated with autism over the decades and they have a 
tendency of being replaced. This makes defending causal claims over autism against 
PMI difficult. I specifically address this point in section 6.5.2.4. For the purposes of 
this chapter there is no need to establish belief or doubt over causal claims to establish
historical continuity or discontinuity over symptoms.
A distinction needs making between two types of historical continuity. Firstly, 
there is continuity of clinical pictures. This is where the descriptions assigned to 
individual autistic people were very similar both historically and today. This means 
similar symptoms and similar clustering of symptoms. As I show, this is largely 
defensible for both autism and childhood schizophrenia. Secondly, continuity of the 
classifications itself. This is where the classification has not changed over time. 
However, historically there was childhood schizophrenia and its numerous subtypes 
(including autism) whereas today there is an autistic spectrum. The diagnosis has 
undergone changes. Since we require belief in the psychiatric classification autism, 
rather than the symptom patterns, this could be problematic. I describe why this is not 
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problematic at the end of this chapter and then more fully in chapter six. Briefly, PMI 
is only applicable when previous scientists were mistaken. PMI is not applicable 
simply because a theory undergoes modifications. I will show the classifications I 
discuss were, from the late 1940s onwards, not mistaken. They exhibit the theoretical 
virtue of unification, the same standards which delivers belief over autism in later 
chapters.
1.3 1925 to 1943
1.3.1 Leo Kanner
Leo Kanner was born in 1896 in what was Austria (currently Ukraine), studied and 
practised medicine in Berlin before emigrating to America in 1924. In 1930 Leo 
Kanner founded the first child psychiatry centre in America. In 1935 he published 
Child Psychiatry, the first English language textbook on child psychiatry. This 
textbook “formed the foundation on which child and adolescent psychiatry was based,
not only in the United States but worldwide” (Neumärker 2003, p.216) and would be 
republished in later editions in 1948, 1957 and 1972. He is generally credited with 
providing the first English language description of autism. He also founded and 
became the editor of the Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia in 1971, the 
only journal devoted specifically to both disorders. To describe Kanner as being 
hugely important to the history of autism would be an understatement. 
1.3.2 Kanner’s autism and discontinuity
In 1943 Kanner published what is typically considered the first description of autism. 
The bulk of the paper described eleven case studies. Kanner suggested these children 
would better fit a new classification rather than the classifications of mental 
retardation or childhood schizophrenia which most these children had previously been
diagnosed with (Kanner 1943, p.247-248). Kanner outlined what he called infantile 
autism, “an extreme autistic aloneness, that, whenever possible, disregards, ignores, 
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shuts out anything that comes to the child from the outside” (Kanner 1943, p.242, 
emphasis original). Kanner described intelligent children who actively shun human 
contact and strongly dislike intrusion into their own world. This is a considerably 
more severe clinical picture than that typical of modern high functioning children, 
who mainly struggle with social information, often avoiding social situations but 
rarely avoid all possible human contact and outside interference. Additionally, Kanner 
believed autistic children have normal intelligence (Kanner 1943, p.247), their 
aloneness and desire for sameness is not due to low intelligence unlike modern low 
functioning children. Although Kanner's 1943 paper does not provide strict diagnostic 
criteria, these two symptoms of aloneness and desire for sameness featured heavily 
and he would later consider them essential to receive a diagnosis of autism (Kanner & 
Eisenberg 1955, p.227). Discontinuity arguments typically refer to these symptoms or 
normal intelligence when discussing Kanner.
1.3.3 The addition of autism to the diagnostic field
Autism and childhood schizophrenia were first conceptualised in the 1930s and 1940s,
soon after the establishment of child psychiatry. Prior to the 1920s there was no 
separate child psychiatry (Kanner 1959, p.582) with children diagnosed instead 
according to adult classifications (Bradley 1941, p.19). A major development within 
the growing field of child psychiatry was the hugely influential first English language 
textbook, Leo Kanner’s Child Psychiatry in 1935. This pre-dated the concept of 
autism and the section on childhood schizophrenia only discusses adult symptoms 
(Kanner 1935, p.484-492) and has no symptoms specific to children. Kanner notes 
children with onset of schizophrenia prior to ten years show much greater variation in 
symptoms than those with onset before ten years (Kanner 1935, p.484). However, 
since no symptoms are given for this variation a description of how these younger 
schizophrenic children differ from adult schizophrenia is lacking.
Whilst Kanner was writing his textbook a new notion of childhood 
schizophrenia with symptoms different to adult symptoms was being developed. 
Whilst absent from Kanner’s 1935 textbook, Kanner later identified Potter (1933) as 
the first to formulate a new notion of childhood schizophrenia that soon became a 
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major theory in child psychiatry (Kanner 1971a, p.17). Within a decade the first major
literature review of childhood schizophrenia was published, Bradley’s hugely 
influential Childhood Schizophrenia (Bradley 1941). This classificatory situation was 
what Kanner worked among when he introduced the new classification of autism in 
1943 (see Fellowes 2015, p.2275; Kanner 1965, p.419 and Kanner 1973a, p.94 for 
details). Let’s consider the main relevant classifications used at that time in more 
detail and then what autism added.
Childhood schizophrenia covered communication, emotional and thought 
disorders and had a wide range of symptoms. In this regard it was quite similar to 
modern autism. However, childhood schizophrenia in this period had a specific course
(Bradley 1941, p.84) that would largely exclude autistic children. Schizophrenic 
children were born normal then declined, an onset which excludes any child with 
symptoms present from birth from being diagnosed childhood schizophrenic. Kanner 
says autistic children have symptoms from birth, claiming “schizophrenic children 
emphasize a more or less gradual change in the patients' behaviour. The [autistic] 
children of our group have all shown their extreme aloneness from the very beginning 
of life” (Kanner 1943, p.48). Present from birth demarcated autism from childhood 
schizophrenia.
The main alternative diagnosis for individuals who were impaired to levels 
equivalent to childhood schizophrenia was mental retardation. The main symptom for 
mental retardation was low intelligence (Kanner 1935, p.58), which would exclude 
Kanner's notion of autism but not modern notions of autism. Kanner demarcates 
autism from mental retardation on intelligence, writing that “though most of these 
[autistic] children were at one time or another looked upon as feebleminded, they are 
all unquestionably endowed with good cognitive potentialities” (Kanner 1943, p.47). 
Requirements of low intelligence should have excluded Kanner's autistic children 
from a diagnosis of mental retardation. 
Speech disorders would have fit the communication difficulties of autism and 
unlike the other disorders listed above nothing in speech disorders should have 
prevented diagnosis. However, speech disorders would have only covered one of the 
myriad symptoms of autism. 
The classifications of pre-1943 psychiatry had enough constraints and 
restrictions to leave considerable room for the new classification of autism to slot into.
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The biggest factor to determine between the two most common diagnoses, childhood 
schizophrenia and mental retardation, was time of onset. Symptoms present from birth
meant the child was intellectually disabled. If symptoms occurred with a decline after 
a period of normality then the child had childhood schizophrenia. Bradley recognised 
that onset of illness played this role. Schizophrenic children sometimes declined to 
intellectual levels comparable with mental retardation (Bradley 1943, p.54-55) whilst 
mental retardation often had some symptoms similar to childhood schizophrenia 
(Bradley 1943, p.94), therefore onset of illness is key to differentiating mental 
retardation and childhood schizophrenia (Bradley 1943, p.81). Since Kanner described
autism as present from birth, the age of onset of autistic children should have 
diagnosed them as mentally retarded and excluded them from childhood 
schizophrenia. However, low intelligence was required for mental retardation whereas
Kanner believed autistic children had normal or above average intelligence, excluding 
them also from mental retardation (I later argue some autistic children were mentally 
retarded but not all were). Therefore, pre-1943 psychiatry lacked categories for 
children with symptoms present from birth yet had normal or superior intelligence. 
Some single symptom disorders like speech disorder were compatible with symptoms 
present from birth and normal intelligence. However, single symptom disorders would
be wholly inadequate to describe the myriad of difficulties afflicting Kanner's 
children.
Autism filled this gap, showing a new set of statistical relationships between 
symptoms. Now classifications existed that could diagnose those individuals not 
fitting any other category. Without making claims about epistemic status, we can see 
the formulation of autism is not arbitrary in any obvious sense. There was a gap within
the diagnostic system which patients fitted, thus legitimizing creating a new 
classification. 
1.3.4 Kanner and Bleuler
Many scholars interpret Kanner's 1943 autism paper in light of Bleuler's earlier notion 
of autism. Verheoff writes, “if we want to retrieve the specific meaning of this new 
disorder [Kanner's autism], it might be better to start with the well-known Swiss 
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psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler” (2013 p.446; also Eyal et al, 2010, p.213; Feinstein, 2010,
p.26; Jacobsen, 2010, p.437; Nadesan, 2005, p.11; Silverman, 2012, p.33). Bleuler's 
early 1900s pioneering work on schizophrenia outlined the concept of autism as a 
primary symptom of schizophrenia.
“The most severe schizophrenics, who have no more contact with 
the outside world, live in a world of their own. They have encased 
themselves with their desires and wishes (which they considered 
fulfilled) or occupy themselves with the trials and tribulations of 
their persecutory ideas; they have cut themselves off as much as 
possible from any contact with the external world. This detachment 
from reality, together with the relative and absolute predominance of
Verheoff claims there is “a fundamental aloofness that relates the two [Kanner's and 
Bleuler's] autisms” (Verheoff 2013, p.447) and many historians see Bleuler's emphasis
on withdrawal as influencing Kanner's concept of autism.
This interpretation has limitations. Kanner explicitly links autism with Bleuler 
in two papers (1965; 1973a). Kanner says his autism “does not seem to fit in with 
Bleuler's criteria for autism” (Kanner 1973a, p.95). There are similarities since autistic
children “start out in a state which, in a way, resembles the end results of later-life 
withdrawal [of Bleuler's autism]” (1973a, p.95) but exactly what 'in a way' covers is 
left unstated beyond both autisms having a “remoteness” (Kanner 1973a, p.95). 
Historians linking Bleuler with Kanner need a clearer picture of which aspects of 
Bleuler's autism Kanner had in mind. Parnas writes that Bleuler
“described a rich variety of clinical manifestations under the heading of
autism: poor ability to enter into contact with others, withdrawal and/or
inaccessibility, negativistic tendencies, indifference, rigid attitudes and 
behaviours, private hierarchy of values and goals, inappropriate 
expression and behaviour, idiosyncratic logic and thinking, and a 
propensity to delusion formation” (Parnas 2011, p.1122).
Kanner never stated which of these symptoms remoteness covers, meaning 
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establishing exactly which aspects Kanner had in mind will require a careful analysis. 
The case studies I describe below suggest that by the 1950s, Kanner linked autism to 
few of those clinical manifestations. Kanner said the “designation “early infantile 
autism” was suggested by... self-centered and, at least in the beginning, often 
impenetrable aloneness” (Kanner & Lesser 1958, p.711). Of the symptoms Parnas 
assigns to Bleuler's autism this plausibly covers poor ability to enter into contact with 
others, withdrawal and/or inaccessibility and, more speculatively, private hierarchy of 
values and goals. Kanner chose the name autism to convey only parts of Bleuler's 
autism.
Kanner may not have outlined the exact relationship between his autism and 
Bleuler's autism because Kanner was probably unsure himself and ultimately did not 
consider the question particularly important. Kanner's methodology involves a 
cautious approach to theoretical questions. His preface to Despert's collected papers 
on childhood schizophrenia highlights this.
“What impresses one more than anything else is the persistent emphasis
on factual data, on the absence of dogmatism, on a truly scientific study
of perceived phenomena and their correlations... She does not claim to 
know all the answers” (Kanner in Despert 1968, p.v). 
He described many theories employed in child psychiatry as 
“huge hypothetical skyscrapers... evaluated one-sidedly and not too 
critically... [Kanner recommends] a pluralistic inclusion and evaluation 
of all the factors involved will keep his [the child psychiatrist's] vision 
unrestrained by theoretical blinders.” (Kanner 1935, p.191). 
Kanner probably associated autism with Bleuler's theories but this does not entail that 
he placed any substantial importance on that association or that he held it with much 
confidence.
I suggest Bleuler's autism is less central to Kanner's account than some 
historians have portrayed. Kanner wrote too little on the topic for historians to reach 
firm conclusions. What little he did write suggests he only associated autism with 
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parts of Bleuler's autism and he held that association with great uncertainty. Some 
historians only link Kanner with Bleuler in passing but Verheoff relies heavily on 
interpreting Kanner in light of Bleuler when arguing Kanner's autism is radically 
different to modern autism. Historians are likely correct to suggest Bleuler's notion of 
autism influenced Kanner's notions but this should not be overemphasised. 
Treating Kanner's 1943 autism as only tentatively and partially related to 
Bleuler's autism makes it easier to accept that Kanner would describe notions of 
autism even less similar to Bleuler's autism from the 1950s onwards. 
1.4 1943 to 1978
1.4.1 Kanner's changing notion of autism
Kanner's autism has undergone radical changes in symptomatology but I argue these 
changes were well underway by the early 1950s, much earlier than the various dates 
given by many other historians of autism. Also, historians typically see the radical 
changes to symptomatology occurring after autism was a major diagnostic category. 
However, “early infantile autism did not enter the public arena until about 1950” 
(Kanner 1973b, p.207) and little was published on autism until 1949 (Eisenberg 1957, 
p.72). The major changes were occurring whilst autism was still in early stages of 
scientific development and occurred as it started being widely employed. This matters 
because the alterations to Kanner’s theory occurred while autism was still under 
development, making these changes of little epistemic significance with respect to 
PMI.
Verheoff argues “Kanner's first description of autism as a diagnostic entity, 
characterized by extreme emotional withdrawal and tenacious insistence on sameness,
remained largely unchallenged for approximately the first two decades after its 
introduction” (2013, p.449). Eyal et al and Jacobsen also mention no changes to 
symptomatology Kanner assigns to autism. However, the clinical picture described by 
Kanner in 1943 was not fully born out in the 1950s. By 1956 Kanner noted autistic 
children diverge around age five, producing clinical pictures with great similarities to 
modern high and low functioning autism. “On clinical grounds, it is now useful to 
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differentiate between the [autistic] children who have learned to speak by the age of 
five and those who have no useful language function by that age” (Kanner & 
Eisenberg 1956, p.559). Half the children who can speak “have made some sort of 
scholastic adjustment and participate in a limited way in the social life of the 
community” (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956, p.559) whereas those without language 
typically end up in institutions and are “functionally severely retarded” (Kanner & 
Eisenberg 1956, p.559). The importance of speech developing was noted by other 
child psychiatrists (Alderton 1966, p.280; Bender 1959a, p.85; Eveloff 1960, p.103; 
Fish & Shapiro 1965, p.42; Havelkova 1968, p.853; Ornitz & Ritvo 1968, p.84; 
Rimland 1971, p.163). I will now describe this change, arguing that Kanner from the 
1950s onwards primarily, though not exclusively, described socially impaired autistic 
people who do not actively shun all human contact and non-verbal autistic people with
limited intellect. Both of these largely make up modern  autism, highlighting the large 
overlaps between 1950s to 1970s autism and modern autism. Doing so shows that 
whilst Kanner's 1943 autism is discontinuous with modern autism his account from 
the early 1950s onwards is much less so.
1.4.2 Autism as social impairment
Lorna Wing's notions of Asperger's syndrome was popularised in the mid-1980s and 
soon most autistic people were considered high functioning, their condition primarily 
conceptualised as a disorder of social understanding. The majority of autistic 
symptoms fit within Wing's triad of impairment, covering social communication, 
social interaction and social imagination (Wing 2005, p.198). From around the 1990s, 
the stereotypical person with autism is an odd individual with low social skills, 
obsessively interested in socially abnormal topics like trains. Historians deny the 
importance of social deficits in descriptions prior to the 1980s. Verheoff writes, 
“what is considered essential in autism has gone through major 
changes, from profound affective withdrawal and aloofness [in the 




“studies [in the 1980s] increasingly regarded autism as a problem of 
'social' interaction, rather than a problem of emotional relationships 
with others. The 'autism' employed in these studies was not... Kanner's 
'autistic disturbance of affective contact'” (2013, p.21). 
Eyal et al write “the aloofness and flat affect noted by Kanner were possible but no 
longer necessary components [of 1980s autism]” (2010, p.207), and “Autism in the 
DSM-III-R was no longer the same thing as what Kanner saw and described” (2010, 
p209). Although they provide much less detail, similar concerns are raised by 
Silverman (2012, p.130) and Feinstein (2011, p.265). I will now show that social 
deficiencies were present and very important to Kanner's autism from the early 1950s.
Kanner's clinical picture from the 1950s involved many children who did not 
actively shun all human contact.
“The major pathology remains in the area of inability to relate in the 
ordinary fashion to other human beings. Even the relatively 
“successful” children exhibited a lack of social perceptiveness, perhaps 
best characterized as a lack of savoir faire” (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956, 
p.558-559).
The major aspect of autism is here described as an inability to relate ordinarily, 
something quite different to actively shunning all human contact. Additionally, in 
sharp contrast to how many historians describe Kanner's account, this inability to 
relate is best characterised by social imperceptiveness. Unfortunately, it is unclear 
who exactly Kanner's quote refers to. Is the inability to relate normally best 
characterised as impaired social perception for all autistic people or just those who are
relatively successful? If the former then Kanner's 1950s autism was primarily 
conceptualised as weak social perceptiveness, if the latter then at a minimum the 
relatively successful were conceptualised as primarily socially impaired. Eisenberg, 
who was Kanner's long-time collaborator, takes the former interpretation, writing that 
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“the primary psychopathologic mechanism in infantile autism might be described as a 
disturbance in social perception” (Eisenberg 1956, p.23). Kanner and Eisenberg had 
close ties, co-authoring papers on autism in both 1955 and 1956 and Eisenberg's 1956 
paper containing that quote was actually a follow-up study of the children in Kanner's 
1943 paper.3 This increases the likelihood that Kanner considered all autistic people as
primarily characterised by impaired social perceptiveness, rather than just the 
successful ones. Unfortunately, Kanner never made a clearer statement on this, 
probably because demarcating symptoms as either primary or secondary was too 
theoretical for his tastes. By 1956 Kanner's 1943 picture of autism as purposeful 
isolation from human contact had already undergone a substantial shift towards a 
disorder of social impairment for some, perhaps all, autistic people.
Exactly how comparable Kanner's and Wing's 'social' are is not clear: Kanner 
only highlights social imperceptiveness through case studies whereas Wing 
conceptualises a triad of impairment covering social communication, social interaction
and social imagination (Wing 2005, p.198). Best characterised as social 
imperceptiveness seems less pervading than Wing conceptualising  most symptoms as 
stemming from abnormal social understanding but social imperceptiveness is clearly 
very important to Kanner.
Setting aside debates over the relationship between Kanner's and Wing's 
'social', the clinical picture of these successful autistic individuals looks quite similar 
to modern stereotypes of high functioning autism. “They relate well to books and 
blackboards but have few, if any, real friends, and have retained some of the earlier 
obsessive-compulsive qualities” (Kanner & Eisenberg 1955, p.236). They are 
“isolated, strange persons... and still maintain a somewhat tenuous contact with 
reality” (Kanner & Lesser 1958, p.727). Academic, few friends, obsessive, strange, 
this bares obvious parallels with high functioning autism. The case studies in Kanner's
1950s and later publications show children, adolescents and adults trying to engage in 
the social world, if often making social failures today stereotypically associated with 
high functioning autism.
3 In 1953 Eisenberg “took two years of Fellowship in Child Psychiatry with Dr. Leo Kanner at the 
Johns Hopkins Hospital, where he has [since then] remained on the faculty... Within five years he 
became Psychiatrist-in-Charge of the Children's Psychiatric Service, on Dr. Kanner's retirement” 
(Lourie 1962, p.757). Also, Eisenberg's views are highly significant in their own right, he became 
the editor of the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry in 1962, perhaps the major journal in child 
psychiatry during this era.
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“Attending a football rally of his junior college and called upon to 
speak, he shocked the assembly by stating that he thought the team was
likely to lose – a prediction that was correct but unthinkable in the 
setting. The ensuing round of booing dismayed this young man who 
was totally unable to comprehend why the truth should be so 
unwelcome” (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956 p.559). 
A nineteen year old woman 
“took part in routine activities, though she made few, if any, real 
friendships. She is a serious, rather literal-minded young woman who 
augurs to do reasonably well in an occupation in which no demand is 
made on give-and-take relationship with other people” (Kanner & 
Lesser 1958, p.713).
Another shows literal interpretation and severe social misjudgement. 
“Having been told that 20 minutes were the usual time for 
breastfeeding, she [a nurse] entered the room at the exact moment and 
took the babies away without saying a word; there were many 
complaints from the mothers” (Kanner 1973b, p.194).
Another “obsessively tried to make social contacts [but largely failed]... as a hobby, 
collects time tables to maintain his interests in trains” (Kanner 1973b, p.198). Eyal et 
al deny such higher functioning individuals were described prior to the 1980s, giving 
the example of how autistic adult Temple Grandin 
“approximated the prototype of Kanner's infantile autism enough to 
become associated with the label, but she grew into something that was 
previously unthinkable to many people, an independent living, self-
reflexive, highly articulate if idiosyncratic autistic adult” (Eyal et al 
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2010, p.228).4
Such higher functioning individuals were clearly not unthinkable to Kanner. 
Exactly when Kanner modified his notion of autism is difficult to judge. From 
1947 to 1954 Kanner published four papers specifically on autism. Only one of these 
contained case studies, focusing solely on clinical accounts of desire for sameness 
(Kanner 1951). This leaves a large window where we lack general case studies. His 
most concrete statement can be found in a lengthy case study by Darr & Warden in 
1951. They described an adult who they believed was autistic. She had an active social
life, she was not withdrawn, but she “never developed any intuitive social sense and 
made repeated faux pas” (Darr & Warden 1951 p.564, emphasis original), the paper 
mentioning various social failures. Kanner, in the comments section of their paper, 
agrees she is autistic. Kanner would later reference this autistic adult as an example of 
social imperceptiveness (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956, p.559). By 1951 Kanner is 
associating autism with someone who is not withdrawn and is described as lacking 
social intuition but he believes such cases are in the minority. He writes that of the 80 
autistic children he has encountered, the
“majority of autistic children have settled in their withdrawal to the 
extent that no emergence seemed possible. Some few who were 
followed therapeutically were able to make sufficient compromise with 
reality to attend school and relate themselves well to blackboard and 
books, to convert functionally useless obsessiveness to socially more 
acceptable routine activities, and to have a degree of more or less 
mechanized contact with people” (Kanner in Darr & Warden 1951, 
p.570).
Here the majority of autistic children are withdrawn, presumably in his 1943 sense, 
but a few have taken a different course. By the mid 1950's Kanner is describing half of
all children who develop language as having taken that alternative course, these 
children being able to “participate in a limited way in the social life of the 
community” (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956, p.559). Kanner sees all autistic children as 
4 Temple Grandin is an individual with autism who has written books about her experiences.
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withdrawn in 1943, by 1951 a majority are withdrawn but a few are not, whereas by 
1956 a third of all autistic people are engaging socially and are not withdrawn in his 
1943 sense.
From the 1950s onwards Kanner wrote little about those children who develop 
language but do not engage socially. 
“Most of them, even at low ebb to which they have receded, still show 
remnants which distinguish them from the demented or pseudo-
demented level of the mute autistic children... They have given up 
much of their earlier ritualism, and the typical features of autism shown
in their childhood are much less in evidence” (Kanner & Eisenberg 
This suggests they are not as severely impaired as non-verbal autistic people but 
unfortunately Kanner offers little more information. Kanner & Eisenberg have far 
fewer case studies on these children compared with autistic people who engage 
socially. There is certainly a possibility that these autistic people have a symptom 
profile rarely or even never described in modern autism (thus suggesting a 
discontinuity), but with such little written about this manifestation of autism 
conclusions are difficult to draw.
1.4.3 Autism and low intellect
I now discuss those autistic children who did not develop language.5 Kanner's 1943 
paper claimed “though most of these children [his case studies] were at one time or 
another looked upon as feebleminded, they are all unquestionably endowed with good 
cognitive potentialities” (Kanner 1943, p.247, emphasis original). Jacobsen takes this 
as evidence that Kanner saw children almost never now described, what he calls “high
functioning isolates” (Jacobsen 2010, p.442) in the sense of Temple Grandin and 
Donna Williams.6 This is highly impaired but intelligent people, whereas modern 
autism sees highly impaired autistic people as having severe intellectual limitations 
5 Not developing language means being unable to communicate meaningfully rather than complete 
absence of speech (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956, p.4).
6 Donna Williams is an individual with autism who has written books about her experiences.
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(Jacobsen 2010, p.439).7 Jacobsen applies this to all children Kanner diagnosed and 
therefore the non-verbal autistic people discussed here. Jacobsen specifically denies 
these children were intellectually retarded (Jacobsen 2010, p.444). However, Kanner's 
1940s claims about the non-verbal are more moderate than Jacobsen believes and 
became even more so after the mid-1950s.
Kanner says non-verbal children are typically institutionalised and resemble 
mentally retarded children but are distinguishable by “residual oases of planned 
mental activity” (Kanner 1949, p.417) and “the preservation of isolated areas of 
unusual intellectual functioning” (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956, p.559). His earlier 
claims of “good intelligence” (Kanner 1943, p.247) for non-verbal children are not 
repeated. Jacobsen seems to take good cognitive potentialities to mean they had an 
underlying, largely untestable intelligence, denying they were retarded (Jacobsen 
2010, p.444). I argue Kanner's account of non-autistic feebleminded people suggests 
an alternative interpretation, applicable to the late 1940s onwards. Kanner believed 
some feebleminded people cannot develop intelligence whereas the pseudo-
feebleminded are prevented from developing intelligence by environmental factors 
(Kanner 1948a, p.374), typically a lack of educational support. Autistic children with 
their good cognitive potentialities would seemingly fall into this latter category. 
Pseudo-feeblemindedness is treated by removing “those handicaps which have 
prevented existing potentialities from coming to full fruition” (Kanner 1948a, p.393). 
Unfortunately, treatment of autistic people had been, in Kanner's views, remarkably 
unsuccessful (Kanner in Darr & Warden 1951, p.370). This suggests they do not 
develop normal intelligence. Although autistic children are born with good cognitive 
potentialities, their withdrawal renders education near impossible. Consequently, 
rather than developing normally across all areas of intellect, their limited contact with 
the world results in isolated areas of intellect. Eisenberg's position supports my 
interpretation. He writes that autistic children “must undergo irreversible intellectual 
deterioration when opportunities for growth are [severely] barred by the exclusion of 
normal experience” (1956, p.21). I suggest Kanner's claims about intellect are quite 
different to Jacobsen's picture of high functioning isolates who cannot communicate 
their underlying intelligence. 
Although Kanner does not believe these children have normal intellect, his 
7 Note that Jacobsen and Eyal et al characterise Temple Grandin in quite different ways.
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claims about good cognitive potentialities is still quite different to the presumed 
unalterable brain damage of modern low functioning autism. However, Kanner's 
views change from the mid-1950s onwards. Whereas in 1943 he claimed that all 
autistic children have normal intelligence, in the 1950s Kanner admits that his 
assessment that non-verbal autistic children have good cognitive potential is made 
“with less confidence” (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956, p.557) than his judgement with 
regard to verbal children and that only “a number... are still distinguishable from their 
fellow [feebleminded] patients” (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956, p.559). None of Kanner's 
papers on autism after the 1950s actually claim non-verbal children have good 
cognitive potentialities, merely maintaining autism and mental retardation are distinct 
(Kanner 1965, p.413; Kanner, 1968, p.140). Kanner admitted to substantial overlap of 
symptoms between mental deficiency and autism (Kanner 1969, p.6) and admitted 
there was often uncertainty over which classification applied, writing that “[m]oderate
or severe mental retardation poses more of a problem in differential diagnosis” 
(Kanner & Lesser 1958, p.728; also Kanner 1969, p.6). His 1971 follow-up study of 
his 1943 cohort has five adults who are non-verbal. One is currently functioning fairly
well, doing chores. The others he described in 1943 as having good intelligence 
whereas now he notes that those capable of performing IQ tests score extremely low 
(Kanner 1971b, p.143) and he omits any claims about isolated intellectual functioning.
He never provided a clear statement about the intellectual level of non-verbal autistic 
people after 1956 but certainly became much less optimistic about intelligence in the 
decades following 1943.
Kanner's picture of mental retardation was quite compatible with modern 
notions of low functioning autism.
“Because some autistic-like symptoms are found in innately retarded 
and in brain-injured children, the differential diagnosis, which 
admittedly does on occasions present difficulties, must depend on clear 
evidence of the essential features of extreme aloneness and the desire 
for the maintenance of sameness” (Kanner 1958, p.110). 
Kanner is using the primary symptoms of autism, rather than IQ, to demarcate autism 
from mental retardation. In Kanner's views they are not autistic because they lack the 
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primary symptoms but they can show other symptoms of autism such as 
obsessiveness, echolalia, skilled manipulation of objects etc. This is similar to modern
low functioning autism where low intellect coexists with other autistic symptoms 
without requiring aloneness or maintenance of the same to be present. 
Other child psychiatrists emphasised the difficulty of distinguishing between 
autism without language from mental deficiency (Eveloff 1960, p.92; O'Gorman 1954,
p.943). Some doubted if non-verbal autistic children were actually intelligent (Bender 
1959a, p.82; Cappon 1953 p.47; Hingtgen & Bryson 1972, p.16; Ornitz & Ritvo 1968,
p.84). The notion that autism can be present with low intelligence is present in 1950s 
to 1970s child psychiatry.
1.4.4 Kanner on other classifications
I have previously described how Kanner required aloneness and desire for sameness 
for a diagnosis of autism. Some historians correctly claim these diagnostic criteria are 
much narrower than modern autism (Eyal et al 2010, p.207; Feinstein 2010, p.265; 
Silverman 2012, p.130; Verheoff 2013, p.454), Kanner requiring both aloneness and 
desire for sameness to be apparent before the age of two (1949, p.419). I have already 
argued that most autistic people Kanner diagnosed using those narrow diagnostic 
criteria would grow into adolescents and adults who look remarkably like modern 
high and low functioning autism. Nonetheless, given how few children would have 
been eligible for Kanner's autism compared with the more relaxed diagnostic criteria 
of the 1987 DSM-III-R a substantial discontinuity would still have taken place unless 
there was another related classification which was not as restrictive as Kanner's autism
and could also produce similar clinical pictures to autism. This was the case with 
childhood schizophrenia and some of its subclassifications, which described clinical 
pictures resembling modern autism whilst lacking Kanner's strict diagnostic criteria.
Even though childhood schizophrenia was diagnosed far more than autism 
(Eyal et al 2010, p.128; Silverman 2012, p.39-40), historians typically focus more on 
autism. Verhoeff (2013) and Jacobson (2010) make almost no mention of childhood 
schizophrenia, making their discontinuity claims highly limited in scope. Kanner's 
views on the relationship between autism and other classifications are complex and 
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sometimes misrepresented. Kanner often strongly objected to other child psychiatrists 
modifying the diagnostic criteria of autism (1965, p.413), preferring to keep the 
diagnostic criteria very narrow. Grinker writes that “Kanner would probably object to 
how inclusive a category autism has become” (2007, p.63). Grinker’s conjecture may 
well be true – it is certainly consistent with Kanner's general stance – but this quote 
conceals that Kanner also believed in childhood schizophrenia which greatly overlaps 
with modern autism. Also, Kanner held no strong views on their relationship, writing 
that “it matters little whether autism be regarded as a form of [childhood] 
schizophrenia or looked upon as a disease sui generis … The issue is more one of 
semantics” (Kanner 1968, p.25 emphasis original). Kanner certainly preferred precise 
classifications to wide ranging classifications (1965, p.420) but Kanner would still 
diagnose the wide ranging classification of childhood schizophrenia even as late as the
1970s (Kanner 1973c, p.253-263). I will now discuss childhood schizophrenia, 
children with circumscribed interests and symbiotic psychosis, these latter two (plus 
autism) typically considered the three subtypes of childhood schizophrenia (Kanner 
1969, p.3).
- 1.4.4.1 Childhood Schizophrenia
Childhood schizophrenia was conceptualised in many different ways, such as severe 
and less severe, present from birth and delayed onset, gradual onset and sudden onset 
(Kanner 1957, p.732-733).8 Most child psychiatrists thought childhood schizophrenia 
could manifest in all these ways. Also, some childhood psychiatrists associated 
childhood schizophrenia with auditory hallucinations (Bettelheim 1967, p.116; Lourie,
Pacella & Piotrowski 1943, p.544; O'Gorman 1954, p.935), visual hallucinations or 
delusion but most did not. Rather, many child psychiatrists thought they had 
hallucinatory thinking in a sense related to Bleuler's notion of an abnormal contact 
with reality (Evans 2013, p.11). Whilst childhood schizophrenia covered a broader 
clinical picture than modern autism, many children diagnosed with childhood 
schizophrenia did have considerable resemblance to modern autistic people.
Whilst childhood schizophrenia covered a very broad clinical picture, common
8 Note that decline from normality was considered necessary until the mid 1940s but after that it was 
believed some schizophrenic children could exhibit symptoms from birth.
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among clinical pictures of childhood schizophrenia were individuals who exhibited 
less severe manifestations of symptoms present in more severe form in Kanner's 
autism.
“The various forms of childhood schizophrenia share with early 
infantile autism the loss of affective contact and autistic thinking. 
However, in other forms of childhood schizophrenia there is usually a 
later onset and a period of normal development preceding it. 
Communication and affective perceptions are not usually as deeply 
disturbed as in autistic children. In the broader schizophrenic group 
there may also be a wider variety of symptoms” (Kanner & Lesser 
1958, p.728). 
This shows schizophrenic children can have many symptoms of Kanner's autism but 
need not exhibit aloneness and desire for sameness by age two. Schizophrenic 
children have 
“withdrawal from affective contact with people, a progressive loss of 
interest in play, an increasing tendency to brood. Speech becomes more
and more autistic and less and less communicative. Thinking loses its 
normal plasticity. Range of contents is narrowed to matters of 
immediate personal concern. At the same time there is excessive 
preoccupation with abstract concepts which are not ordinarily a part of 
infantile interests. It takes the form of obsessively repetitious 
ruminations about calendar dates, positions of the planets, 
arrangements of numbers, or various measurements. Some of the 
children are fascinated by names, especially of animals and plants. One 
of our patients “specialised” in names of snakes and deers; the 
distinguishing characteristics were of no importance to him, only the 
appellations mattered. Eventually, the picture becomes complicated by 
aggressiveness and destructiveness, which are impulsive rather than 
deliberate. Despert emphasised compulsive possessiveness 
“characterised by an intense drive for storing objects of no concrete 
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value or significance” [quoting Despert]”. (Kanner 1948b, p.713).
Lauretta Bender, the main proponent of childhood schizophrenia, described how many
schizophrenic children have less impaired symptoms, such as, preferring structured 
environments, intelligent, enjoying academic study, disliking new situations, rigid in 
approach, little awareness of self, fearing social situations, restricted range of actions 
and being obsessive (Bender 1959b, p.506).9 Social impairment was also emphasised, 
Mahler writing that 
“no other single feature of child schizophrenia represents the essence of
its psychopathology as pertinently as the gravely disturbed preverbal 
and verbal intercommunication between the child and his 
environment… [childhood] schizophrenia represents, more than 
anything else, a grave disturbance of social intercommunication” 
All these symptoms look more like modern autism than any other DSM classification. 
Childhood schizophrenia also overlapped with modern low functioning autism.
“When schizophrenia occurs in the first few years or before language is well 
established, there is usually more or less retardation, inhibition or blocking, often with
complete mutism” (Bender 1947, p.47). Childhood schizophrenia can involve mental 
retardation but unlike Kanner's autism, aloneness or desire for sameness is not 
required, meaning they have similarities to modern low functioning autism where 
mental retardation co-existed with other symptoms of autism.
Childhood schizophrenia had no specific diagnostic criteria, rather, diagnosis 
was typically based upon multiple pervasive abnormalities, Bender writing that 
“typical symptomatology must pervade in every area of functioning” (1953, p.673). 
This meant childhood schizophrenia covered a wide variety of children, including 
children with symptoms of Kanner's autism but who did not meet Kanner's strict 
diagnostic criteria for autism of aloneness and desire for sameness present at two 
years of age. Bender writes that “one can often make an unusually good contact with 
schizophrenic children. There is generally a searching, penetrating, even aggressive 
clinging dependence” (Bender 1947, p.53). These are not children who actively shun 
9 These are symptoms of pseudo-neurotics and pseudo-psychopathics, who are discussed in section 
1.4.5.
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all human contact and outside interference. Also, this quote shows that many 
schizophrenic children exhibited symptoms quite different to Bleuler's sense of 
withdrawal.
- 1.4.4.2 Acute childhood schizophrenia
There were two types of childhood schizophrenia, insidious and acute. Above I 
described what Kanner called insidious childhood schizophrenia; here I describe what 
Kanner calls acute childhood schizophrenia. 
“[W]ithin a short period, there is a marked drop in scholastic efficiency.
The ability to concentrate decreases. There may be complaints of 
headache or other physical discomfort. This prodromal stage is 
followed by a turbulent psychotic condition with acute anxiety, sleep 
disorder, motor restlessness, disturbances of speech, occasional 
hallucinations, general perplexity, bizarre bodily sensations, and loss of
contact with people in the environment. The episode, which is often 
precipitated by physical illness, operation, or a major emotional upset, 
lasts a few days or weeks and tapers off gradually though occasionally 
it acts as a “catastrophic reaction” from which the patient never 
recovers. In most instances, there are remissions during which 
functioning on a simpler level may be re-established. Sometimes there 
is a return to the pre-psychotic mode of living but very often the 
remission represents merely a “recovery with defect” and is followed 
by other acute episodes, each of which leaves the patients with a further
Additionally, some acute schizophrenic children did have hallucinations, thought only 
in older children (Bender 1947, p.55; Clardy 1951, p.12; Despert 1938, p.369; 
Freedman 1953, p.490; Kratter 1959, p.416; Symonds & Herman 1957, p.523). Acute 
childhood schizophrenia appears to cover what are considered today two distinct 
clinical pictures. Acute childhood schizophrenia partly covered childhood 
disintegrative disorder, where a child is normal until around age four and then decline 
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to a severe state. Though a very different clinical picture to typical notions of high and
low functioning autism, they are heavily associated in recent DSM and childhood 
disintegrative disorder is merged into autism DSM-5 (see section 2.5.2. for details). 
Acute childhood schizophrenia also partly cover early onset schizophrenia, rare cases 
where schizophrenia starts in late childhood and early adolescence. Both these clinical
pictures of acute childhood schizophrenia were distinct from autism because autism 
was deemed to be present from birth. Both were distinct from insidious childhood 
schizophrenia because the childhood disintegrative pattern was much more severe 
than insidious childhood schizophrenia whilst insidious schizophrenic children did not
hallucinate whereas the early adult schizophrenia pattern did hallucinate. In essence, 
insidious childhood schizophrenia looks much more like modern low and high 
functioning autism than it looks like either symptom pattern of acute childhood 
schizophrenia. Let’s now consider other subtypes of childhood schizophrenia to see 
how they related to Kanner's autism.
- 1.4.4.3 Circumscribed interests
Franklin Robinson and Louis Vitale worked at the Children's Service Centre in 
Wyoming Valley, Pennsylvania. They “presented three cases of children with 
circumscribed interest patterns and 'a limited establishment of interpersonal 
relationships'” (Robinson & Vitale 1954, p.755). Verhoeff states that such children 
would today fit Asperger's syndrome or high functioning autism (2013, p.448). “These
children were all introvert, had average or above average intelligence, good language 
skills and circumscribed interests in rather unusual topics” (Verheoff 2014, p.448), 
such as chemistry, finances, calendars, maps, astronomy. However, as Verhoeff shows,
Robinson & Vitale describe demarcation criteria between autism and these children 
and Kanner agreed with those demarcation criteria (Kanner in Robinson & Vitale 
1954, p.765). Verheoff takes this as evidence that Kanner was describing something 
qualitatively different to modern high functioning autism (Verhoeff 2013, p.448). I 
argue Kanner thought the difference was between different subtypes of childhood 
schizophrenia, sharing many symptoms but having different diagnostic criteria.
Robinson's & Vitale's demarcation criteria between children with 
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circumscribed interests and autism do not support Verheoff’s claims of qualitative 
differences between Kanner's autism and modern autism. Children with circumscribed
interests “present a lesser degree of “withdrawal from contact with people” and a 
lesser measure of the “obsessive desire for the preservation of sameness” than is 
encountered in children who have been autistic from early infancy” (Robinson & 
Vitale 1954, p.760). Whilst these symptoms are quantitatively weaker than Kanner's 
autism they are not qualitatively different. Unmentioned by Verheoff is that Kanner 
considered both autism and children with circumscribed interests subtypes of 
childhood schizophrenia, much like how Asperger's syndrome could be considered a 
subtype found on the autistic spectrum. Also, Robinson & Vitale claimed children 
with circumscribed interests do not “utilize the favoured neologistic or meaning-
restricted language forms which have special meaning for the autistic children” (1954,
p.760). However, such idiosyncratic language is extremely common in Asperger's 
syndrome (Mayes, Calhoun & Crites 2001, p.268). Either Robinson & Vitale were 
mistaken to claim these children, unlike autistic children, lacked meaning restricted 
language or Verheoff cannot claim these children resembled Asperger's syndrome. 
Finally, “these children have not presented the early infantile [autism] incapacity for 
emotional responsiveness” (Robinson & Vitale 1954, p.760). Robinson & Vitale say 
they generally appear emotionless but they may briefly display emotion when 
discussing their favourite interests.
“They, however, do reveal flashes of good emotional reactive capacity, 
especially in the first few interviews... Such fleeting reactions indicate 
that there is a good quality of emotional responsiveness beneath the 
fixed and usually serious expression he customarily retains” (Robinson 
& Vitale 1954, p.761).
Measured by symptoms expressed the difference is an absence of emotional 
responsiveness compared to fleeting flashes of emotional responses. If this counts as a
qualitative difference it is one which manifests extremely rarely. 
All this is fully compatible with children with circumscribed interest exhibiting
similar, though less severe, symptoms to Kanner's autism. Measured by older autistic 
individuals, the case studies in Kanner & Eisenberg (1955) and Kanner & Eisenberg 
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(1956) look remarkably similar.10 The major difference is autistic children need show 
aloneness and desire for sameness by age two, children with circumscribed interests 
need not show these symptoms and were generally diagnosed later, between eight to 
eleven years (Robinson & Vitale 1954, p.760). Like childhood schizophrenia, children
with circumscribed interests covered many symptoms of Kanner's autism but lacked 
the stringent diagnostic criteria.
-1.4.4.4 Symbiotic psychosis
Manhattan based Hungarian psychoanalyst Margaret Mahler conceptualised symbiotic
psychosis in the late 1940s. Mahler thought these children did not pass beyond mother
infancy dual unity, unable to conceptualise themselves separately from their mother 
(Mahler 1952, p.289). Mahler does not provide a clear list of symptoms or differential 
diagnostic criteria beyond the psychoanalytical cause.
Those diagnosed with symbiotic psychosis generally have late onset, at around
three or four years (Mahler 1952, p.292). During this time “symbiotic psychosis 
candidates are characterized by an abnormally low tolerance for frustration and later 
by a more or less evident lack of emotional separation or differentiation from the 
mother” (Mahler 1952, p.297). Autism and symbiotic-psychosis can 
“in many cases be clearly differentiated in the beginning. Later the 
pictures tend to overlap... When we meet cases of child psychosis at a 
later stage, it seems that pure cases of autistic child psychosis as well as
pure cases of symbiotic-parasitic psychosis are rather rare, whereas 
mixed cases are frequent” (Mahler 1952, p.301). 
Kanner describes Mahler's subdivisions as “excellent” (1953, p.527). Symbiotic 
psychosis included the clinical picture of Kanner's autism but without requiring 
Kanner's strict diagnostic criteria of aloneness and desire for sameness apparent from 
two years.
Childhood schizophrenia and symbiotic psychosis covered a substantially 
10 Additionally, unmentioned by Verheoff, Robinson later changed his mind, seeing autism and 
children with circumscribed interests as on a continuum (1961, p.548). 
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wider set of clinical descriptions than modern autism. Within that set there existed 
clinical descriptions which heavily overlap with modern autism. Also, children with 
circumscribed interests are very similar to modern high functioning autism. Historians
correctly claim that Kanner's diagnostic criteria for autism are much narrower than 
modern autism. This, however, does not prevent the much more widely diagnosed 
childhood schizophrenia and its less diagnosed subtypes – all of which (except autism)
lacked those strict diagnostic criteria – covering similar clinical material to modern 
autism.
1.4.5 Autism as a spectrum
Wing's landmark 1979 epidemiological study of autism maintained there was a 
“continuum of severity” (Wing & Gould 1979, p.26). Although not employed in the 
1980 DSM-III, such ideas made their impact on the 1987 DSM-III-R. Autism in the 
DSM-III-R is placed within an umbrella category of  pervasive developmental 
disorders. This has two subtypes, autism and pervasive developmental disorders not 
otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), both covering almost identical symptoms but autism 
being more severe and PDD-NOS being less severe (APA 1987, p.34). The less severe
notion of autism was generally referred to as high functioning autism or Asperger's 
syndrome. Jacobson (2010, p.438), Eyal et al (2010, p.130) and Verheoff (2013, 
p.452) emphasise that Kanner's autism was much more specific than the 
“nebulousness” (Jacobsen 2010, p.438) of the autistic spectrum, and claim that Kanner
only described highly impaired children. Since the notion of an autistic spectrum is 
typically undefined and can have many meanings (Verheoff 2014, p.75) I shall only 
draw comparisons with its most central claim, showing autism and childhood 
schizophrenia were described as conditions that could manifest with varying levels of 
severity. 
Severity played a central role in differentiating different types of childhood 
schizophrenia. Bender believed childhood schizophrenia went through stages, the first 
being pseudo-defective which is present from birth, the second being pseudo-neurotic 
which is present from mid-childhood, and the final stage being pseudo-psychopathic 
which has onset in late childhood (1959b, p.492). Onset could occur and could halt at 
60
any stage, a child might start pseudo-defective and halt there, might start pseudo-
neurotic and develop into pseudo-psychopathic, or might go through all three stages 
etc. Pseudo-defective children were severely impaired whereas pseudo-neurotics and 
pseudopsychopaths were both less impaired than pseudo-defectives, with those with 
onset prior to five worse off (Bender 1947, p.54; Clardy 1951, p.83-84; Richards, 
1951, p.308) as are those who do not develop speech (Fish & Shaprio 1965, p.42). 
Autism and symbiotic-psychosis were often included in this relationship between 
onset and changing levels of severity. Some took autism as being early childhood 
schizophrenia, the autistic child developing into childhood schizophrenia (Alderton 
1966, p.279; Despert; 1971, p.367; Fish & Shaprio, 1965, p.42; Havelkova, 1968, 
p.851; Kratter, 1959, p.416) whilst Ornitz & Rivto believe autism and childhood 
schizophrenia tend to merge at age 5 or 6 (1968, p.84). Additionally, some considered 
symbiotic psychosis as late onset autism (Eaton & Menolascino 1966, p.526) or 
believed autistic children could develop into symbiotic psychosis (Alderton 1966, 
p.281). Some considered symbiotic psychosis as equivalent to pseudo-neurotics or a 
less severe version of Kanner's autism and Bender's pseudo-defectives (Fish & 
Shapiro, 1965, p.42) or could occur during a transition phase from Kanner's autism to 
pseudo-neurotics (Havelkova 1968, p.852). All this bares relationship to Kanner's 
observation that autistic children change at age five. To exhibit identifiable symptoms 
before three years meant most autistic children were initially quite impaired, then 
either became more socially able (often interpreted as turning into pseudo-neurotics or
symbiotic psychosis) or started to resemble mental retardation (often interpreted as 
remaining as pseudo-defectives). Less impaired children would have shown symptoms
too late to qualify as autistic, typically being diagnosed as pseudo-neurotics or 
symbiotic-psychosis from three years onwards. Here we effectively see a low 
functioning child turn into a high functioning child, something which is part of 
modern autism where “changes occur over the years and a child who was 
appropriately diagnosed with Kanner’s autism can grow into an adolescent who fits 
Asperger’s descriptions” (Wing, Gould & Gillberg 2011, p.771). Concepts of differing
levels of severity played an important role in the thinking of child psychiatrists.
A large number of child psychiatrists explicitly favoured some form of 
spectrum, covering autism and other classifications. Numerous child psychiatrists 
conceptualised various disorders as lying on a “continuum” (Goldfarb 1961, p.29; 
61
Robinson, 1961, p.548; Smolen, 1965, p.444; Ward, 1970, p.353), others employed 
the word “spectrum” (Cappon 1953, p.45; Szurek, 1956, p.522), others focused on a 
“graduated series” (O'Gorman 1954, p.939) or “gradients” (Esman 1960, p.395). 
Generally, the spectrum covered at least autism and childhood schizophrenia with 
Kanner's autism generally considered close to the most severe end.
Kanner may have contemplated explicit notions of a spectrum of severity. 
Noting the diversity of their outcome as adults in the follow-up study of his 1943 
paper, he ponders that “any illness may appear in different degrees of severity, all the 
way from so-called forme fruste [translation: atypical or incomplete] to the most 
fulminate manifestations. Does this possibly apply also to early infantile autism?” 
(Kanner 1971b, p.145). Much earlier, he had noted “differences in the intensity of 
autistic aloneness and fragmentation” (Kanner & Eisenberg 1955, p.232). Also, 
describing the parents of autistic children, Kanner wonders “do not the personalities of
the parents indicate that there are milder degrees of detachment and obsessiveness 
which enable a person to function and even gain a certain type of success in a 
nonpsychotic existence?” (1949, p.426). The parents' “aloofness has not reached the 
gross preportions [proportions] of a psychotic illness. One is tempted to think of them 
as successfully autistic adults” (Kanner 1954, 334-384). These quotes bare obvious 
relationship to the modern notion that autism varies substantially in severity.
Child psychiatrists conceptualised both autism and childhood schizophrenia as 
varying in severity, many thought that severe autistic children might turn into less 
severe schizophrenic children, and some explicitly conceptualised a spectrum. Varying
levels of severity played an important role in differentiating children and continued 
doing so today with high and low functioning autism.
1.5 Pessimistic Meta Induction
Does autism avoid the pessimistic meta induction? Broadly, yes. Let’s consider what 
has been established, firstly considering prior to the late 1940s and then considering 
after the late 1940s.
Prior to the late 1940s the diagnostic scheme has substantial dissimilarities 
with modern autism. This does not entail PMI given the maturity clause, that we only 
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judge for PMI once a theory has had time to develop. Maturity should be measured by
level of evidence gathering and level of theoretical development. After the theory has 
been formulated we should allow further empirical evidence to be gathered, for that 
empirical evidence to be reflected upon and for the theory to be modified accordingly. 
This in principle gives a scientific community an opportunity to gather evidence about
and potentially modify key tenets of a theory before they get locked in. At minimum, 
only once a significant number of scientists feel a significant level of commitment to a
theory could it be considered mature. In terms of psychiatric classifications, I suggest 
that maturity will typically come through clinical use. A psychiatrist formulates a 
diagnosis (be it from observing patients or from a theory) and starts to diagnose it. By 
spending more time around those he or she initially diagnoses and diagnosing others 
the psychiatrist has only encountered after formulating the psychiatric classification, 
the psychiatrists should soon have more information about individuals they have 
diagnosed. This will become especially true if other psychiatrists start employing it 
and it starts being written about in scientific journals. All this should bring in much 
more empirical information than was present when the diagnosis was initially 
formulated. The diagnosis may then undergo changes in response to new evidence. I 
suggest a psychiatric diagnosis in this initial phase should be considered not mature 
and therefore modifications made in this initial stage should not be counted when 
measuring historical continuity. 
Exactly when this stage has passed is difficult to judge and plausibly involves 
a level of arbitrary selection. Rather than specifically argue for one particular date as 
passing this threshold of maturity I shall instead suggest multiple possible dates and 
suggest that whichever one is chosen means the pessimistic meta-induction fails to be 
particularly strong. We need set two different dates. First, we must decide when the 
period of maturity starts and thus we can start to measure for continuity and 
discontinuity. Second, we then compare this with the period when autism actually 
starts being continuous. The longer the gap between these two times, the stronger the 
pessimistic meta-induction becomes.
Child psychiatry started to be distinct from adult psychiatry around 1925 
(Bradley 1941, p.19; Kanner 1959, p.582). Relatively soon after this notions which 
modern autism can be traced back to are formulated. Potter introduced childhood 
schizophrenia in 1933 and Kanner introduced autism in 1943. Though potential 
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candidates for maturity, neither date allows much time for evidence gathering or 
theoretical developments. A fairer earliest date would be somewhere in the late 1940s 
because “early infantile autism did not enter the public arena until about 1950” 
(Kanner, 1973b, pp.207) and little was published on autism until 1949 (Eisenberg, 
1957, pp.72). Additionally, childhood schizophrenia was also undergoing significant 
changes in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Fellowes 2015, p.2). I suggest 1948 as a 
better date for maturity, the publication of Kanner's second volume of child psychiatry,
which included both childhood schizophrenia and autism, both absent from his 1935 
edition. We then need establish how long the period was between maturity being 
obtained and historical autism starting being continuous. Childhood schizophrenia 
starts becoming recognisable from a modern perspective in Bender (1947) and Kanner
(1948b) whilst modern autism starts becoming recognisable in Kanner's commentary 
in Darr & Warden's (1951) paper. These are all plausible dates but a more conservative
choice would be 1955. Kanner & Eisenberg's 1956 paper I referenced extensively was 
from a 1955 symposium on childhood schizophrenia, so let us pick 1955 as a 
conservative date for continuity. We could, highly unfairly, start the clock from 1925, 
taking discontinuity to last thirty years until 1955 then having sixty years of 
continuity, meaning 33.3% to 66.6%.11 Slightly better is 1933, though here we ignore 
the maturity clause, then discontinuity lasts twenty two years and continuity sixty, 
meaning 26.8% to 73.2%. If counting from Kanner's autism in 1943 then discontinuity
is twelve years and continuity sixty, 16.6% to 83.3%. If we pick 1948 as a starting 
point for maturity then we have seven years of discontinuity from 1948 to 1955 and 
sixty years of continuity, 10% versus 90%. The level of discontinuity falls 
significantly if historical autism were to be considered continuous from an earlier date
than 1955, say at 1948 or 1951.  Ultimately, whichever is taken, levels of discontinuity
are not massively high. Whether they are sufficiently high to entail the PMI depends 
upon a stance towards epistemic risk, as discussed in chapter five, but we should be 
encouraged. 
Psychiatry from the late 1940s often assigned individuals clusters of symptoms
with striking similarity to modern autism. This alone, however, does not avoid PMI. 
We seek to establish belief in the psychiatric classification, not just over symptom 
clusters. However, the psychiatric classification has taken multiple forms across its 
11 Measured by 2015 when this was written.
64
history. Kanner diagnosed autism only for individuals who exhibited aloneness and 
desire for sameness by two years, whilst diagnosing childhood schizophrenia for 
individuals exhibiting similar symptoms to autism but lacked those two symptoms. 
Bender considered children exhibiting aloneness and desire for sameness by two years
as pseudo-defectives but so were children who did not exhibit those symptoms. Also, 
Kanner employed specific subtypes of autism, children with circumscribe interests 
and symbiotic psychosis, whereas Bender just considered all these as schizophrenic 
children rather than additionally considering them those subtype diagnosis. Kanner's 
and Bender's diagnostic scheme were not identical to one another or to modern 
autism.
This does not entail PMI, however, to fully understand why requires an 
understanding of what psychiatric classifications are (as discussed in chapter four) and
the exact role PMI plays in the scientific realist debate (as discussed in chapter six). 
Briefly, scientific realism is based on theoretical virtues. The two main virtues are 
causation and unification. I will argue autism merits belief due to unification. This is 
where a set of phenomena is accurately described by as few theories as possible. We 
can portray Kanner's and Bender's approaches as disagreeing over how many 
classifications are required to accurately maximise information; employing childhood 
schizophrenia and three subtypes (Kanner) or just employing childhood schizophrenia 
(Bender). Bender's approach advantageously employs fewer classifications than 
Kanner's approach of adding specific subtypes to childhood schizophrenia. Kanner's 
approach advantageously provides more specific clinical pictures but at the cost of 
employing more classifications. These are effectively two different ways to unify 
clusters of symptoms. We need demarcate between historical disagreements over 
balancing theoretical virtues and scientists being mistaken historically about the 
presence of theoretical virtues. Balancing theoretical virtues involves a subjective 
judgement. Scientists rarely, if ever, find the absolute best balance. Theories have 
greater approximate truth the closer they are to that best balance. Multiple theories can
have good balances, each having high degrees of approximate truth. Thus multiple 
theories having different levels of theoretical virtues do not entail PMI. It is entailed 
only when earlier theories lacked theoretical virtues. If scientists believed in earlier 
theories but those theories were lacking theoretical virtues then the scientists were 
mistaken to assign belief. Though PMI is generally applied to causes, where scientists 
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believed in false causal claims despite good evidence, this is also applicable to 
unifications (see Psillos for discussion of non-causal unification based realism (2010, 
p.957)). Since neither Bender nor Kanner were mistaken, both employing 
classifications which attained some approximate truth via the theoretical virtue 
unification, PMI is not applicable.
1.6 Hacking and the Pessimistic Meta Induction
Let’s consider Hacking's looping effect. Hacking claims people sometimes act in new 
ways after a psychiatric classification is introduced. If this were so, this might raise 
worries symptoms would change over time as people react to new or changing 
classifications. This may result in historical changes which might entail PMI. Hacking
describes
“a looping or feedback effect involving the introduction of 
classifications of people. New sorting and theorizing induces changes 
in self-conception and in behaviour of the people classified. Those 
changes demand revisions of the classification and theories, the causal 
connections, and the expectations. Kinds are modified, revised 
classifications are formed, and the classified change again, loop upon 
loop” (Hacking 1995, p.370).
Hacking makes the distinction between two different kinds of things. There are 
interactive kinds, which “are affected by the ways in which being [for example] 
female or having a disability are conceived, described, ordained by ourselves and the 
network of milieus in which we live” (Hacking 1999, p.104). These interactive kinds 
are contrasted with indifferent kinds which do not act differently upon being 
classified, such as how quarks may be treated differently by scientists once classified 
but the quark is not aware of this and does not modify itself based upon that 
classification (Hacking 1999, p.105). Only interactive kinds are subject to the looping 
effect and may change themselves over time in response to being classified.
Since autism is an interactive kind, new behaviour might have occurred when 
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autism was first introduced and when it was later modified. Hacking argues this is the 
case when he applies the effect to autism. Psychoanalysis was once dominant, casting 
the parent as causally responsible for the illness. Later on, cognitive psychology gave 
no such causal role to the parents. Hacking suggests the parents modified their 
behaviour, which in turn caused the children to modify their behaviour. Classification 
resulted in behavioural modifications. Unfortunately, Hacking provides almost no 
evidence for this, simply stating that “[m]ost of the behaviours described by Kanner 
seem not to exist any more” (1999, p.115). This claim does almost nothing to support 
Hacking's argument. Kanner's autism was a very narrowly defined diagnosis, whereas 
modern autism is an extremely widely defined diagnosis. A much fairer comparison 
would be with childhood schizophrenia. The only specific symptoms Hacking 
mentions is that absent anticipatory posture (where a baby puts out its arms to be 
picked up) and feeding problems are no longer discussed (1995, p.377). However, 
these are commonly described, such as Ledford & Gast's (2006)  review on feeding 
problems in autism and Cliffard, Young & Williamson's (2007) analysis of pre-
diagnosis individuals which identifies absence of anticipatory posture as more 
common in children who do subsequently develop autism. Hacking is mistaken on 
these accounts. 
Hacking does describe some changes to autistic behaviours which better fit his 
looping claims (though not specifically discussing them in the context of looping). He 
describes how the formulation of an autistic community offers new notions of what 
autism means (Hacking 2009a, p.506) and how the internet allows new forms of 
communication which better suit the autistic (Hacking 2009b, p.56). Autistic 
behaviour changing does not necessarily entail PMI. The world often changes and 
science needs reflect this. For example, models of climate change need updating as the
world heats up. Earlier models were not mistaken, the world actually changed. The 
earlier model may have been true at an earlier time, the current model might be true 
today. Similarly, as Hacking points out, some indifferent kinds undergo change, such 
as microbes mutating (Hacking 1999, p.105). Where interactive or indifferent kind 
change then scientists should change their descriptions, this process does not imply 
that scientists were mistaken and therefore does not entail PMI. Thus changing 
behaviour of autistic individuals over time does not entail PMI. It does entail a second 
problem, needing the correct explanation of why behaviour changed. Hacking has 
67
offered plausible reasons accounting for minor changes in behaviour. In the absence of
unexplained large changes to behaviour Hacking's looping effect is not 
epistemologically worrying.
1.7 Conclusion
The classification of autism needs have high historical continuation to avoid the 
pessimistic meta-induction. Autism as originally formulated in 1943 is not historically 
continuous with modern autism but is from around the early 1950s. By the mid-1950s 
Kanner identifies a third of all autistic people as those who engage socially in the 
community. These people look very similar to modern high functioning autism, they 
are conceptualised as having a disorder of social perceptiveness, something quite 
different to Bleuler's notion of autism. Kanner identifies a third of all autistic people 
as non-verbal. He expresses doubts about earlier claims that all these have normal 
intelligence and most child psychiatrists endorsed these doubts. I have argued many, 
perhaps most, of these autistic people also had mental retardation in a manner similar 
to modern low functioning autism. 
Childhood schizophrenia could also manifest in ways with great overlap with 
modern high and low functioning autism, being associated with both social 
impairment and low intellect. Childhood schizophrenia certainly covered much 
broader clinical material than modern autism but central concepts of modern autism 
were present. Finally, child psychiatrists were very aware that both autism and 
childhood schizophrenia varied greatly in level of impairment, giving this a central 
role in differentiating various types of childhood schizophrenia. All this shows that 
three central concepts of modern and current autism – autism as social impairment, 
autism co-existing with mental retardation, autism as varying in severity – were 
present, widely employed and important between the 1950s and 1970s.
Autism is quite resilient to the PMI. Early discontinuity does not entail the 
pessimistic meta induction because of the maturity clause. A theory is allowed to 
develop before we are concerned by major changes. Kanner's autism and childhood 
schizophrenia started to effectively become something resembling modern autism 
between around 1948 to 1955. We discount somewhere between the first fifteen to 
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twenty years and then accept continuity has been present for over six decades. This 
alone does not defeat PMI but goes some way to weaken concerns. However, Kanner's
and Bender's diagnostic scheme differ from one another and differ from modern 
autism. For now, we have established similar symptoms and symptoms clusters were 
describe both historically and today. In later chapters I will suggest Kanner's and 
Bender's approaches (alongside the approach of modern autism) all merit belief 
because they are all theoretically virtuous ways to accommodate the symptoms and 
the probabilistic relationships between symptoms. They are all good ways to 
accommodate the clinical pictures, therefore all deserve belief. PMI is only 
threatening if Kanner's, Bender's or the modern approaches lacked theoretical virtues, 
but they did not.
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2.0 Chapter 2 – The challenge of 
underdetermination
2.1 Introduction
Philosophers of science sometimes question the truth of scientific concepts by 
pointing to alternative concepts that could be used to describe the same phenomena. 
This is the argument from underdetermination. Seemingly following this reasoning, 
philosopher of psychiatry Dominic Murphy raises concerns about psychiatric 
classification by asking “what evidence do we have that current practice in psychiatry 
produces good outcomes, outcomes that couldn't be matched by alternative nosologies
that start from a completely different set of premises?” (Murphy 2006, p.10). The 
thought is that if there are alternative ways to describe any given scientific phenomena
then why believe one scientific concept rather than an alternative is truthful. This 
chapter explores changes made to autism between the late 1970s to mid-1980s. This is
effectively an alternative, competing classification to the notion of autism I defend 
throughout all the chapters, raising the prospect of an underdetermination argument. 
In this chapter I show major flaws in the process of abandoning late 1940s to 1970s 
autism in favour of the DSM-III autism, showing major problems with this alternative 
autism and show how it was quickly abandoned with psychiatry largely readopting 
late 1940s to 1970s autism.
The alternative notion of autism is that developed by Kolvin in the early 
1970s, advocated by Rutter and then adopted by 1980 DSM-III. I call this competing 
alternative 'DSM-III autism'. This competes with what I call 'historically continuous 
autism', roughly late 1940s autism and childhood schizophrenia alongside autism from
the mid-1980s onward. Kolvin's (1971) study is generally taken as proving that 
childhood schizophrenia is a separate disorder to autism but a close reading shows that
Kolvin fails to establish this. Kolvin separates children previously diagnosed as either 
autistic or childhood schizophrenic into two categories, autism which occurs within 
the first three years of life or schizophrenia in childhood which is the early 
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manifestations of adult schizophrenia. The concept of childhood schizophrenia 
employed since 1933 was now portrayed as early manifestations of adult 
schizophrenia despite these children not having hallucinations. Kolvin instead could 
have merged childhood schizophrenia with autism by dropping the age requirements 
of autism or Kolvin could have retained a third category for childhood schizophrenia. 
There is no good reason to believe that Kolvin proved that childhood schizophrenia 
and autism were separate disorders. Kolvin's approach was largely adopted by DSM-
III and upon doing so the inadequacies soon became apparent. Many clinical pictures 
present in autism and childhood schizophrenia from the late 1940s, especially those 
higher functioning types described in chapter one, no longer found a place in DSM-
III. The diagnosis of autism and childhood onset pervasive developmental disorders 
had very little room for higher functioning individuals whilst the diagnosis of schizoid
of childhood and schizotypal personality disorder were inadequate to cover many 
clinical pictures of childhood schizophrenia (plus subtypes) described from around 
1950 onwards. Consequently, for good reason, the diagnostic scheme of DSM-III was 
often ignored (Eyal et al 2010, p.235). By 1987 DSM-III-R, the changes of DSM-III 
were partially reversed, reverting back to something with substantial similarities to 
late 1940s onwards autism.
Highlighting flaws with DSM-III autism and highlighting benefits of the 
DSM-III-R reversal shows that DSM-III autism is not a strong challenger to 
historically continuous autism, and this, in turn, provides a counter to any general 
argument based on underdetermination. Consequently, the key aim of this chapter is to
show substantial inadequacies with the alternative notion of autism embraced in 
DSM-III. However, ultimately showing why underdetermination fails requires a 
broader understanding of what scientific theories are (as discussed in chapter four) and
what theoretical virtues are (as discussed in chapter six). For now, we only seek to 
show the main alternative to autism had major scientific short comings and was soon 
replaced with good reason. Additionally, I briefly address how the changes introduced 
by DSM-III autism, which disrupt historical continuity, does not entail PMI, providing
more detail in chapter six.
I start by outlining the underdetermination argument. Then I discuss the 
changes Kolvin introduced, showing major flaws. I then show Wing effectively 
reversed many of the changes Kolvin introduced. I then suggest this type of 
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underdetermination does not undermine belief in modern autism. Finally, I discuss 
how this relates to PMI.
2.2 Underdetermination
Underdetermination is 
“concerned with the possible existence of alternatives to our best 
scientific theories that share some or all of their empirical implications – 
that is, quite different accounts of the entities and/or processes inhabiting
some inaccessible domains of nature that nonetheless make the same 
confirmed predictions about what we should expect to find in the world 
and recommend the same successful strategies for intervening in it that 
our own theories do. No matter how impressive a theory's practical 
achievements in guiding predictions and interventions are, those 
achievements do not favour the theory over any alternative that would 
ground those same predictions and interventions and therefore enjoy just 
the same degree of empirical success” (Stanford 2006, p.8). 
No matter how much evidence is obtained, more than one theory can fit the evidence. 
Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to determine which theory is correct. Something
more is needed to decide which theory is true. 
Underdetermination suits the social constructivist agenda well. As Giere notes,
social constructivists often argue that what singles out a theory as supposedly true is 
just social convention (Giere 1999 p.237). Social convention could here be 
interchanged with concerns over medicalisation or negative influence of ethical and 
political values. For example, Bentall thinks that for a psychiatric classification to be 
“a valid scientific concept, then at the very least psychiatrists will need to answer the 
question. Which set of criteria [classifications] are the right ones?” (Bentall 1992a, 
p.28). However, there are few means for determining which classification is correct 
(Bentall 2004, p.65). He sees psychiatry as a contingent dynamic process dependent 
on personal opinion, with modern psychiatric classifications as one of many possible 
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classifications that will likely be replaced with an alternative classification or a non-
classificatory approach in the future (Bentall 1992a, p.50; also Boyle 1990, p.79).
The underdetermination argument needs qualifying since it is too sceptical, 
being applicable to everything. For example, induction is underdetermined. Any 
number of instances of the sun rising is compatible with it not rising the next day. 
Unless one is an inductive sceptic then something more is required for 
underdetermination to be acceptable. Similarly, we might modify our theory about 
electrons to claim they morph into protons once a minute at undetectable speeds. This 
seems unconvincing. Scientists often struggle greatly to establish a single working 
theory, let alone two, so fair underdeterminations need be constrained to actual 
working scientific theories (Kitcher 1993a, p.247; Stanford 2006, p.18). Candidates 
for underdetermination must accommodate a challenging range of empirical evidence,
must have compatibility with a wider body of theories and must exhibit theoretical 
virtues. By only considering genuine scientific theories we narrow the range of 
possible underdeterminations.
Though limiting the range of possible underdeterminations is wise, this risks 
the possibility that no competing alternative theories are produced because one theory 
has unfairly been focused upon. One theory may receive the majority or all the 
attention, in the form of funding, experiments, publications and media attention. 
Perhaps possible competitors would have made similar empirical accomplishments 
had they been given an equal chance. Conveniently for our purposes we do have a 
competitor which for a time attracted most of the research efforts. Let’s demarcate the 
notion of autism I defend and its competitor. From around the late 1940s onwards a 
number of related diagnostic schemes were developed. Broadly, they involved a 
notion of childhood schizophrenia which was described either in terms of a continuum
or had specific subtypes (or both simultaneously). Chapter one drew similarities 
between these and modern autism. Both covered many clinical pictures with 
remarkable similarity. The autism I defend is this diagnostic scheme which runs 
between these eras, what I call historically continuous autism. The competitor is the 
changes started in the late 1970s and which formulate DSM-III. Thus we have 
'historically continuous autism' which I defend and we have 'DSM-III' autism which is
the competitor. Let’s investigate what DSM-III autism was and how it briefly replaced
historically continuous autism.
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2.3 The demise of childhood schizophrenia
 
As we saw in chapter one, from 1943 autism and childhood schizophrenia co-existed 
as psychiatric classifications. The boundaries and relationship between both these 
classifications and other classifications was debated and discussed. Despite this, these 
approaches were still able to diagnose a wide variety of individuals with a broad range
of related symptoms. They were applicable to higher and lower functioning 
individuals, individuals with and without mental retardation, and to individuals who 
did or did not exhibit Kanner's stringent diagnostic criteria of aloneness and desire for 
sameness (by two years old). Some thought all this was covered by a continuum. 
Some thought that subtypes were present. All this changed within a short period of 
time, starting in the late 1970s and fully implemented by 1980 DSM-III, when 
childhood schizophrenia was abandoned in favour of a narrowly-defined autism.
Kanner started the first journal dedicated to research on autism and childhood 
schizophrenia in 1971 (The Journal of Autism and Childhood Schizophrenia). The 
journal reflected the disunity of the field, with the editorial board consisting of 
“psychiatrists, psychologists, and psychoanalysts, and the articles that they included in
the journal reflected their often sharply divergent approaches to the disorder” 
(Silverman 2012, p.39). Indeed, the main proponent of childhood schizophrenia, 
Lauretta Bender, was on the editorial board despite disagreeing with Kanner over the 
nature of autism. However, this all changed in 1978 and 1979. Eric Schopler, who 
replaced Kanner as editor in 1974, wrote a provocative editorial in the 1978 edition. 
“[S]ince Leo Kanner founded this journal in 1971, many variations of his criteria for 
infantile autism have been used” (Schopler 1978, p.137) but now there are to be 
“guidelines for reducing confusion [of diagnostic criteria]. It is hoped these will be 
used for the research published in this journal” (Schopler 1978, p.138). This brief 
editorial is followed by the new guidelines in an article by Michael Rutter (1978) that 
sets out new diagnostic criteria for autism. These criteria were largely based on 
Kanner's 1943 paper (Blacher & Christiansen 2011, p.182; Mandy & Skuse 2008, 
p.39; Silverman 2012, p.49) except for an emphasis on mental retardation. Though 
many historians have focused too heavily on Kanner's 1943 notion, portraying it as 
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more significant than it was from the 1950s to 1970s, it now became very important. 
Also, notions of childhood schizophrenia were abandoned. This process was 
completed a year later when the journal was given its modern name of Journal of 
Autism and Developmental Disorders. The only journal specifically dedicated to 
autistic and schizophrenic children had officially come firmly down upon one side of a
thirty five year long debate about their relationship  and effectively told future 
contributors they must also take this side to get published. 
The enormously influential DSM-III (APA 1980) followed these changes when
published two years later. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-III was a guidebook 
for psychiatrists containing standardised criteria for diagnosis. The DSM-III was 
important because diagnosis based on DSM-III was required for insurance companies 
to pay out medical insurance, drug trials were only considered valid if based upon 
DSM-III and many journals only accepted research papers employing DSM-III 
classifications (Cooper 2005, p.146). Earlier editions of the DSM-I and DSM-II had 
entries for childhood schizophrenia (APA 1952, p.28; APA 1968, p.35) whilst autism 
was included only as a symptom of childhood schizophrenia. In DSM-III autism was 
now included as a classification (APA 1980, p.87) whilst childhood schizophrenia was
removed (APA 1980, p.375). The notion of autism was based on Michael Rutter's late 
1970s work (Blacher & Christensen 2011, p.182-183; Silverman 2012, p.49), the 
author who set the new guidelines for The Journal of Autism and Childhood 
Schizophrenia. Within a few years psychiatrists who employed notions of childhood 
schizophrenia popular for the previous five decades faced substantial barriers to 
publication and needed use other diagnostic categories for their patients to receive 
medical insurance. 
 This was a remarkable reversal of fortune. Autism went in a few years from 
being secondary to childhood schizophrenia to nearly completely replacing childhood 
schizophrenia. Even a proponent of childhood schizophrenia like Sanua admits by 
1983 that “while childhood schizophrenia which has been a popular concept for 
almost five decades has lost its importance, infantile autism remains as a major 
diagnostic category” (Sanua 1983, p.1648). This sort of exercising of authority is 
commonly taken as harmful to scientific investigation. Historians and sociologists like
Schaffer (1989) and Collins (Collin & Pinch 1998) often claim decisions in science 
are based less on scientific evidence than on power struggles between competing 
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scientists. Each side claims their own theory is legitimate science whilst their rival’s 
theory is illegitimate, victory often going to who has greatest social influence and 
authority. More moderately, there should be an equal distribution of research effects 
among competing theories providing each theory is making empirical 
accomplishments (Solomon 2001, p.149). The changes which brought about DSM-III 
autism appear partly due to key sources of authority favouring a particular 
interpretation of autism whilst  not giving equal support to notions of childhood 
schizophrenia popular in earlier decades. Below I show many of these changes were 
insufficient to justify the changes to autism and childhood schizophrenia made by 
DSM-III. 
2.4 Kolvin's separation of autism and childhood schizophrenia
2.4.1 Kolvin's study
Kolvin (1971) is taken as primarily responsible for separating childhood schizophrenia
from autism. Historians of autism will usually only cite Kolvin when discussing this 
separation. For example, Wolff writes “Kolvin's comparative studies distinguishing 
early childhood autism from childhood schizophrenia, by age of onset, 
phenomenology, family history and associated symptoms, are now rightly regarded as 
classics in the history of autism” (Wolff 2004, p.204). Also, “[t]he confusion between 
autism and schizophrenia occurring in childhood continued to affect the field until, 
early in the 1970s, Kolvin (1971) and his colleagues carried out a study comparing the
two groups of conditions and listed the many differences” (Wing 1997, p.18 ; also 
Evans 2013, p.18; Feinstein 2010, p.143). They may also cite Rutter's 1972 or 1978 
article, but his 1972 paper only cites Kolvin (Rutter 1972, p.320) when discussing 
separating childhood schizophrenia from autism whilst Rutter's 1978 only cites Kolvin
plus a study from Japan and Russia (Rutter 1978, p.151). Papers on childhood 
schizophrenia from the 1980s almost always cite Kolvin (plus possibly Rutter and 
colleagues) and employ the notion of childhood schizophrenia Kolvin suggests (I 
provide evidence of this in section 2.4.2). 
Kolvin's work is based upon a study beginning in 1962 in Oxford and 
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Newcastle of 80 children: 47 autistic and 33 schizophrenic children (Kolvin et al 
1971, p.385).12 The study was published in a series of six articles in the April 1971 
edition of the British Journal of Psychiatry, and the papers were written by Kolvin and
seven co-authors. The study aimed to test if psychotic disorders are dependent upon 
age of onset, if age of onset determines different symptoms and aetiology (Kolvin 
1971, p.383). The autistic children are defined on Kanner's 1943 article (Kolvin 1971, 
p.381) whilst the schizophrenic children are defined upon criteria from the third 
edition of Kanner's Child Psychiatry (Kolvin 1971, p.382) who gives diagnostic 
criteria based upon Potter, Bradley and Bender (Kanner 1957, p.711).
Kolvin concludes that children with early onset disorder (prior to 3 years) have
symptoms of autism as described by Kanner whilst children with late onset disorder (5
years and after) have symptoms corresponding to adult schizophrenia (Kolvin 1971, 
p.384). The early onset group had gaze avoidance (Kolvin et al 1971, p.387), 
abnormal pre-occupations, resistance to change and stereotyped repetitive movements 
(Kolvin et al 1971, p.390-391) all largely absent in late onset group. Both those in 
early and late onset groups had problems with social relationships but these were 
worse in early onset group (Kolvin et al 1971, p.387). Both had delayed speech but 
these were worse in early onset group (Kolvin et al 1971, p.388). Both had ritualistic 
and perseverative behaviour (Kolvin et al 1971, p.390) and both had behaviour 
problems (Kolvin et al 1971, p.391). The late onset group had thought disorder 
(Kolvin et al 1971, p.389) and the majority, though not all, had hallucinations (Kolvin 
et al 1971, p.390). Both of these were absent in the early onset group. Crucially 
though, those in the early onset group never developed hallucinations in later life but 
could develop thought disorders (Kolvin 1971, p.394). Kolvin effectively says early 
onset disorders is autistic whilst late onset are an early manifestation of adult 
schizophrenia, separating autism from childhood schizophrenia.
Kolvin also briefly mentioned children aged three to five years that are normal 
at birth who undergo a sudden regression to very low functionality (Kolvin 1971, 
p.381). Rutter says less is known about these disintegrative disorders except that they 
include a high proportion of abnormal brain disorders and are extremely rare (Rutter 
1978, p.6). These rare cases were documented between 1940 and 1970s (De Heller in 
Hulse 1954, p.472-477). They are dissimilar to those with autism or insidious 
12 Note that Kolvin (1971) and Kolvin et al (1971) are just different papers on the same study, in the 
same issue of the journal.
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childhood schizophrenia, being demarcated from both disorders by the brain 
abnormalities, demarcated from autism by clear regression from normality, and 
demarcated from insidious childhood schizophrenia by regression to near zero 
functionality. 
I will now criticise Kolvin’s  study, alongside showing how Rutter also made 
similar claims to Kolvin. The primary problem is that Kolvin's study is not sufficiently
representative of the previous decades of US child psychiatry for it to form a basis 
from which autism can be separated from childhood schizophrenia.
2.4.2 Relationship between Kolvin and prior decades of childhood schizophrenia 
research
I will show Kolvin does not adequately show schizophrenic children should be related
to schizophrenia rather than autism. Whilst Kolvin adequately shows children with 
symptoms of autism do not become schizophrenic adults, this does not show all 
children with symptoms of childhood schizophrenia become schizophrenic. 
Hallucinations do not occur in early onset disorders, they only ever occur in late onset 
disorders, however, not all late onset children have hallucinations.13 These non-
hallucinating schizophrenic children do not obviously fit either of the classifications 
proposed by Kolvin. Since these non-hallucinating schizophrenic children have late 
onset after a period of normality they do not fit early onset autism well and since they 
do not hallucinate they do not fit Kolvin’s category of schizophrenia in childhood very
well, it being basically early adult schizophrenia. Kolvin faced a choice between 
demarcating autism from schizophrenia in childhood on either age of onset or 
presence of hallucinations. Alternatively, Kolvin could have created a third category, 
for children with late onset but who did not hallucinate. 
All these three choices were compatible with the child psychiatry of the 
previous decades. Kolvin claims age of onset separates autism from childhood 
schizophrenia but psychiatrists of the previous decades were fully aware of the 
importance of age of onset. “In the classification of childhood schizophrenia, the most
13 Note that Kolvin is aware that hallucinations are more difficult to detect in younger children (Kolvin
& Edgell 1972, p.285) but there is no indication that his 1971 paper (or later work) took this 
problem into account. Evans correctly highlights how problematic this is (2013, p.16). 
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important factor is the age of onset of the illness” (Bender 1947, p.53; also, Clardy 
1951, p.82; Creak 1951, p.548; DeMyer et al 1971, p.178; Despert 1938, p.366; Eaton 
& Mesnolascino 1966, p.526; Eisenberg 1957, p.72; Eveloff 1960, p.92; Havelkova 
1968, p.849; Hingtgen & Bryson 1972, p.9; Kanner 1943, p.248; Kratter 1959, p.416; 
Mahler 1965, p.651; O'Gorman 1954, p.937; Ornitz 1973, p.24; Richards 1951, p.305;
Szurek 1956, p.541; Ward 1970, p.351). We saw how many employed notions similar 
to a spectrum (Cappon 1953, p.45; Esman 1960, p.395; Goldfarb 1961, p.29; 
O'Gorman 1954, p.939; Robinson 1961, p.548; Smolen 1965, p.444; Szurek 1956, 
p.522; Ward 1970, p.353). We also saw how many thought autism could turn into 
childhood schizophrenia (Alderton 1966, p.279; Despert 1971, p.367; Fish & Shaprio 
1965, p.42; Havelkova 1968, p.851; Kratter 1959, p.416). Whether autism and 
childhood schizophrenia were considered the same thing or separate, child 
psychiatrists recognised relationships between various symptom patterns and age of 
onset. As discussed in chapter one, Bender's pseudo-defectives, pseudo-neurotics and 
pseudo-psychopathics were differentiated on age of onset, similarly Kanner 
recognised age of onset as important for autism and symbiotic psychosis. Other child 
psychiatrists recognised age of onset produced different outcomes but considered this 
a matter of degrees, generally not feeling inclined to firmly differentiate psychiatric 
classification. Child psychiatrists of the 1950s to 1970s placed much less emphasis on 
hallucinations than Kolvin does. The vast majority of child psychiatrists of earlier 
decades believed schizophrenic children either rarely or never hallucinated (Alderton 
1966, p.282; Bender 1947, p.50; Bender 1959b, p.501; Clardy 1951, p.82; Colbert & 
Koegler 1958, p.215; Despert 1940, p.190; Eisenberg 1956, p.21; Ornitz & Ritvo 
1968, p.78; Ornitz 1973, p.33; Richards 1951, p.303; Robinson 1961, p.544). Those 
who recognised rare instances of childhood hallucinations thought, like Kolvin, they 
only occurred in older children (Bender 1947, p.55; Clardy 1951, p.12; Despert 1938, 
p.369; Freedman 1953, p.490; Kratter 1959, p.416; Symonds & Herman 1957, p.523). 
1940s to 1970s child psychiatrists noticed different outcomes substantially related to 
age of onset but did not link this with hallucinations, except when the children were 
old. In contrast, Kolvin thinks age of onset is important primarily because late onset 
psychosis is linked to hallucinations, unlike early onset psychosis. I will now discuss 
why Kolvin obtained different results to those of earlier decades.
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2.4.3 Unrepresentativeness
I will argue that there is reason to think there were methodological problems with 
Kolvin’s study. I will suggest his sample was unrepresentative for drawing 
conclusions about US notions of childhood schizophrenia. A 1974 review article of 
childhood schizophrenia by Miller (1974) also claims Kolvin's study is 
unrepresentative, a claim I shall expand upon. 
 Kolvin's 1971 paper endorses Anthony's demarcation between three types of 
infantile psychosis (Kolvin et al 1971, p.381). James Anthony, a medical doctor based 
at the Maudsley Hospital in London, was a major figure in British child psychiatry 
(Evans 2014, p. 262). Anthony's first group was early onset and covered Kanner's 
autism and Bender's pseudo-defectives; his second group “at three to five years with 
an acute course followed by regression, included Heller's disease, De Sanctis and 
Weygant's dementias, Bender's pseudoneurotic, Despert's 'acute onset' type and 
Mahler's symbiotic psychosis” (Kolvin et al 1971, p.381); his third group was late 
onset which covered Bender's pseudo-psychopathics. Anthony's scheme is 
representative of the main approaches used in the previous decades.
However, the diagnostic criteria Kolvin employs are more restrictive than 
Anthony's. Kolvin's criteria for early onset are substantially (though not entirely) 
based on Kanner's autism. As Miller remarks, “an implication of the position 
maintained by Rutter and Kolvin is that there is only one syndrome of psychosis with 
onset under age three – namely, infantile autism” (1974, p.7). We saw in chapter one 
that Kanner's autism was a quite specific manifestation whereas Bender's pseudo-
defectives were broader. Also, 55 percent of Kolvin's autistic children did not use 
speech meaningfully (Kolvin 1971, p.388), whereas Kanner thought only a third did 
not, suggesting Kolvin's criteria may be lower functioning than Kanner's. Also, as 
mentioned above, schizophrenic children described in the earlier decades rarely 
hallucinated, whereas most late onset individuals in Kolvin’s study did have 
hallucinations, making them an unrepresentative sample of childhood schizophrenia of
the previous decades. Though claiming to employ Anthony's first and third categories, 
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Kolvin's criteria for his study is more restrictive than earlier notions of childhood 
psychosis, indeed, “[i]t took Kolvin many years to collect a series of 33 [children 
meeting his criteria]” (Rutter 1972, p.321).
The biggest problem with Kolvin's study is that higher functioning non-
hallucinating individuals appear to be largely excluded by Kolvin's diagnostic 
criteria.14 He states most shy, introverted children with schizoid personalities in the 
general population do not develop late onset psychosis (Kolvin 1971, p.385) and 
Kolvin excluded children “with less clear-cut symptoms” (Kolvin 1971, p.384), 
whereas US notions of childhood schizophrenia were often applied to a wide variety 
of children. Kolvin's 1971 paper is not fully clear as to why he excludes such higher 
functioning individuals, but this is primarily because Kolvin's 1971 sample only 
included individuals from Anthony's first and third group whereas individuals from 
Anthony's second group are not included. Their omission is not explicitly stated in his 
1971 paper but it is explicitly acknowledged in a later paper (Kolvin 1985, p.148). A 
1985 article provides a problematic justification for this exclusion. “The second 
group, those with an onset between three and five years, has been described as 
'disintegrative psychosis' (Rutter, 1972) and is very rare (Makita, 1966; Kolvin et al, 
1971e)... These children have mostly been found to be suffering from clear-cut organic
disorders” (Kolvin 1985, p.148). Here Kolvin suggests Anthony's second group is 
disintegrative and very rare. However, Anthony's second group includes Bender's 
pseudo-neurotics but the clinical picture Kolvin describes here is very different from 
Bender's pseudo-neurotics. They were generally relatively high functioning and 
common among childhood psychotics. Bender considered pseudo-neurotics to have 
symptoms like  preferring  structured  environments,  intelligent,  enjoying  academic  
study,  disliking  new  situations,  rigid  in  approach,  little  awareness  of  self,  
fearing  social  situations,  restricted  range  of  actions  and  being  obsessive (Bender 
1959b,  p.506). Additionally, Kolvin considers this second group acute onset (1971, 
p.381), whereas Bender's pseudo-neurotics could have acute or insidious onset. 
Finally, the cause of most pseudo-neurotics was unknown (and this is true of high 
functioning autistic individuals today whom pseudo-neurotics resemble), whereas 
14 Another study which supposedly separated schizophrenic children from autistic children, referenced
far less frequently than Kolvin's study, also suffered from being unrepresentative. Egger's study 
specifically intended his notion of schizophrenic children to be different to prior notions of 
childhood schizophrenia (1975, p.22).
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Kolvin considers most in the second group to have an organic disorder. Note that 
Rutter also endorses Anthony's groupings (Rutter & Lockyer 1968, p.1172) whilst 
most participants (58 of 63) in his influential late 1960s study have age of onset below
that associated with Bender's pseudo-neurotics (Rutter & Lockyer 1968, p.1172). 
Miller correctly remarks that “there is some evidence that psychosis with onset 
between three and six years of age is not so rare as reported by Rutter (1972) and 
Kolvin and co-workers (1971) and is not necessarily associated with organic 
processes” (1974, p.9). Let's consider why Kolvin would largely exclude higher 
functioning individuals from his study.
Kolvin employed a different notion of schizophrenia from that used in most of 
US child psychiatry. In 1972, he suggests US and UK child psychiatrists may be 
employing different notions of psychosis (Kolvin & Edgell 1972, p.285). He is 
clearest on this point in 1990. 
“Traditionally, diagnostic criteria have reflected various combinations of 
Schneider's (1959) approach, where there is more emphasis on positive 
delusions and hallucinations, with that of Bleuler (1950) where the 
emphasis is on the more negative symptoms of withdrawal, loosening of 
association, and blunted affect... In the original research of Kolvin and 
his coworkers [referencing his 1971 study]... there was an attempt to 
sharpen and limit the concept and definition of schizophrenia in school-
aged children and diagnosis was achieved by using the rank criteria 
(Schneider, 1959)” (Kolvin, Berney & Yoeli 1990, p.102). 
Kolvin's 1971 paper references Schneider when outlining diagnostic criteria for late 
onset children (Kolvin 1971, p.384). Kolvin appears to think many individuals 
diagnosed in the US are not schizophrenic, or at least schizophrenic in a very 
difference sense, to those in the UK. Similarly, he claims that “overdiagnosis is a 
greater problem in the United States than in the United Kingdom. In the former there 
is a tendency to use broader definitions and hence a wider concept of psychosis, so 
that the severe adolescent crisis is often perceived as being a schizophrenic state” 
(Kolvin 1972, p.816). Note also that Rutter's 1972 article arguing for the abandonment
of childhood schizophrenia states that of “Bender['s] (1953) [childhood 
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schizophrenia], only a few were autistic by Kanner's criteria, and her use of the word 
schizophrenia is wider than WHO [World Health Organisation] definition followed 
here” (1972, p.329). Kolvin's and Rutter's approach, based in UK notions, are not 
particularly relevant for drawing conclusions about US child psychiatry of earlier 
decades. 
Kolvin's later publications consider Asperger's syndrome to be different to his 
1971 notions of early onset autism and late onset psychosis. “Asperger's syndrome 
(1944) which presents clinically as a schizoid-type personality disorder of childhood. 
Some authorities (Wing, 1981) regard it as a mild variation of autism, while others 
agree with Asperger that it is a personality trait (Kolvin and Goodyer, 1981)” (Kolvin 
1985 p.150). Similarly, “[t]he deviance, patterning, and severity of features are 
insufficient for it [Asperger's syndrome] to be considered as psychosis but rather as a 
personality variant” (Kolvin, Berney & Yoeli 1990, p.108) and Kolvin thinks 
Asperger's syndrome is not separate from schizoid personality disorder (Kolvin, 
Berney & Yoeli 1990, p.108). Rutter's 1978 paper also considers this a possibility, 
Asperger's syndrome “thought to be a personality trait” (Rutter, 1978, p.145) but “it 
remains uncertain whether they constitute a distinct syndrome different from mild 
childhood autism” (Rutter, 1978, p.145). Kolvin appears to think, and Rutter 
considered it a possibility in 1978, that such abnormalities are just substantial 
variations on personality rather than distinct syndrome. I conclude that Kolvin’s study 
missed out a population that had previously been considered to suffer disorders in the 
autism-childhood schizophrenia family by US child psychiatrists. Kolvin excluded 
high-functioning children suffering from a late-onset, disorder who did not hallucinate
from his study. Excluding this population made it look like autism and childhood 
schizophrenia are clearly distinguishable conditions, whereas if this population had 
been included in the study I suggest  the results would not have been so clear-cut.
2.4.4 Additional problems
Let’s consider other flaws with Kolvin's study beyond his sample being 
unrepresentative of previous decades. Kolvin notes that some with late onset seemed 
closer to the early onset group than to adult schizophrenia, that “there are some 
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overlapping cases in which the margins between the two conditions might be blurred” 
(Kolvin 1971, p.394). Some late onset children without hallucinations had symptoms 
resembling those of the early onset group (Kolvin 1971, p.394). Equally, some with 
early onset disorders had all the symptoms of late onset disorders except 
hallucinations: “some of the older [early onset] cases with their suggestion of thought 
disorder and affective rigidity or poverty were almost indistinguishable in terms of 
behavioural features alone from certain of the [late onset] cases” (Kolvin 1971, 
p.394). Kolvin seems aware that, except for restrictions over age of onset, some of the 
late onset cases could fit the classification of early onset autism.
Furthermore, Kolvin's notion of late onset actually allowed for prior 
abnormalities. Kolvin considered a child late onset only if specific symptoms of 
childhood schizophrenia were not present from birth. 87 percent of the late onset 
children had pre-onset conditions. They were considered odd by their parents and they
had “shyness, diffidence, withdrawal, timidity and sensitivity” (Kolvin 1971, p. 385). 
This creates problems deciding which abnormal behaviour should be considered pre-
onset and late onset, with Kolvin admitting to difficulties “trying to disentangle pre-
morbid personality factors and pre-existing behaviour disorders from features of 
psychotic onset” (Kolvin 1971, p.386). Without clear symptoms only associated with 
late onset, non-hallucinating schizophrenic children have no exclusive symptoms 
absent in autism. Kolvin’s study supports child psychiatrists who thought that some 
schizophrenic children had pre-onset abnormalities prior to full illness (Alderton 
1966, p.281; Bender and Freedman 1959, p.564; Bradley 1941, p.49; Creak 1951, 
p.550; Richards 1951, p.300). Kolvin demarcates autism from childhood 
schizophrenia on age of onset despite most children with late onset having pre-onset 
conditions. This questions age of onset as best means of dividing autism from 
childhood schizophrenia.
Some of the schizophrenic children who overlapped with autistic children 
resemble modern notions of high functioning autism or Asperger’s syndrome. Kolvin 
describes one such child 
“who starts off with poor speech development and combines this with 
some personality difficulties, behaviour disorder and poor intellectual 
endowment, is perhaps made worse by teasing in early school years, 
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and drifts almost imperceptibly and insidiously around puberty into a 
simple schizophrenic state” (Kolvin et al, 1971, p.395). 
Schizophrenic children who overlap with autism in Kolvin's study parallel children 
described by child psychiatrists in 1950s to 1970s and bare similarities to high 
functioning autism of today. 
2.5 Reactions to Kolvin
2.5.1 Scientific Reactions to Kolvin
I argue that Kolvin cannot be said to have proven schizophrenic children of the 
previous decades should be considered early adult onset schizophrenic rather than 
autistic or have their own category. As shown earlier, some historians consider Kolvin 
as accomplishing this when they claim Kolvin separated autism from childhood 
schizophrenia. Let’s now consider what the 1980s and 1990s made of Kolvin's 
findings. Consider the following references, which either refers to Kolvin and 
colleagues or Rutter and colleagues.
“[The] age and developmental stage were important criteria for 
classification... Their importance was demonstrated by several 
empirical studies (Rutter & Lockyer 1967; Rutter et al. 1967; Kolvin 
1971; Kolvin et al. 1971. 1971a, 1971b, 1971c, 1971d, 1971e). Finally, 
these studies confirmed the notion of Kanner (1943, 1957), who 
subdivided childhood psychoses into three groups: early infantile 
autism, childhood schizophrenia, and disintegrative psychosis of 
childhood” (Remschmidt et al 1994, p.728). 
Remschmidt and colleagues are correct to claim Kanner did indeed employ autism and
childhood schizophrenia whilst acute childhood schizophrenia covered childhood 
disintegrative disorder and hallucinating acute onset children.15 However, for Kanner, 
15 Though Remschmit and colleagues characterisation of Kanner does not fully account for Kanner's 
position since he employed other diagnosis (children and circumscribed interests and symbiotic 
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autism was rare and had very specific diagnostic criteria, whilst childhood 
schizophrenia was much more common, could be present from birth onwards and only
involved hallucinations very rarely. More importantly, Kanner recognised autistic 
children and schizophrenic children had great similarities from around five years, 
differing over specific symptoms being present or absent from birth. For Kanner 
childhood schizophrenia is completely different to early adult onset schizophrenia, 
meaning Remschmidt et al are deeply mistaken to consider Kolvin's conclusions as 
relevant for the notion of childhood schizophrenia Kanner employed. Let’s consider 
1980s papers. “Subsequent data clarified important features of the autistic syndrome...
its lack of association with other disorders such as schizophrenia (Kolvin, 1971; 
Rutter, 1972)” (Cohen, Volkmar & Paul 1986, p.158). Also,
“[f]or a number of years, there were some who held that early infantile 
autism, or other forms of severe developmental disorder, might be such 
an expression [of early adult schizophrenia]... more recent 
epidemiological studies and retrospective chart reviews (Kolvin et al., 
1971; Rutter 1972) have tended to discredit this idea” (Tanguay & 
Cantor 1986, p.591).
Additionally, see Cantor et al (1982, p.758), Kydd & Werry (1982, p.344) and 
Volkmar et al (1988, p.191). When claiming Kovlin separated autism from childhood 
schizophrenia these papers cite child psychiatrists like Bender, Kanner, Eisenberg, 
Despert, Mahler, Rank, Szurek, Bradley, Fish and Potter but, as I argued, Kolvin's 
work has little relevance to the notion of childhood schizophrenia these child 
psychiatrists employ. 
2.5.2 DSM and Kolvin
Kolvin’s conclusions were initially largely adopted by DSM-III then slowly largely 
reversed in later editions.
DSM-I and DSM-II included childhood schizophrenia, but not autism, as a 
psychosis) and considered these, alongside autism, as subtypes of a childhood schizophrenia which 
covered both insidious and acute onset. 
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separate diagnosis. DSM-I lists no additional symptoms for childhood schizophrenia 
than those listed for schizophrenic children (APA 1952, p.28) except “[p]sychotic 
reactions in children, manifesting primarily autism” (APA 1952, p.28). The DSM-II 
added psychoanalytic concepts to childhood schizophrenia whilst autism is still a 
symptom (APA 1968, p.35). The DSM-I and the DSM-II seemingly take autism and 
childhood schizophrenia as the same disorder.
The DSM-III explicitly splits childhood schizophrenia into three categories, 
autism, childhood onset pervasive developmental disorders (COPDD) and 
schizophrenia occurring in childhood (APA 1980, p.375). The symptoms of autism are
similar to those described by Kanner. The symptoms of COPDD are social difficulties 
and odd behaviour but “the full syndrome of Infantile Autism is not present” (APA 
1980, p.89). The symptoms of schizophrenia occurring in childhood are the same as 
adult schizophrenia (APA 1980, p.35) including hallucinations and delusions (APA 
1980, p.89). Pre-adolescent onset is said to be rare (APA 1980, p.184). Onset for 
autism is prior to 30 months (APA 1980, p.88) whilst the onset of COPDD is two and 
a half to twelve years (APA 1980, p.90). Autistic individuals do not hallucinate as 
children or adults (APA 1980, p.375), children with COPDD do not hallucinate as 
children (APA 1980, p.91) but it is unknown if they will hallucinate as adults (APA 
1980, p.375) and children with schizophrenia occurring in childhood do typically 
hallucinate (APA 1980, p.89). Autism is “very rare (2-4 cases per 10,000) (APA 1980, 
p89) and COPDD is “extremely rare” (APA 1980, p.91) whilst schizophrenia 
occurring in childhood is even rarer. COPDD appears to cover both the children 
between 3-5 who decline to almost no functionality and the non-hallucinating 
schizophrenic children. On this basis, it had the potential to cover higher functioning 
individuals. However, COPDD does not have all the symptoms of autism which 
schizophrenic children used to have. Also, whereas before autism was a rare subtype 
of childhood schizophrenia, now autism is still rare but more common than COPDD.16
DSM-III does have Infantile Autism, Residual State for individuals who once met the 
criteria for infantile autism but no longer do (APA 1980, p.90), potentially covering 
individuals who met Kanner's stringent diagnostic criteria before three years but 
whose symptoms then changed. There is also Atypical Pervasive Developmental 
16  Whilst DSM prevalence figures are sometimes unreliable, especially when new categories are 
introduced, research in 1988 still considered DSM-III COPDD as rarer than DSM-III autism 
(Volkmar et al 1988, p.198).
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Disorders, “for children with distortions in the development of multiple basic 
psychological functions that are involved in the development of social skills and 
language that cannot be classified as either Infantile Autism or Childhood Onset 
Pervasive Developmental Disorders” (APA 1980, p.92). This lacks the rich descriptive
clinical picture provided by childhood schizophrenia in earlier decades. I shall 
continue my comparison of DSM editions before considering DSM-III schizoid and 
schizotypal personality disorder.
The DSM-III-R replaces autism and COPDD with pervasive developmental 
disorders (PDD). PDDs come in two forms, a severe version named autism plus a less 
severe version named PDD-NOS (pervasive developmental disorders not otherwise 
specified) (APA 1987, p.34). The children aged 4 to 5 who decline to almost no 
functionality can be diagnosed as autistic or PDD-NOS (APA 1987, p.36). DSM-III-R 
has two important relevant differences to DSM-III. Firstly, DSM-III COPDD could 
cover high-functioning individuals but COPDD was rarer than autism. In contrast, 
DSM-III-R considers PDD-NOS as three times more common than autism, meaning 
higher functioning individuals are now more common than lower functioning 
individuals (APA 1987, p.37). The second important difference is that higher 
functionality is not tied to age of onset. Most PDD (covering autism and PDD-NOS) 
have an age of onset prior to three (APA 1987, p.36) and onset after five or six years is
very rare (APA 1987, p.36).  In the DSM-III onset prior to three was slightly more 
common than onset after three whereas in DSM-III-R onset prior to three is far more 
common. DSM-III-R now has a basic notion of modern high and low functioning 
autism, with autism as lower functioning and PDD-NOS as slightly higher 
functioning. However, late onset non-hallucinating children have become even rarer. 
This partially reinstates Kanner's approach of having an overarching classification 
plus specific subtypes. Early pre-adolescent schizophrenia is still placed with the 
schizophrenia section (APA 1987, p.187) and is said to be rare (APA 1987, p.190). 
Adopting an approach even closer to Kanner's, DSM-IV expands PDD and 
loosens age of onset as a requirement for a diagnosis. PDD now also includes 
childhood disintegrative disorder which describes the children aged 3 to 5 which 
Kolvin described who decline to near zero functionality (though onset in DSM-IV can
be two to ten), Asperger’s Syndrome and Rett's disorder. Asperger's syndrome is now 
listed separately and is similar to autism except that such children do not have delayed
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language development (APA 1994, p.69). Also, “Asperger's Disorder appears to have a
somewhat later onset than Autistic Disorder, or at least to be recognized somewhat 
later” (APA 1994, p.76). Meanwhile, the addition of childhood disintegrative disorder 
allows for a diagnosis with substantial similarities to autism for children who decline 
around three or four years of age (APA 1994, p.74). The addition of Asperger’s 
Syndrome which does not have to present before three years of age and occasional 
cases similar to autism occurring after three years mean that the DSM-IV is far more 
compatible with late onset non-hallucinating children than DSM-III or DSM-III-R. 
Schizophrenic pre-adolescents are still placed within the schizophrenia category and 
are said to be rare (APA 1994, p.281).
After no changes in DSM-IV-TR (2000), DSM-5 made some substantial 
changes. All the subtypes were removed and subsumed into an autistic spectrum. 
“Autism spectrum disorder encompasses disorders previously referred 
to as early infantile autism, childhood autism, Kanner's autism, high-
functioning autism, atypical autism, pervasive developmental disorder 
not otherwise specified, childhood disintegrative disorder, and 
Asperger's disorder” (APA 2013, p.53).
Now there is no longer any distinction between autism and late onset. All symptoms 
can be present from birth or after a period of normality. This classification is now 
closer to Bender's childhood schizophrenia than the previous three DSM, an 
overarching classification which covered high and low functioning autism and 
covered present from birth and delayed onset (though onset must be earlier than some 
of Bender's schizophrenic children since “[s]ymptoms must be present in the early 
development period” (APA 2013, p.50)). Early adult schizophrenic individuals are still
considered schizophrenic and are still rare (APA 2013, p.102). 
The changes in the DSM have been quite substantial. From the 1940s to the 
1970s higher functioning individuals were considered more common than lower 
functioning individuals and late onset childhood schizophrenia was more common 
than early onset autism. DSM-III put early onset prior to three as more common than 
onset after two and a half years, whilst considering the lower functioning clinical 
picture as more common than the higher functioning clinical picture. The DSM-III-R 
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put early onset as much more common than late onset and higher functioning as more 
common than lower functioning, a situation retained by later editions. By including 
focus on higher functioning individuals, DSM-III-R and subsequent editions once 
again covered clinical pictures employed prior to DSM-III. The DSM-III changes 
described here were largely reversed by later editions; I discuss areas which were not 
reversed in section 2.7.1.
2.5.3 Schizoid and schizotypal personality disorder
An alternative location where autism might be located is schizoid and schizotypal 
personality disorder. Here I will discuss DSM-III and DSM-III-R schizoid and 
schizotypal personality disorder, alongside Sula Wolff's views. 
DSM-III schizoid disorder of childhood and adolescence does overlap with 
some of the phenomenology of modern autism. Such individuals “often appear aloof, 
reserved, withdrawn, and seclusive” (APA 1980, p.60), they are “sensitive to 
criticism” (APA 1980, p.61) and “often are vague about their goals, indecisive, 
absentminded, and detached from their environment (“not with it” or “in a fog”). They
often appear self-absorbed and engage in excessive day dreaming. They tend to pursue
solitary interests and hobbies” (APA 1980, p.61). It can be seen as early as age five 
(APA 1980, p.61), just after when Bender's pseudo-neurotics could emerge. Also, it is 
more common in boys than girls (APA 1980, p.61). All this provides some 
compatibility with modern autism. However, the repetitive activities of modern autism
are absent, differential diagnosis from pervasive developmental disorders being on no 
“marked defects in multiple areas of functioning” (APA 1980, p.61). Also, they “are 
often preoccupied with esoteric topics, such as violence or supernatural phenomena” 
(APA 1980, p.61), covering additional symptoms to modern autism. The clinical 
picture in DSM-III-R is largely similar and DSM-IV differentiates milder autism and 
Asperger's syndrome from schizoid by “more impaired social interaction and 
stereotyped behaviours and interests [in the latter]” (APA 1994, p.640).17
DSM-III schizotypal has some similarity to modern autism, though less than 
17 Note that DSM-III has schizoid disorder of childhood and adolescence alongside schizoid 
personality disorder (which is for adults), whereas DSM-IV removes the childhood specific 
diagnosis but schizoid personality disorder affect both children and adults.
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schizoid. In schizotypal “speech shows marked peculiarities: concepts may be 
expressed unclearly or oddly or words deviantly” (APA 1980, p.312), “odd speech... 
e.g., speech that is digressive, vague, overelaborate, circumstantial, metaphorical” 
(APA 1980, p.313). Also, “[u]sually some interference with social or occupational 
functioning occurs” (APA 1980, p.312). This seems weaker than modern autism which
emphasises communication difficulties and both DSM-III and DSM-III-R schizoid 
which emphasise solitariness. However, DSM-III-R places more emphasis on social 
impairment (APA 1987, p.341). Schizotypal also covers “disturbance in the content of 
thought [which] may include magical thinking (or in children, bizarre fantasies or 
preoccupations), ideas of reference, or paranoid ideation. Perceptual disturbances may
include recurrent illusions, depersonalization, or derealization” (APA 1987, p.312). 
These slightly overlap with modern autism, though symptoms not associated with 
modern autism are present such as the disturbed thinking and magical thinking. Also, 
as with schizoid, the repetitive routines are not covered and these are used for 
differential diagnosis from milder autism and Asperger's syndrome in DSM-IV (APA 
1994, p.644).
It is briefly worth considering the work of Sula Wolff, a British based 
psychiatrist working in Edinburgh who pioneered notions of schizoid personality in 
childhood. Though publishing in the late 1970s and early 1980s, her notions did not 
influence DSM-III notions of schizoid disorder of childhood and adolescence or 
schizotypal personality disorder. However, considering Wolff provides some context 
to the work of British based Kolvin and Rutter. Additionally, the workbook describing 
the process of formulating DSM-IV considered Wolff's schizoid children as PDD-
NOS ) (Szatmari 1997a, p.45). Whilst DSM-III was not historically continuous with 
earlier decades it is still important to consider if non-DSM notions deliver historical 
continuity. 
Wolff describes schizoid personality disorder children as exhibiting 
“(1) emotional detachment and solitariness, present in all subjects; (2) 
rigidity (or lack of adaptability), at times assuming obsessional 
proportions and often expressed in the form of long-lasting, 
circumscribed interests or preoccupations; (3) sensitivity with occasional
suspiciousness and paranoid ideation; (4) lack of empathy for the 
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feelings of others, at times amounting to callousness; and (5) odd 
ideation, often with metaphorical use of language and marked lack of 
guardedness. Although resembling autistic children in some respects they
never exhibited the 3 cardinal features of this syndrome (absent or 
impaired language development with echolalia; lack of emotional 
responsiveness with gaze avoidance; ritualistic and compulsive 
behaviour), all beginning under the age of 2 years” (Wolff & Chick 1980,
p.89).
This 1980s description, covering the DSM-III era, describes many aspects of modern 
autism by including both communicative and repetitive behaviour abnormalities. It is 
broader than modern autism because communication abnormalities can take the form 
of being too communicative and because of focusing on thought disorders, though 
both these were also true of childhood schizophrenia of earlier decades.
Despite this, Wolff's notion of schizoid does not adequately cover the missing 
clinical pictures absent from DSM-III which were described in earlier decades. Wolff 
writes that “[o]ur concept of schizoid personality has most in common [of DSM-III 
diagnoses] with the DSM-III definition of schizotypal personality disorder” (Wolff & 
Cull 1986, p.678), whereas DSM-III schizoid personality disorder seems closer to 
modern autism than DSM-III schizotypal. She did, however, later link her notion of 
schizoid to both DSM-III and DSM-III-R schizoid and schizotypal (Wolff 1991, 
p.619). Wolff considered her schizoid personality disorder as identical to Asperger's 
syndrome (Wolff & Chick 1980, p.88) as described by Asperger but different to 
Asperger's syndrome as described by Wing. She considered schizoid personality 
disorder as higher functioning than and much more common than Wing's Asperger's 
syndrome, which she considers rare (Wolff 1991 p.616-617). She maintained this 
stance over DSM-IV Asperger's syndrome. For Wolff's schizoid children, a diagnosis 
of “Asperger syndrome is inappropriate unless its criteria both in DSM-IV and ICD-
10 are modified to omit the exclusion of significant delays in speech and language and
of schizoid and schizotypal disorders; to specify the less severe social impairments 
and more sophisticated all-absorbing interests in comparison with autism; and to 
include a criterion for unusual fantasy” (Wolff 1995, p7). Wolff's schizoids are higher 
functioning than pervasive developmental disorders in DSM-III-R and DSM-IV. If 
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Wolff's schizoids were added to DSM-III then lower functioning individuals and much
higher functioning individuals would be covered but this still leaves a gap (individuals
not as impaired as lower functioning but more impaired than very high functioning) 
which DSM-III-R PDD-NOS and DSM-IV Asperger's syndrome filled.
2.6 Lorna Wing, Asperger's syndrome and an autistic spectrum
The 1980s DSM removed childhood schizophrenia and reformulated autism into 
something very narrow, leaving 1980s autism historically discontinuous with before 
and afterwards, notions similar to high functioning autism being absent during this 
period. However, this was partly reversed in DSM-III-R which has a distinction 
between high and low functioning autism, then near fully reversed with DSM-IV 
which introduced Asperger's syndrome. These changes can be traced back to Lorna 
Wing's work. 
Wing's (& Gould's) 1979 epidemiological study was a major step in 
formulating modern autism, ultimately introducing the autistic spectrum, the triad of 
impairments and high functioning autism. Wing's study took a selection of children 
known to a local health service and subdivided them into two categories, a socially 
impaired category and a sociable but severe mentally retarded category. She analyzed 
how various symptoms inter-related and checked the results against earlier 
classifications.
Wing found most children in the socially impaired category also exhibited 
other symptoms rarely present in the sociable but severely retarded group. 
“[M]uteness or echolalia, absence or marked repetitiveness of symbolic
activities, and an interest pattern consisting entirely or partly of 
repetitive activities occurred in virtually all of the socially impaired 
group, but these items could also have been seen in a very significantly 
smaller proportion of the sociable severely retarded children. In the 
latter, absence of symbolic activities and an interest pattern dominated 
by repetitive behaviours were found only in children with language 
comprehension ages below 20 months” (Wing & Gould 1979, p.20). 
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Wing defined social impairment based upon mental age, social impairment being 
where social skills were lower than mental age (Wing & Gould 1979, p.15). Some 
children had normal intelligence with lower comparative social skills, some had low 
mental age but with higher comparative social skills and some had low mental age 
with social skills equivalent to that mental age. Irrespective of intelligence, the above 
pattern was found only in children with weak social skills.
Wing checked her results against historically employed classifications, 
including Kanner's 1943 autism and Asperger's syndrome. The only classification that 
appeared present within her results was Kanner's autism (Wing & Gould 1979, p.19) 
yet Wing advocates abandoning Kanner's autism. His autism became statistically 
insignificant within Wing's wider symptom pattern. 
“The  social  impairment  subgroups  did  not  differ  significantly on  
the three  speech  and  behavioural  abnormalities  associated  with  
typical  autism, but  were significantly  differentiated on  all  other  
cognitive  and  behavioural variables  that  were  measured” (Wing & 
Gould 1979, p.25). 
Kanner's classification was present within the wider group but insufficiently present, 
as measured by statistical significance, whilst other factors were more significant 
when measured by how symptoms cluster. 
“Of  the  two  independent  methods  of  subclassifying  the  socially  
impaired  children,  the  system  based  on  severity  of  social 
impairment  gave more  statistically  significant  associations  with  
behavioural,  psychological, and  medical  variables  than  that  based  
on  the presence or absence  of a history of typical  autism” (Wing & 
Gould 1979, p.25).
Let’s consider what these were.
“Mutism, echolalia, absence of or repetitive symbolic activities, and an 
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interest pattern consisting entirely or partly of stereotyped activities did
not differentiate those with and without a history of typical autism. On 
the other hand, they were very significantly associated with the degree 
of social impairment. Mutism  and  stereotyped  repetitive  activities  
characterized  the aloof groups  while  the  passive  and  the  odd  
children  were more  likely  to  have repetitive  speech  and  repetitive  
symbolic  activities,  but  some  constructive pursuits  as  well” (Wing 
& Gould 1979, p.22).
Wing argues Kanner's pattern is much less significant than level of socialising. Level 
of socialising was associated with other symptoms and this held for the entire group, 
whereas children who met Kanner's specific pattern did not correlate interestingly 
with the wider pattern. She later wrote that “Wing and Gould found that there were 
many more children who also had the triad but who did not precisely fit Kanner's 
descriptions of his syndrome” (Wing 1993, p.70; also Wing 1981, p.37). Autism for 
Wing was the triad of impairment co-occurring.
Wing found within her grouping one overall class and three subclasses which 
varied on level of functioning, thus she favoured an autistic spectrum, subsuming 
Kanner's autism alongside much else. However, DSM-III largely did not cover higher 
functioning autism except for the rare childhood onset pervasive developmental 
disorders. During this period Lorna Wing advocated for Asperger's syndrome and 
developed the autistic spectrum. She became interested in the more specific and richer
classification of Asperger's syndrome because DSM-III was too restrictive (Happé 
1994, p.84). Asperger's syndrome soon gained in popularity, filling the gap Kolvin and
Rutter created. Autism was again linked with weak social skills, with mental 
retardation and with variations in severity. From around 1950 there was Kanner's 
autism, covering substantial variations in severity by age five. Also, schizophrenic 
children could start and remain as lower functioning pseudo-defectives, or start as 
higher functioning pseudo-neurotics, or move from pseudo-defectives to pseudo-
neurotics. Now there is low and high functioning autism with potential movement 
from low to high. Unlike under Kolvin and Rutter, these three symptom patterns were 
covered again. 
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2.7 Underdetermination and DSM-III autism
Kolvin's study suggested three classificatory options. He could place non-
hallucinating childhood schizophrenia with autistic children, with the early adult onset
schizophrenia or provide them their own category. It is not obvious from his sample 
why one would choose the middle option. However, much more problematic is how 
unrepresentative his sample was for comparisons with previous decades. Including so 
many hallucinating individuals means the population in his study has very little 
resemblance to previous decades. However, there are only six non-hallucinating 
schizophrenic children in a study of 33 individuals despite being much more common 
during the previous decades than autism or hallucinating schizophrenic children 
(Alderton 1966, p.282; Bender 1947, p.50; Bender 1959b, p.501; Clardy 1951, p.82; 
Clobert & Koegler 1958, p.215; Despert 1940, p.190; Eisenberg 1956, p.21; Ornitz & 
Ritvo 1968, p.78; Ornitz 1973, p.33; Richards 1951, p.303; Robinson 1961, p.544). 
Additionally, non-hallucinating schizophrenic children exhibited a wide variety of 
symptoms. There was pseudo-defectives, pseudo-neurotics and pseudo-psychopathics 
(Bender 1959b, p.492), children with circumscribed interest (Robinson & Vitale 1954,
p.755) and symbiotic psychosis (Mahler 1952, p.289). Adequately covering all these 
variations with six children is impossible. Though he had reasons for not including 
Bender's pseudo-neurotics, their absence means Kolvin's study has little relevance for 
notions of US childhood psychosis of the 1940s to 1970s – though scientists in the 
1980s onwards believed that it did. 
How does all this relate to the underdetermination argument? As chapter six 
will describe, whether there are grounds for belief partly depends upon whether a 
theory has  theoretical virtues. One major theoretical virtue is unification, which 
Kitcher specifically appeals to for resolving underdeterminations (Kitcher 1993, 
p.255). This is where as few theories as possible are employed to adequately account 
for the phenomena of a domain. Ideally, scientists would employ one theory to cover 
an entire domain. However, this theory might struggle to cover the entire domain with 
much accuracy, being too general. Accuracy could be increased through creating an 
alternative theory which achieves greater precision by being narrower but covers 
fewer phenomena. Greater accuracy leaves some phenomena not accounted for. 
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Alternatively, we might replace the original theory with two theories, each being less 
general which allows more accurate description of phenomena. Of these two options, 
the second is generally significantly preferable. What the two theory approach loses in
unification (employing two, rather than one, theory) is likely made up for in strength 
(covering more phenomena), making it superior to the single theory which leaves 
many phenomena unaccounted for.
Kolvin's and Rutter's modification of childhood schizophrenia similarly leaves 
phenomena unaccounted for. Previously, a scientific domain consisting of clusters of 
symptoms was covered by both autism and childhood schizophrenia. Upon 
implementing Kolvin's and Rutter's approach DSM-III radically narrowed the domain 
described. Those higher functioning autistic and schizophrenic children of the late 
1940s to late 1970s did not fit DSM-III. Some may have received no diagnosis. Some 
were likely diagnosed with an alternative diagnosis than autism (such as schizoid or 
schizotypal) meaning some now had a diagnosis which did not adequately account for 
many symptom profiles whereas earlier notions of childhood schizophrenia and its 
subtypes would have. Alternatively, some were effectively misdiagnosed with autism 
because autism was the closest diagnosis. Eyal and colleagues al write that “by 1987 
they [DSM-III-R committee] had evidence that clinicians were not, in fact, adhering to
the DSM-III criteria” (2010, p.235). DSM-III-R then substantially reversed the 
changes. DSM-III autism has flaws which late 1940 to late 1970s childhood 
schizophrenia and DSM-III-R autism do not have. Underdetermination is acceptable 
when two theories make similar empirical and theoretical accomplishment but DSM-
III autism is far worse on these measurements than historically continuous autism. 
Therefore, DSM-III autism is insufficient to support an underdetermination argument 
against historically continuous autism.
2.7.1 Pessimistic Meta Induction
Chapter one argued autism is resistant to pessimistic meta induction (PMI) because it 
has been historically continuous, yet this chapter offers a clear instance of historical 
change. This does not necessarily automatically entail PMI, but to understand why we 
need wait until chapter six. Briefly, PMI creates epistemic risk, our inferences 
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carrying more risk the stronger PMI is. If that risk exceeds acceptable levels of 
epistemic risk then belief is no longer justified. Additionally, PMI can have some 
strength but this may only undermine parts of a theory it applies to without 
undermining those parts it does not apply to.  
DSM-III autism gives PMI some, though not massive, strength. DSM-III 
autism was adopted due to the influence of key sources of authority rather than ideal 
scientific debate. Diagnosticians then did not adhere to DSM-III autism. Within seven 
years the DSM-III changes were substantially reversed. The levels of historical 
discontinuity are not large. Consequently, this is not a classic PMI where large 
sections of a scientific community believe in false claims for many years, but a short 
term change implemented by key figures which was initially partially ignored and 
soon largely reversed. All this strengthens PMI but not in my judgement to excessive 
levels. 
More worrying for belief in modern autism is that parts of autism from 1987 
onwards are missing parts of late 1940s to late 1970s autism and childhood 
schizophrenia. There were two major differences of symptomatology, which I now 
consider. 
From the 1930s (see Potter 1933, p.1267; Despert 1938, p.366) child 
psychiatrists believed many, perhaps the majority, of children who exhibited 
symptoms we identify with autism underwent a decline from normality. Most today 
would assume those child psychiatrists were largely mistaken. Declines from apparent
normality do occasionally occur, a modern psychologist writing that “in some 
[autistic] children problems do not appear to be apparent early in development but 
then appear later, leading to a late diagnosis” (Kaland 2011, p.985). Some regression 
is quite common for autistic children, whereby they have some normal and some 
abnormal development, then the normal development declines. Previously normal 
children fully declining are rarer. Studies disagree upon prevalence, some reporting 
this in a third of cases. However, all these declines are usually before three years, with
regression from normality after three years extremely rare (Stefanatos 2008, p309; 
Rogers 2004, p.141). Perhaps child psychiatrists of earlier decades were mistaken 
about age of onset, usually just mistakenly taking the age symptoms were noticed for 
the age symptoms first appeared. Plausibly, this was due to the influence of 
psychoanalysis, which suggested childhood schizophrenia partially involved a 
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reaction to the environment so could not be present from birth. However, PMI 
suggests our modern beliefs about age of onset are unreliable. It is not inconceivable 
that late-onset has greater prevalence than typically believed. Following PMI, claims 
over age of onset needs treating with great caution, potentially not meriting belief. 
Therefore, one aspect of modern autism may not merit belief, though this only entail 
doubts over what age symptoms are exhibited rather than if they are exhibited. PMI 
has some applicability but only to age of onset rather than over symptoms.
More worrying is that child psychiatrists, especially when  discussing 
schizophrenic children, focused more on abnormal thinking than they do today. Evans 
(2013) has insightfully charted how wider changes to theoretical beliefs moved focus 
away from the inner psychic life of autism and childhood schizophrenia towards social
and cognitive approaches. Whilst child psychiatrists of the 1950s to 1970s may have 
emphasised this too much, especially those employing highly theoretical 
psychoanalysis, modern psychiatry may place too little emphasis on this. It might be 
that abnormal thinking occurs in autism-related disorders but is currently under-
investigated. PMI is applicable here, limiting the approximate truth of autism.
Some philosophers are untroubled by false past theories given how much more
empirical evidence there is today (Fahrbach 2011, p.1283). With age of onset it is 
important to note that modern psychologists have much more information about the 
early life of individuals later diagnosed with autism through extensive screening 
programs and home video recordings, information which was far less present from the
1940s to late 1970s. Therefore, modern psychiatry goes some way to meet Fahrbach's 
condition of greater empirical evidence. In contrast, investigation of the inner psychic 
life is studied far less today than between the 1940s to 1970s. Whilst both are potential
causes for worry, missed abnormal thinking is the greater concern and likely limits to 
a greater degree the approximate truth of modern autism.
2.8 Conclusion
The underdetermination argument is a threat to scientific realism, suggesting 
alternative scientific theories may be as good as currently employed ones. It is 
undermined by assessing strengths and weaknesses of various alternative, competing 
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theories. DSM-III autism is an alternative to historically continuous autism but this 
does not entail underdetermination because DSM-III autism has major flaws which 
were soon largely reversed.
DSM-III autism is a genuine alternative to historical variations of an autistic 
spectrum. Plausibly, negative extra-scientific factors unfairly worked in favour of 
DSM-III autism and against historically continuous autism. Despite this, 
diagnosticians often ignored this DSM-III approach due to its inadequacies. It was 
soon abandoned and replaced with a basic notion of an autistic spectrum in DSM-III-
R. Reconstruction of Kolvin's approach shows substantial flaws. It is unclear that 
Kolvin choose the best way to classify non-hallucinating schizophrenic children given
his data. Additional, the sample from which data was gathered was unrepresentative of
previous decades. Finally, DSM-III autism did not accommodate many clinical 
pictures which were accommodated pre-DSM-III. Assessed by theoretical virtues, 
discussed in chapter six, DSM-III autism does weaker on unifications than historically
continuous autism. DSM-III autism does not provide a successful underdetermination 
against historically continuous autism.
This chapter does give some limited strength to the pessimistic meta induction 
but not sufficient to carry substantial epistemic risk. Additionally, some significant 
concerns are raised about modern approaches to thought disorders as not meriting 
belief; thought disorders may be present and modern psychiatry would have higher 
approximate truth if it described them. Some weaker concerns have been flagged up 
about age of onset. Chapter six covers issues over belief, approximate truth and 
acceptable levels of epistemic risk. For now, neither PMI nor underdetermination offer
strong reason to disbelieve in autism. 
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3.0 Chapter 3 – The Theoretical 
Robustness of Autism
3.1 Introduction
Having covered pessimistic meta induction and underdetermination let’s now consider
the third sceptical argument, theory laden nature of evidence. The worry is that what 
observations are made depends upon what theories the scientist holds. 
“Theory-ladenness implies that when an observer has a false theory 
their observations will be distorted by their false beliefs. Unfortunately 
it is likely that much current psychiatric theory is mistaken... 
psychiatrists' false beliefs can be expected to distort their observations 
of their patients and prevent them from seeing the true similarities and 
differences between types of mental disorder” (Cooper 2005, p.77). 
If theories are epistemologically insecure then observations dependent upon those 
theories will also be epistemologically insecure. We would lack justification for 
believing in any aspects of autism dependent upon such theories.
I show autism is theory-laden but only in an unproblematic manner. To do this,
I provide an historical analysis comparing descriptions of autism under psychoanalysis
and cognitive psychology. Both offer radically different accounts of the causes and 
nature of autism. Though I do not specifically show either is false, I am not willing to 
claim either merits belief. This means any aspect of autism theory-laden by 
psychoanalysis or cognitive psychology is in turn epistemologically insecure. Autism 
merits belief to the degree to which belief is justified over the symptoms and how 
those symptoms are grouped together into a classification. Belief would be 
undermined if the symptoms or classification is dependent upon cognitive psychology 
or psychoanalysis unless I first showed those theories merit belief – something which 
I do not commit to. I can undermine such concerns by identifying parts of autism 
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which were described by both psychoanalysts and cognitive psychologists. My history
shows most symptoms were described by both psychoanalysts and cognitive 
psychologists whilst the classification was formulated in fairly similar ways. Most 
symptoms and the classification are thus not dependent upon either theory. Assuming 
psychoanalysis or cognitive psychology (or both) turn out mistaken, this does not 
entail those symptoms or the classification will also turn out wrong.
The chapter first outlines theory-laden nature of evidence.  I then discuss 
cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis. I show that most symptoms and 
classification of autism described by proponents of these theories are broadly similar 
to modern autism. Where there are differences I discuss them in detail. Finally, I 
compare my findings to different types of theory-ladeness.
3.2 Theory-laden nature of evidence
The classic text on the theory-laden nature of evidence is Kuhn (1996 [1962]) but 
Kuhn make many diverse claims which need separating out; Bogen (2013) divides 
Kuhn's claims into three types, ones which Cooper roughly also employs (2005, p.80).
The strongest version of theory-laden evidence is perceptual loading (Bogen 
2013). Scientists with different theories see the world differently, they have different 
visual experiences depending upon what theories they hold. If the account of theory-
laden evidence most applicable to autism is perceptual loading then it would appear 
that the symptoms of autism actually depend upon highly contingent theories, 
suggesting those symptoms would have weak epistemological justification.
The next strongest level of theory-laden evidence is semantic theory loading 
(Bogen 2013). According to this, “theoretical commitments exert a strong influence on
observation descriptions, and what they are understood to mean” (Bogen 2013). If the 
'observation descriptions' of autistic people are heavily influenced by theory then this 
also suggests the symptoms formulated are dependent upon theories, potentially ones 
with negative epistemic consequences.
The weakest level of theory-laden evidence is salience (Bogen 2013). This is 
where scientists look at or attend to different things based upon the theories they hold. 
If autism best fits this version of theory-laden evidence the strength of this 
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epistemological concern depends upon the extent to which theories narrow the 
attention of scientists.
Due to the perceptual nature of perceptual loading it is very difficult to 
establish instances of it from subjective reports of scientists. However, we do not have
to find instances of perceptual loading to be sceptical about the symptoms or 
explanations of autism since semantic theory loading would be adequate for 
scepticism. If semantic theory loading does not apply then neither will perceptual 
loading, therefore establishing that the symptoms of autism avoid semantic theory 
loading also shows they avoid perceptual loading. Since semantic theory loading is 
much easier to detect this chapter will focus on semantic theory loading over 
perceptual loading. Salience will also be investigated, though this is less 
epistemologically worrying than semantic theory loading. 
The historical study below intends to show that the observation description 
aspect of semantic theory loading largely does not apply to symptoms or 
classifications. This also rules out perceptual loading. By contrast, what is thought to 
cause symptoms is heavily theory laden and therefore we should not believe in 
meanings or explanations assigned to them. Salience does apply in a limited manner 
but not to the majority of symptoms of autism or the classification.
3.3 Psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology and autism
Kuhn outlines major changes in theoretical conceptions of the world, such as 
Newtonian to relativistic physics (Kuhn 1996, p.101-102) or the affinity theory of 
chemistry to Dalton's atomic theory of chemistry (Kuhn 1996, p. 130-133). Kuhn 
argues these involved a compete shift in perspective, the world appearing in a new 
way after theory change. Psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology are two very 
different ways to conceptualise autism. I examine descriptions of autism provided by 
proponents of each type of theory to see if they see autism differently.
I do not argue psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology are false but here I 
mention possible reasons for doubt. Psychoanalysis supplied explanations of autism 
that were once popular whereas now most popular explanation of autism comes from 
cognitive psychology. Employing the pessimistic meta induction, instances of shifting 
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theoretical explanations suggests theoretical explanation may change again, 
undermining belief in psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology. Secondly, both are 
potentially competing theories, providing potentially contradictory explanations of the
same phenomena. Employing underdetermination, we cannot work out which one is 
correct.  
There are four possible relationships between these theories and inferences of 
symptoms and classifications. Firstly, a psychoanalyst (for example) might explicitly 
employ psychoanalysis when describing symptoms and classifications. Secondly, a 
psychoanalyst might unconsciously employ psychoanalysis when describing 
symptoms and classifications. They may believe symptoms and classifications have 
been observed or inferred on some other theory, but actually the inference was 
primarily or entirely unconsciously due to their psychoanalytical theory. Thirdly, the 
psychoanalyst did not consciously or unconsciously use psychoanalysis when 
inferring symptoms and classifications. They fully endorse psychoanalysis, potentially
attempting to employ psychoanalysis where possible, but symptoms and classification 
are inferred using theories other than psychoanalysis. Fourthly, the psychoanalyst 
consciously or unconsciously employed psychoanalysis but the inference process 
mostly rested upon other theories, psychoanalysis having little influence on the 
symptoms and classifications formulated compared to other theories. The first and 
second options undermine belief in symptoms and classification. The third and fourth 
possibility does not undermine inferences over symptoms and classification. 
3.3.1 Modern Symptoms
Below are a list of symptoms taken from two of the most well-known texts on autism, 
Uta Frith's Autism: Explaining the Enigma (1989 1st edition, 2003 2nd edition) and 
Francesa Happe's Autism: Introduction to Psychological Theory (1994). The 
symptoms listed below provide a bench mark from which a comparison with 
psychoanalytical notions of autism could be measured by. 
Happe Frith
Social Social
Pester with questions and monologues Too talkative (p.3)
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(p.19)
Stereotyped and repetitive use of 
language (p.36)
Repetitive language (p.3)
Not reciprocal social interactions (p.83) Not understand social concept (p.3)
Impaired recognition of affect (p.36), 
lacking empathy  (p.83)
Difficulty interpreting emotion (p.109)
Odd language (p.19), idiosyncratic use of 
words, abnormal pitch, stress, intonation 
(p.37), stereotyped speech (p.83)
Idiosyncratic word use, peculiar phrases 
(p.121), peculiar voice (p.3)
Echolalia (p.19) Echolalia  (p.121)
Monotone voice (p.83) Monotone voice (p.103)
Inability to share and direct attention 
(p.35), failure to respond to other's speech
(p.36)
Respond less to name being called (p.103)
Possible delay or lack of development of 
speech (p.36)
Delayed or absent language (p.103)
Prominal reversal (p.37) Substituting I and you (p.124)
Seem cut off from others (p.19) Not look up when name called (p.2)
Little face expressions (p.83) Fewer social smiles (p.103)
Failure to initiate or sustain conversation 
(p.37)
Inappropriate gestures  (p.83)
Semantic conceptual difficulties (p.37)
Fairly normal phonology and grammer 
(p.37)
Abnormal non-verbal communication 
(p.37)
Little interest when spoken to (p.2)
Social praise and disapproval difficult to 
apply (p.103)
Dislike and not understand criticism 
(p.103)
Literal (p.3)
Less eye contact (p.103)
Looks through people (p.103)
Poor language (p.3)
Repetitive Repetitive
Obsessions (p.37), repetitive activities 
(p.37), enjoys repetitive activities (p.83), 
stereotyped movements (p.83), 
Absorbed in repetitive activities (p.2), 
stereotypies, obsessions, compulsions 
(p.173)
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circumscribed special interests (p.83)
Spinning wheels (p.19) Spinning wheels (p.2)
Preservation of sameness (p.19) Require specific order (p.2)
Resistant to change  (p.83)
Dislike routines being disrupted (p.37)
Hyperstimulous (p.169)
Lower sensitivity to sensations (p.170)
Prefers certain foods and clothes
(170)
Other Other
Good rote memory  (p.83) Good rote memory (p.145)
Clumsy, gait and posture odd, gross 
movements  (p.83)
Ungainly gait (p.3), stiff posture (p.110)
Lack of pretend and symbolic play (p.37)
No interest in fiction (p.19)
Not creative and do not show pretend 
play, with inappropriate thoughts (p.84)
 No anticipatory posture (p.2)
Sensitive to certain sounds (p.2)
Did not point to things or  look at things 
when pointed at (p.2)
Flapping hand (p.2)
Good at geometry (p.3)
Difficulty remembering faces (p.104)
Naïve (p.3)
Some good at reading and maths (p.142)
Self absorbed (p.1), obstinate (p.3)
Seeing everything as black and white 
(p.127)
Difficulty with irony (p.128)
No sense of humour (p.128)
Islets of ability (p.143)
3.3.2 Modern Classifications
There are three popular approaches to subdividing modern autism. I discuss these then
later see how these subdivisions relate to the three cognitive psychological theories. 
Firstly, DSM-IV subdivides Pervasive Developmental Disorders into autism, 
Asperger's syndrome and pervasive developmental disorders not otherwise specified 
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(PDD-NOS).18 This is usually interpreted as each category reflecting severity of 
symptoms (though some rare PDD-NOS take a very severe late onset disintegrative 
form). Secondly, Wing subdivides autism into aloof children, passive children and 
active but odd children (Wing & Gould 1979). Thirdly, many endorse level of IQ for 
subdivision (Borden & Ollendick 1994, p.33; Prior et al 1998, p.900; Witwer & 
Lecavalier 2008, p.1621).
All these three subdivisions appear related. Wing's three categories are linked 
to severity of symptoms, aloof children being most impaired whilst active but odd are 
least impaired (Borden & Ollendick 1994, p.26). Similarly, aloof children are more 
autistic whilst higher functioning children usually fit active but odd (Belinger & Smith
2001, p.417). Caselloe & Dawson (1993, p.235) also found aloof children more 
autistic. So two subdivisions, Wing's categories and level of functioning, are related. 
Additionally, Wing's subdivisions relate to IQ. Aloof have the lowest IQ whilst active 
but odd children are highest (Belinger & Smith 2001, p.413; Castelloe & Dawson 
1993, p.235; Joseph et al 2002, p.818). Finally, level of functioning and level of IQ 
also relate, higher functioning individuals usually, though not always, having higher 
intellect than lower functioning individuals. This suggests all three methods of 
subdividing autism are linked. The DSM classifies on level of functioning which fits 
Wing's classifications which also have different levels of functioning. Subdivisions 
also occur on level of IQ and this matches Wing's classifications which also differ on 
IQ, as do DSM subdivisions over levels of functioning.
3.4 Cognitive Psychology
There are three main cognitive psychological accounts of autism: problems with 
theory of mind, weak central coherence, or executive functioning. Here I establish if 
autism is theory-laden by any of these cognitive psychological theories by seeing if 
each describes symptoms or classifications which the others do not (I consider 
psychoanalysis later). 
The account of autism that sees it as stemming from difficulties with theory of 
18 I mention DSM-IV here because it covers the period in which most cognitive psychological texts I 
discuss were published. DSM-5 removes Asperger's syndrome but notions of a spectrum varying in 
severity are present (APA 2013, p.53) and arguably stronger than in DSM-IV. 
107
mind reasoning claims non-autistic people have a theory of mind which autistic people
either lack or are deficient in. Theory of mind is 
“being able to infer the full range of mental states (beliefs, desires, 
intentions, imagination, emotions, etc.) that cause action. In brief, 
having a theory of mind is to be able to reflect on the contents of one’s 
own and other’s mind… Difficulty in understanding other minds is a 
core cognitive feature of autism spectrum conditions” (Baron-Cohen 
2001, p.3). 
Not appreciating fully that other people are thinking beings, autistic people fail to 
understand the perspective of others. This causes autistic people social difficulties and 
accounts for their lack of imagination.
The account of autism that sees it as stemming from weak central coherence 
claims that non-autistic people form meanings from perceptual information whilst 
autistic people instead focus on individual pieces of information without placing a 
wider meaning upon it. Normal people
process incoming information for meaning and gestalt (global) form, 
often at the expense of attention to or memory for details and surface 
structure. The tendency, referred to by Bartlett (1932) as “drive for 
meaning”, was termed “central coherence” by Frith. Individuals with 
ASD were hypothesised to show “weak central coherence”; a 
processing bias for featural and local information and relative failure to
gist or “see the big picture’ in everyday life” (Happe & Frith 2006, p.5-
6). 
The focus on local information means that autistic people focus on detail, accounting 
for obsessive interests and their difficulties seeing the perspectives of others.
The final account suggests that non-autistic people use executive functioning 
for planning and decision making but autistic people may be deficient in it.
“ 'Executive  functioning' is traditionally used as an umbrella term for 
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functioning such as planning, working memory, impulse control, 
inhibition, and shifting set, as well as initiation and monitoring of 
action… Historically these functions have been linked to frontal 
structures of the brain, and to prefrontal cortex in particular. These 
functions share the need to disengage from the immediate environment 
in order to guide actions” (Hill 2004, p.191). 
Difficulties with planning and decision making accounts for the focused and often 
impractical approach autistic people take to life.
Each cognitive psychological theory largely complements one another, rather 
than competes. Each theory broadly accepts the main findings of the other theories, in 
that each describes sets of behaviour which are generally accepted by cognitive 
psychologists. Weak central coherence occurs across the spectrum (Happe & Frith 
2006, p.18; Pellicano et al 2006, p.91). Many autistic people pass basic theory of mind
tests, though most struggle excessively with more complicated theory of mind tests 
(Baron-Cohen 2001, p.19). Rajendran & Mitchell (2007, p.233) think it is unclear if 
executive functioning deficits are universal in autism whilst Hill (2004, p.224) thinks 
executive functioning deficits are not universal. For example, an advocate of 
executive functioning is not sceptical about mentalizing deficits and does not think 
they can be explained away by executive functioning (Russel 1997, p.1). 
Disagreements are not about what symptoms are exhibited; rather disagreements 
mainly relate to the level of theoretical explanations, to whether one explanation 
reduces down to another or if one explanation causes another. Weak central coherence 
may be linked to executive functioning, “failure to process information globally might
be argued to follow from problems in shifting between local and global levels” 
(Happe & Frith 2006, p.19) though it does not appear reducible to executive 
functioning (Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, p.243). Executive functioning may cause 
theory of mind deficits, presence of executive functioning being predictive of theory 
of mind deficits whereas the reverse is not true (Hill 2004, p.221). Theory of mind 
may actually be reducible to executive functioning (Rajendran & Mitchell 2007, 
p.237). Despite this overlap between all three theories, they currently are independent 
because no single explanation accounts for all three (Volkmar et al 2004, p.141). 
Each theory broadly accepts modern autism; they do not each propose a 
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different account of the symptoms or provide different classifications. They are not 
mentioned within DSM. They are not mentioned in the DSM-IV sourcebook (which 
discussed reasoning for proposed changes from DSM-III-R to DSM-IV) for either 
autism (Szatmari 1997b) or PDD-NOS (which primarily discussed Asperger's 
syndrome) (Szatmari 1997a). Arguably, amongst the three most well-known books on 
autism are Baron-Cohen (1997), Frith (2003) and Happe (1994), and these are often 
employed on undergraduate courses. Frith (2003) and Happe (1994) discuss all three 
cognitive psychological theories. They believe all three cognitive psychological 
defects can occur in the same person, therefore, each defect is not specific to a subtype
of autism. Baron-Cohen (1997) only discusses theory of mind but his account of the 
symptoms and classification of autism is similar to Frith (2003) and Happe (1994). 
Also, Frith (2003), Happe (1994) and Baron-Cohen (1997) define autism in terms of 
DSM symptoms, suggesting all three theories are compatible with DSM. A review 
article extensively covering autism (Volkmar et al 2004) discusses all three cognitive 
psychological theories but does not subdivide autism on them or associate each with 
different symptoms. Rajendran & Mitchell (2007) review all three theories whilst 
Baron-Cohen (2001) reviews theory of mind, Frith & Happe (2006) review weak 
central coherence and Hill (2004) review executive functioning but none discuss 
subdivisions of autism on cognitive psychological theories. Cognitive psychological 
theories seek to explain DSM accounts of autism rather than modify it.
All this suggests each cognitive psychological theory is not, when measured 
against one another, theory-laden in a problematic way. That is, if cognitive 
psychology were adopted as a standpoint, there appears no further problematic theory-
ladeness in relation to autism from each theory. Whichever theory is used a similar 
account of autism is formulated, both at the level of symptoms and classification. On 
this basis neither perceptual loading nor semantic theory-ladeness seems applicable. 
However, salience is highly applicable. For example, an advocate of executive 
functioning remarks that 
“research – especially recent research – in autism has neglected the 
existence of behavioural rigidity in its various forms (resistance to 
change, obsession with regularity, stereotypes, lack of spontaneity)” 
(Russell 1997, p.1)
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Russell describes how Theory of Mind dominated autism research and how this made 
psychologists focus on particular aspects of autism at the cost of others. Inhibiting 
research in this manner is clearly unwise. Similarly, Russel suggests treatment can be 
influenced by which cognitive psychological theory is employed. If a theory of mind 
module never developed, it cannot be remedied by medication, so treatment usually 
focuses on training programs for teaching other means of assigning mental states to 
others. In contrast, problems with executive functioning could be caused by different 
parts of the brain not communicating because chemical neurotransmitters are not 
activating, something which drugs might potentially assist with (Russel 1997, p.15). 
Additionally, modifying the environment might be more suitable than training 
programs for weak executive functioning (Russel 1997, p.15). Salience is important 
but it does not raise substantial problems for scientific realism. It just means some 
parts of autism are emphasised more or less than other symptoms; it does not entail 
these parts are real or not real.
3.5 Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalysts do not clearly outline specific classifications. Consequently, 
psychoanalytical texts need detailed investigation to establish what symptoms they 
associated with autism and what classifications they employ. The texts chosen are 
Bettelheim (1967) because it is the most famous psychoanalytical text on autism, 
Tustin (1981) because it is often credited as the most sophisticated and Rhode & 
Klauber (2004a) because is covers relatively recent notions of autism, basing its 
notion of autism on the DSM-IV.19
3.5.1 Psychoanalytical explanations of autism
Historically, many psychoanalysts believed autism is the rejection of or lack of a 
notion of external reality, caused by an inability to accept an aspect of external reality. 
19  The book describes itself as the only book to analyses Asperger's syndrome from a psychoanalytical
perspective.
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According to some psychoanalysts all children initially lack a concept of the external 
world, only being aware of themselves, making everyone initially autistic (Bettelheim 
1967, p.4; Tustin 1981, p.18).20 As they age children gain awareness of the external 
world, however, some encounter aspects of reality they cannot deal with, consequently
rejecting external reality and remaining autistic. Bettelheim thinks autism is caused by
the child firstly rejecting the mother which then causes the mother to consciously or 
unconsciously reject the child. This means the child does not gain an adequate 
response from their environment. “[A]utism is a state of mind that develops in 
reaction to feeling oneself in an extreme situation entirely without hope” (Bettelheim 
1967, p68). The child believes they cannot influence the world, consequently 
retreating into their own world (Bettelheim 1967, p.46). Tustin thinks the realisation 
there exists an external world where desires might go unsatisfied is a massive stress 
(Tustin 1981, p.5). Children usually build up capacities to handle this stress prior to 
awareness of the external world, however, sometimes the realisation occurs before the 
capacities develop and sometimes the capacities never develop (Tustin 1981, p.5). 
Unable to accept external reality they remain autistic. “[A]utism is a system of 
protective manoeuvres, the function of which is to prevent or to massively diminish 
contact with the ‘not-me’ outside world” (Tustin 1981, p.173 emphasis original).
Rejecting the external world causes abnormal development. Bettelheim thinks 
that in the autistic child the personality does not develop properly, writing that “while 
they probably do not experience the world as the infant does, what they experience is 
not mediated through a complex personality, or at least not as complex as in normal 
children their age” (Bettelheim 1967, p.5). Emotional and intellectual level remains at 
or returns to the autism stage, focusing on the self and not the outside world. Tustin 
thinks rejecting the external world and a focus on the self results in abnormal notions 
of reality. She writes “the ‘reality’ of a psychotic child are [sic] different from ours 
because the apparatus which makes the construction [of someone’s notion of reality] is
in a different state of formation” (Tustin 1981, p.216). Both Bettelheim and Tustin 
think that autistic children develop abnormally. 
Bettelheim and Tustin think unusual development gives autistic children an ab-
normal understanding of the world, including developing abnormal concepts. These 
abnormal concepts then influence how the child interacts with the world. Bettelheim 
20 Tustin later abandoned this claim (1991, p.585) and the modern text on Asperger’s syndrome 
specifically rejects it (Rhode 2004a, p.13)
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thinks they fear disappointment so they refuse to hope by assuming the future cannot 
change, assuming the future will always be the same as the present. Believing there 
will be no changes means “[i]n the autistic child’s world the chain of events is not 
conditioned by the causality we [non-autistic people] know” (Bettelheim 1967, p.84). 
Rejecting typical notions of causation also means they reject typical notions of time 
(Bettelheim 1967, p.84). Tustin thinks autistic children, having rejected external reali-
ty, focus on immediate sensation and conceive of the world in terms of sensation. 
“[F]or the infant, “being” is a stream of sensations. Put in another way, in earliest 
days, the infant is the stream of sensations from which constructs gradually emerge as 
nameless entities” (Tustin 1969, p.31 emphasis original). Thus the world for autistic 
children consists of “bodily rhythms and crude sensations” (Tustin 1981, p.254) and 
they interpret the world in light of these bodily sensations unlike most people who in-
terpret external things socially. “[T]hese auto-generated, auto-sensual protective reac-
tions appear in external behaviour as what are usually called ‘stereotypes (rocking, 
hand flapping, finger flicking, twirling, object twirling, toe walking, etc.)” (Tustin 




Most of the symptoms described by Bettelheim in his book The Empty Fortress are 
also associated with modern autism, as covered in the table above.
Symptoms similar to modern autism Symptoms not similar to modern autism
Routines (p.53) Initially developed speech and then gave 
up (p.31)21
Rituals and terrible reaction if ritual fails
(p.54)
“unremitting fear for their lives” (p.63)
Fantasy world (p.55) “seem convinced that death is immanent” 
(p.63)
Mutism (p.56) Disorganised thinking (p.80)
21 Whilst a small minority of mute autistic children do initially talk then lose the ability, this is 
extremely rare whereas Bettelheim claims this always occurs.
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Withdrawn (p.56) Hallucinations (p.116)
Talk to self (p.57) Limp and non-reactive (p.101)
Self-created language (p.57)
Insensitive to pain (p.57)
Poor coordination (p.59)
Insistence on sameness (p.62)
Total non-action (p.62)
Hostility (p.62)
Rote memory, listing name or places 
(p.67) 
Anxiety (p.74)
No practical skills (p.75)
Immaturity (p.75)








Likes spinning stuff (p.233)




Uses third person to talk to others 
(p.244)
Likes making long lists (p.429)
This list covered many symptoms of modern autism. On this basis there is no 
immediate large threat from theory-ladeness over symptoms. I will discuss dissimilar 
symptoms later.
- 3.5.2.2 Classification
Bettelheim mentions two different classifications of psychotic children but provides 
few specific symptoms for each classification. Schizophrenic children have the least 
autistic withdrawal. Autistic children insist on maintenance of the same and have more
autistic withdrawal. Also there are mute children who are the most autistic withdrawn 
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(Bettelheim 1967, p.75-76). No other symptoms are specifically assigned to any 
classification and Bettelheim never elaborates upon the relationship between these 
disorders except to describe autism as a more severe subgroup of childhood 
schizophrenia (Bettelheim 1967, p.6). Though he does not explicitly state this, 
occasional comments suggest that all claims about schizophrenia also apply to autism 
but autistic individuals have additional characteristics (for example, see Bettelheim 
(1967, p.67)).
Bettelheim provides no firm figures for age of onset. Autistic children are 
normal until 18 to 24 months and “no obvious deviation or dramatization [is evident] 
at the earliest age, though it may have occurred” (Bettelheim 1967, p.31). This 
suggests Bettelheim believes autistic children decline from normality but at ages 
substantially lower than typical accounts of childhood schizophrenia. Bender, for 
example, thought pseudo-neurotics decline from around age four. Contradictory, he 
says autism is present from one year of age (Bettelheim 1967, p.393). The only figure 
given for age of onset for childhood schizophrenia is a specific child who declined at 
age four (Bettelheim 1967, p.118). Whilst all these figures are compatible with autism 
as early onset and childhood schizophrenia as late onset, more clarity from Bettelheim
would be required for this conclusion. 
Bettelheim believes schizophrenic children have better prognosis than autism. 
Schizophrenic children usually recover after a few years of intense therapy 
(Bettelheim 1967, p.409) but most still have problems. They still have difficulties with
empathy (Bettelheim 1967, p.416) and about half who recover are still schizoid or 
borderline (Bettelheim 1967, p.415). This parallels Kanner's autism where some 
individuals became much less impaired as they aged and Bender's schizophrenic 
children where heavily impaired pseudo-defectives could grow into less impaired 
pseudo-neurotics and even less impaired pseudo-psychopathics. Although no 
symptoms are given for schizoid and borderline, children who lack empathy and have 
sufficient symptoms (the post-recovery abnormalities) to warrant a new diagnosis 
possibly suggests modern high functioning autism. If recovery is interpreted as 
evidence of higher functioning autism then the lower rates of recovery for autistic 
children suggests lower functioning.  Bettelheim can be interpreted as having both a 
high and low functioning autism, corresponding to his notions of childhood 




To understand the symptoms Tustin assigns I must first briefly outline her 
classification. Tustin bases her classification on psychoanalytical theory. Children 
might fail to accept the distinction between themselves and the external world in two 
different ways. Those who retreat into their own world, rejecting external reality, are 
encapsulators; they encapsulate themselves in their own world and are “scarcely 
aware of the outside world” (Tustin 1981, p.39). Tustin believes her classification of 
encapsulators is “virtually identical” (Tustin 1981, p.34) to autism (she does not 
specify which diagnosis of autism she refers to). Alternatively, children who fail to 
make the distinction between themselves and the external world are confusional; they 
confuse the internal world and the external world. Discussing confusional children she
writes that “some of whom have features in common with adult schizophrenics... but 
not all Confusional children are Childhood Schizophrenics” (Tustin 1981, p.34). Her 
psychoanalytical theory partially matches classifications employed between 1943 and 
1978.
The below table lists symptoms associated and not associated with modern 
autism for both encapsulators and confusional children.
Autistic symptoms of both Encapsulators and Confusional
Clumsy (p.21)
Fascinated by mechanism (p.21)
Spin objects obsessively (p.21)
Hard rather than soft cuddly toys (p.21) 
Fussy eaters (p.21)
Use other people’s limbs to open doors (p.21)
Often mute (p.21)
Avoid looking at people (p.21)
Intelligence seems likely (but untestable) (p.21)
Preservation of sameness (p.37)
Weak symbolising capacities (p.123)
Sometimes strong sensory powers (p.138)
Autistic symptoms of Encapsulator Autistic symptoms of Confusional
Avert their eyes (lack eye contact) (p.35) Some hyperactive (p.36)
Shy and withdrawn (p.35) Play in unhealthy way (p.39)
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Quiet and gentle (p.36) May use pronoun reversal (p.40)
Unusual memory (p.37)
Do not play (p.39)
Rarely talk and when do talk use 
echolalia and pronoun reversal (p.40)
Do not body mould (p.35)
Non-autistic symptoms of Encapsulator Non-autistic symptoms of Confusional
Difficulties with contrasts like hot and 
cold, light and dark (p.133)
Difficulties with contrasts like hot and 
cold, light and dark (p.133) 
Some can spontaneously recover (p.21) Some can spontaneously recover (p.21)
Not clumsy (p.35) Soft and flaccid muscle tones (p.35)
Hard muscular bodies (p.35) Do not avert eyes (they give eye contact) 
but might have unfocused and bleary eyes
(p.35)
Aware of the shapes but not insides of 
objects (p.125)
Not shy and withdrawn (p.35)
Bad health (p.36)
Some limp and placid (p.36)
Hallucinations (p.37)
Heavy fantasy life but not 
psychologically sophisticated (p.40)
Encapsulators are reasonably similar to modern autism. The difficulty encapsulators 
have conceptualising contrasts and their unawareness of the insides of objects are 
symptoms not associated with modern autism. The claims that these children have 
hard muscular bodies is not incompatible with modern autism though if true it is 
puzzling that this symptom is absent from modern autism since it should be relatively 
easy to detect. It is possible she means hard and muscular in contrast to confusional 
children who have limp bodies. The claim that encapsulators can spontaneously 
recover is also incompatible though this only applies to very few encapsulators, 
suggesting the minority of encapsulators who do recover were not low functioning 
autistic. Whilst not identical, Tustin's account of encapsulators is largely compatible 
with modern autism. 
Confusional children are more difficult to interpret as autistic. The least 
worrying symptoms are having a heavy but not psychologically sophisticated fantasy 
life. Autistic people are known to live in their own world, though Tustin describes this 
in far more detail than modern psychologists typically do. Having difficulty 
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conceptualising contrasts like light and dark is not associated with modern autism. 
The notion that confusional children do not lack eye contact is extremely worrying 
since this is relatively easy to detect in autistic people, are very common in autistic 
people and are considered a sign of autism by modern psychologists. Soft and flaccid 
muscle tones, bad health and being limp and placid have been linked to autism 
(Filiano et al 2002, p.438) though this is rare. Tustin says confusional children usually 
have this body type, meaning it is not rare. Confusional children being not shy and 
withdrawn could have some compatibility with modern autism, the low social skills of
some autistic people causes them to be overly friendly, overly talkative, invading the 
space of others. It is unclear if 'not shy and withdrawn' means these confusional 
children are normal in this regard or are overly friendly, the latter making them 
compatible with autism. The most problematic are the notions that confusional 
children have hallucinations and that a small minority recover spontaneously. None of 
these are associated with modern autism. Although many symptoms of confusional 
children are associated with modern autism, a substantial number are not.
- 3.5.3.2 Classification
Tustin divides both encapsulators and confusional children into primary and 
secondary types.  Encapsulators are either globally encapsulated primary shell types 
(Tustin 1981, p.22) or secondary segmented types whose impairment “is not total as in
the shell-type children” (Tustin 1981, p.23). Secondary segmented children are 
defined psychoanalytically, Tustin writing that “threatening 'not self' objects are 
broken up into segments until they can be brought together in familiar 'me' terms” 
(Tustin 1981, p.30), suggesting these children can partially understand the external 
world, unlike presumably primary shell types whose global impairment means the 
external world cannot be conceptualised in terms of the self and thus never accepted. 
The only symptom demarcating each group is shell-types are usually mute whereas 
segmented-types are usually not (Tustin 1981, p.23). A primary shell-type case study 
looks like low functioning autism (she presents no secondary segmented type case 
studies). Tustin appears to name confusional children with childhood schizophrenia as 
primary confusional children whilst confusional children who are not childhood 
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schizophrenic are secondary fragmented confusional children (Tustin 1981, p.70). 
Unfortunately, rather than list specific symptoms to demarcate primary and secondary 
confusional children she instead only provides a case study of each disorder (Tustin 
1981, p.45-48) without any analysis. Both resembled low functioning autism and it 
was unclear how primary and secondary confusional children differ beyond having 
different psychoanalytical connotations.
Tustin claims that confusional children are more difficult to treat than 
encapsulators but it is unclear if this is related to severity of illness. This would 
initially appear to suggest that confusional children have a more severe illness than 
encapsulators in contrast to my claims in earlier chapters that suggested many 
schizophrenic children were higher functioning. However, Tustin's claims over 
difficulty treating each category appear based in psychoanalytical theory and might 
not be indicative of severity of illness. She writes that “treatment situation with regard
to Confusionals is more difficult than with the Encapsulated Childhood Autistic 
because it is complicated by this pathological entanglement with the ‘not-self’, and 
because fragments of the ‘self’ are felt to be dispersed and scattered, so that ‘self’ and 
‘not-self’ are inextricably confused” (Tustin 1981, p.34). Tustin appears to consider 
confusional children more difficult to treat because of their specific psychoanalytical 
problems. She makes similar claims about the sub-types of encapsulators and 
confusional children, writing that “secondary pathological autism of the segmented 
Encapsulated and the fragmented Confusional children has become intensified as the 
result of the disturbance, and this increases the difficulties in treating them” (Tustin 
1981, p.55). This claim appears to only make sense if there is little connection 
between treatment and severity of symptoms. Primary shell-type encapsulators are 
mute and so probably would be considered very low functioning yet Tustin claims 
secondary segmented encapsulators are harder to treat, suggesting no link between 
Tustin's claims about treatment potential and level of functioning.
Tustin appears to endorse notions of age of onset employed from the 1950s to 
1970. Encapsulators have symptoms present from birth or just after (Tustin 1981, 
p.36-37) whereas confusional start normal and then decline by before six to seven 
years of age (Tustin 1981, p.61). Tustin later changed her mind about age of onset and 
childhood schizophrenia. Writing in 1994, she no longer considered schizophrenic 
children to be in an autistic state (Tustin 1994, p.111). She also believes that children 
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with Asperger's syndrome had a late onset (Tusin 1994, p.144). Asperger's syndrome 
is not discussed in her 1981 book, however, due to their late onset they would be 
incompatible with encapsulators and have to fit confusional. This would heavily 
support the notion that at least some in Tustin's 1981 book would today fit Asperger’s 
syndrome.
Tustin does not appear to link age of onset to specific outcome. Tustin states 
that both encapsulators and confusional children can become adult schizophrenic 
(Tustin 1981, p.62). This is problematic since neither autism nor Asperger's syndrome 
is today associated with schizophrenia. If Tustin's observations are accurate then 
clearly at least some encapsulators and some confusional children were not on the 
autistic spectrum. However, as discussed above, it looks like only primary confusional
children resemble schizophrenic children, secondary confusional children do not 
resemble schizophrenic children. It would therefore be possible that only the 
secondary confusional children become adult schizophrenic whereas primary 
confusional children do not, meaning primary confusional children would still be 
compatible with Asperger's syndrome. 
Rhode & Klauber, psychoanalysts I discuss below, suggest Tustin's 
classifications can be demarcated by presence or absence of theory of mind.  
“[C]onfusional entangled children (as opposed to shell-type Kanner's children) blur 
the difference between themselves and others by treating other people as though they 
represented aspects of themselves” (Klauber & Rhode 2004b, p.262). These are 
contrasted with shell-type children who “relate to others in terms of surface mimicry, 
if at all – as though they had no idea of the inner, mental life of other people” (Klauber
& Rhode 2004b, p263). These two groups differ in respect to theory of mind. 
Confusional children appear aware that other people have mental states. By contrast, 
shell-type children do not understand that other people have mental states. No mention
is made of the segmented children, who are the other type of encapsulator, so it is 
unclear if they have a theory of mind. Tustin makes no claims about confusional 
children and mental states but appears to agree encapsulators are not aware of the 
mental life of others, writing that encapsulators “have treated another person as if he 
had no life and identity of his [their] own” (Tustin 1981, p.33). Klauber's & Rhode's 
claim that confusional children have a theory of mind whereas encapsulators do not 
may be compatible with Tustin's classification. Klauber & Rhode then link 
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functionality to presence or absence of theory of mind, linking confusional children is 
Asperger's syndrome (Rhode 2004a, p.14) whilst shell-type children are linked to 
Kanner's autism (Klauber & Rhode 2004b, p.262) which is usually associated with 
low functioning autism. Children with low functioning autism can become children 
with Asperger's syndrome as treatment progresses since they start seeing people as 
more than surface (Klauber & Rhode 2004b, p.264). There is no mention in Tustin of 
encapsulators becoming confusional children but shell-type encapsulators can become
segmented-type encapsulators as treatment progresses (Tustin 1981, p.31). If Klauber 
& Rhode describe the same process as Tustin here then segmented-type encapsulators 
do develop a theory of mind and so would fit the description of Asperger's syndrome 
under Klauber & Rhode's scheme.
Interpreting Tustin's classification to fit modern autism faces a number of 
difficulties. By modern standards some encapsulators were low functioning (because 
they were associated with autism which historically would more likely have meant 
low functioning, because some lacked a theory of mind, because some presumably 
had more severe symptoms), some were high functioning (because some may have 
had a theory of mind, because encapsulators may have differed in level of severity) 
and some were not on the autistic spectrum (because some spontaneously recovered 
and some became adult schizophrenic). Similarly, by modern standards some 
confusional children were low functioning (because the case studies look low 
functioning), some were high functioning (because some may have had a theory of 
mind, because they had late onset and so were likely Asperger's syndrome with a 
misinterpreted late onset, because they were presumably less severe) and some were 
not on the autistic spectrum (because they became adult schizophrenic and because 
many of the symptoms were different). All this suggests Tustin's analysis does not 
vastly reflect modern autism. As I explain below, this results from Tustin employing 
psychoanalytical theory to demarcate classifications. 
3.5.4 Rhode & Klauber
Rhode & Klauber present two subdivisions of Asperger's syndrome. The first 
subdivision has “major problems relating to other people – which included theory of 
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mind capabilities – and in dealing with their own aggressive impulses, but they relied 
predominantly on controlling others by means of “bossy” behaviour and on retreating 
to their own obsessive “interests” (Klauber & Rhode 2004b, p.262). The second 
subdivision is “characterised by florid, confusing, and seemingly bizarre behaviour 
and utterances and often by reliance on physical action. They frequently seemed to be 
unable to distinguish between their own fantasies and external reality, or between 
themselves and other people, to whom they attributed many of their own feelings” 
(Klauber & Rhode 2004b, p.262). These children  have all of the other symptoms of 
Asperger's Syndrome.22 No evidence is offered for these subdivisions beyond the 
children in case studies supposedly falling into one category or the other (Klauber & 
Rhode 2004b, p.262) though some children mix both types (Klauber & Rhode 2004b, 
p.262). Both subdivisions seem compatible with modern autism, merely adding a few 
symptoms.
These two subdivisions appear to be based on abnormal theory of mind. The 
first group struggle to relate to others due to theory of mind difficulties and tries to 
control others or avoid others by retreating into obsessive interests. Whilst not stated, 
this is presumably because their theory of mind difficulties means they struggle to 
appreciate that other people are not objects. Though not explicitly described in theory 
of mind terms, the second group had problems which appear similar to theory of mind 
difficulties whereby they sometimes failed to understand other people did not have a 
separate theory of mind to themselves and consequently did not fully see the 
distinction between themselves and other people. Klauber & Rhode present two 
variations of higher functioning individuals, each with a different type of abnormally 
functioning theory of mind (though Klauber & Rhode's notions are slightly broader 
than theory of mind, covering other types of abnormal thinking which I will discuss 
later). Modern psychologists disagree about the degree to which both high and low 
functioning autistic children lack a theory of mind. Some psychologists argue higher 
functioning individuals who lack a theory of mind pass theory of mind tests through 
some other means than theory of mind, so called hacking out the answer through 
experience and intellect rather than by using theory of mind (Frith 1994, p.119; Happé
22 All children “recognizably fit Asperger’s original description and the present-day criteria of ICD-10 
and DSM-IV” which are Social isolation, “oddness”, special interests verging on obsession, the 
eccentric and often pedantic use of language, physical clumsiness, and unusual sensory 
experiences” (Rhode 2004a, p.2).
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1995, p.853). Others disagree, believing partial failure of theory of mind is possible 
(see Kaland et al for a study highlighting how higher functioning autistic people do 
not simply have stronger theory of mind but have strengths and weakness in various 
different aspects of theory of mind (2008)). Klauber's & Rhode's account of Asperger's
syndrome fits the later approach, allowing for partial failure of theory of  mind and 
subdividing two groups of higher functioning individuals based upon different areas 
of failure. Klauber's & Rhode's account is therefore compatible with some 
interpretations of modern autism. 
3.6 Similarities and Differences of symptoms
3.6.1 The alternative symptoms of psychoanalysis
Having outlined the history, let’s compare psychoanalytical accounts of autism with 
modern cognitive psychological accounts. Many descriptions of autistic people made 
by psychoanalysts were different to modern accounts but the epistemological 
consequences of this vary considerably. 
Sometimes psychoanalysts saw symptoms never associated with modern 
autism, other times psychoanalysts noted symptoms today associated with modern 
autism but dismissed the symptoms as illusions and sometimes psychoanalysts 
observed symptoms today associated with autism but gave those symptoms a different
interpretation to the modern interpretation. Examples of psychoanalysts seeing 
different symptoms or seeing symptoms but discounting them as false suggests 
psychoanalytical theory influences what symptoms are seen. Such instances are 
epistemologically worrying, suggesting epistemically insecure theories influence their 
observations. Examples of observing the same symptom but giving a different causal 
interpretation suggest psychoanalytical theory played little role in which symptoms 
are seen. These need not epistemologically worry us since we argue for belief in 
symptoms and classifications but not causes. I show below most symptoms which 
psychoanalysts reported as looking superficially different to modern autism are 
symptoms being given a different causal interpretation rather than being additional 
symptoms or discounted symptoms.
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One of the difficulties with Bettelheim (1967) and Tustin (1981) is that they 
also incorporate schizophrenic children into their books on autism. Childhood 
schizophrenia was largely composed of children similar to modern autism but did 
include children with substantially different symptoms, ones who would today be 
considered to have childhood-disintegrative disorder and early adult onset 
schizophrenia. This means we cannot expect Bettelheim (1967) or Tustin (1981) to 
fully conform to the DSM notion of autism and therefore some differences reported 
can be discounted on these grounds. 
3.6.2 Symptoms not associated with modern autism
All three psychoanalytical text studies stated some children they studied hallucinated, 
a claim very contrary to modern autism. However, very little evidence is given to 
support this claim. Bettelheim on occasions mentions hallucinations but rarely 
provides any evidence. The most detailed mention - the only one with evidence 
offered - states hallucinations were evident from “the way she then looked up into 
space, preferably up to the ceiling, entirely preoccupied with something going on in 
her mind, and totally oblivious to what was going on around her” (Bettelheim 1967, 
p.116). More broadly, he mentions “vague hallucinations and daydreams of more or 
less limited and stereotyped content” (Bettelheim 1967, p.206) but does not state what
type of hallucinations they were or what evidence there was for them. Also, 
Bettelheim's psychoanalytical descriptions are extremely unclear if the children 
actually make direct statements about how they perceive their surroundings or if 
Bettelheim is just inferring these perceptions from the child's behaviour. If the latter 
then the same may be true about hallucination, Bettelheim inferring hallucinations 
from external behaviour rather than verbal reports. However, it is certainly possible 
that some of Bettelheim's children did hallucinate since a small minority of 
schizophrenic children did hallucinate. Tustin only makes one mention of 
hallucinations. When summarising confusional children she states confusional 
children have hallucinations but encapsulators do not, beyond this she makes no 
mention of hallucination let alone offers evidence for them or examples of them. One 
paper in the 2004 volume on autism and psychoanalysis states some children show 
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“psychotic phenomena, particularly hallucinations both positive and negative” 
(Simpson 2004, p.34). No evidence is offered for this beyond citing a paper published 
in 1955. Although all three texts mention hallucinations, mentions are rare, none 
provide any discussion of hallucinations and none provide any evidence for 
hallucinations or case studies covering hallucinations except Bettelheim’s single 
example. Remember also that a very small number of schizophrenic children did 
hallucinate. This suggests hallucinations are not excessively theory-dependent on 
psychoanalysis. 
All three psychoanalytical texts thought these children had a distorted 
understanding of the world and many bizarre beliefs. Abnormal thinking and 
understanding to this degree, what I call thought disorders, are also absent in modern 
autism. Bettelheim describes Laurie, a mute and near inactive autistic girl. Bettelheim 
thought she lacked an ego, describing “her central symptomatology: her inability to 
take in (and hence give out) or to relate to the world” (Bettelheim 1967, p.141) 
because she did not recognise the external world. Through psychotherapy her ego 
started to grow, recognised the external world and thus she abandoned playing with 
her faeces, no longer conceiving them as part of herself. He also describes Marcia who
had obsession with the weather. Bettelheim thought this was because she feared her 
mother would eat her, the weather symbolising the phrase we/eat/her. Bettelheim also 
describes Joey who believed he was a machine that had to be constantly plugged in 
with imaginary wires to remain alive. All three texts make general statements about 
thought disorders not associated with modern autism. For example, Bettelheim claims 
that autistic children “fear constantly for their lives, they seem convinced that death is 
immanent...”  (Bettelheim 1967, p.63). Tustin claims – “[c]hildren in autistic states 
invariably feel that cupboards and drawers are stomachs” (Tustin 1981, p.217). Rhode 
& Klauber claim a common theme described is “extreme infantile helplessness… 
strikingly represented in the image of a baby – or baby like animal - with arms 
hanging loosely, unable to grasp and hold on. A related image concerns that of a dead, 
brain-damaged, misshapen, or ugly (Meltzer, 1988) baby or foetus” (2004b, p.265). 
Psychoanalysts emphasised thought disorder in a way which has similarities to that 
employed from the 1940s to the late 1970s but which is absent in modern autism. 
These are certainly likely to be theory-laden though below I suggest modern 
psychologists perhaps do not observe this because cognitive psychology directs 
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observations away from them.
3.6.3 Symptoms observed but discounted
There were occasional cases where Bettelheim made an observation associated with 
modern autism but used psychoanalytical theory to discount the observation. 
Bettelheim disagrees with Kanner's claims that autistic children cannot relate to 
people but can relate to objects. Bettelheim disagrees, saying if autistic children could 
relate to objects then this would “constitute a self-chosen positive attachment and this 
would soon permit the child to escape his exclusive relatedness to one set of negative 
principles” (Bettelheim 1967, p.91). Bettelheim here claims the child only relates to 
the world negatively, the child interpreting the world as hostile. However, if the child 
could relate to objects then the child would be able to accept the world does have 
positive elements and stop rejecting the world. Since this has not happened, they 
clearly cannot relate to objects. Bettelheim seems to discount the evidence because he 
realises his psychoanalytical theory is contradicted by the evidence, resolving the 
conflict between theory and evidence by favouring the theory and discounting the 
evidence.
Bettelheim appears to discount instances of autistic children associating 
specific actions to specific situation. Some autistic children associate specific skills or 
words only with specific situation and struggle greatly to generalise those skills and 
words. Bettelheim cites Kanner who describes a child who associated the word 'yes' 
with being asked if he wished to be put on his father's shoulders and it took many 
years to use the word yes more generally. Bettelheim thinks it evidence of how the 
child reacts negatively to the world, unwilling to positively engage by not using the 
word yes to requests from others (Bettelheim 1967, p.426). Having rejected the 
external world, requests from others are always answered with a no and rarely a yes so
the child does not have to do anything. Here Bettelheim accepts some autistic children
use skills only in specific situation but uses psychoanalytic theory to interpret this as 
only occurring in relation to rejecting requests from others to engage in the world by 
refusing to use the word yes.
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3.6.4 Alternative interpretations of symptoms
There are many cases where psychoanalysts discussed symptoms today associated 
with autism but gave different causal interpretations not employed within mainstream 
modern autism. These examples show instances where psychoanalytic theory provides
an alternative causal explanation but does not influence what symptoms are seen.
Bettelheim spends many pages arguing that Kanner and other authors do not 
understand pronominal reversal, the phenomena when autistic people replace the word
'I' with 'you'. Bettelheim argues autistic children do not misunderstand the word I but 
avoid using it because of their anxiety about themselves and their unwillingness to 
commit to any course of action (Bettelheim 1967, p.427). Bettelheim claims autistic 
children like learning lists because it means they do not have to make a personal 
connection with other people (Bettelheim 1967, p.429). Bettelheim thinks that autistic 
children's dislike of unexpected changes reduces anxiety caused by their supposed 
inability to affect the external world (Bettelheim 1967, p.68). Rituals of autistic 
children are interpreted to serve the same purpose, ensuring certain outcomes occur to 
prevent anxiety stemming from unexpected outcomes (Bettelheim 1967, p.54), 
whereas some modern psychologists think repetitive behaviour stems from both desire
to prevent anxiety alongside deeper psychological or biological causes.
Tustin thinks both hypersensitivity of some autistic children and muted 
inaction of other autistic children are explained by their failure to adequately 
symbolise the world. This causes an uncontrollable sea of waves of sensation causing 
“keyed-up state of hypersensitive awareness or in a muted state of inaction in order to 
fend off these threats to their bodily survival” (Tustin 1981, p.142). She describes non-
social play such as autistic children playing with toy trains by continually spinning 
wheels or treating it merely as a rectangle, failing to recognize the toy symbolizes 
another object. Such items are autistic objects, Tustin writing, “[t]he main purpose of 
Autistic Objects (that is, objects used as part of the body to give reassuring and 
diverting sensations) is to shut out menaces which threaten bodily attack and ultimate 
annihilation. Hardness helps the soft and vulnerable child to feel safe in a world which
seems fraught with unspeakable dangers, and about which he feel unutterable terror” 
(Tustin 1981, p.100). Similarly, using language non-meaningfully is also effectively 
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an autistic object, employed to block communication with others (Tustin 1981, p.130).
Finally, repetitive behaviour is employed to prevent catastrophic breakdowns (Tustin 
1981, p.133).
Klauber & Rhode similarly gave interpretations to symptoms today associated 
with autism. Obsessions were taken as attempts to focus the mind on elsewhere than 
primitive fears supposedly causing the psychosis (Klauber 2004, p.59). Obsessively 
collecting information intends to keep feelings down, to prevent themselves feeling 
emotions (Klauber 2004, p.63). Discussing difficulties with communication, autistic 
people “desire contact with another person’s mental processes but cannot sustain 
genuine communication because differences remain overwhelmingly threatening” 
(Klauber & Rhode 2004b, p.263). Difficulties with communication and using 
obsessions to block feelings are linked, the children fear “relinquishing the alleged 
safety of their narrow and detailed interests [to] allows access to [the] subjectively 
distorted and frightening contents of their mind” (Rhode 2004b, p.84-85).
The above historical analysis shows many symptoms of autism described by 
cognitive psychologists and psychoanalysts were broadly similar. Although both saw 
some symptoms which the other did not these cases were quite rare. Plausibly, these 
rare symptoms may have been dependent upon a single theory, therefore have high 
epistemic risk if that theory has high epistemic risk. By contrast, most symptoms were
described by both theories so are not dependent upon a single theory. Therefore, there 
is no specific reason to believe these would be at risk if theories changed. For such 
symptoms there is no evidence Bogen’s (2013) notion of perceptual loading is 
applicable. Bogen's notion of semantic theory loading is partly applicable to 
symptoms shared by both theories. The symptom descriptions are generally the same 
under both theories, as shown in my discussion. However, symptoms had different 
causal accounts, psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology having very different 
causal approaches. For descriptions of symptoms semantic theory loading generally is 
not worrying; for causal explanations of symptoms semantic theory loading is deeply 
worrying. Finally, notions of salience appeared applicable to both symptoms and 
explanations. Cognitive psychologists and psychoanalysts clearly focused on different 
aspects of their patients depending upon theories used. Cognitive psychology focuses 
on cognition and perception; psychoanalysis focuses on emotions and thoughts. 
Cognitive psychologists see symptoms of autism but focus on cognition and 
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perception whilst ignoring or idealising specific aspects of emotion and thoughts. 
Psychoanalysts focus on emotions and thoughts over cognition and perception. 
Although they focus on some specific symptoms at the cost of other symptoms, this 
did not prevent those psychiatrists seeing many symptoms shared between both 
theories. There are epistemological concerns over theory laden nature of evidence for 
explanations of autism and symptoms only observed by one theory but not specific 
epistemological concerns from theory laden nature of evidence for symptoms present 
in both theories.We have no reason to believe most symptoms are dependent upon 
either theory. Consequently, if either theory is false this would not mean those 
symptoms are also false.
3.6.5 Classifications
Let’s now consider if the psychiatric classification of autism is theory-laden. Here we 
compare psychoanalytical accounts with cognitive psychological accounts, 
establishing if a similar classification occurs under either theory. We shall consider 
Bettelheim and then Rhode & Klauber first, and then discuss Tustin separately 
because she raises different challenges.
Bettelheim is broadly compatible with modern autism except for a few of the 
symptoms he lists, mentioning many symptoms associated with modern autism and 
appearing to effectively endorse something analogous to high and low functioning 
autism. Rather, he demarcates on severity, considering autistic individuals as severe 
and schizophrenic children as less severe. This has obvious similarity with typical 
demarcations made by cognitive psychologists, namely a spectrum where individuals 
vary on severity.
Klauber & Rhode look largely compatible with modern autism. They identify 
themselves with modern autism, writing, “[a]ll of these children and young people [in 
the case studies in the book] recognizably fit Asperger’s original description and the 
present-day criteria of ICD-10 and DSM-IV” (2004b, p.261). They contribute two 
additional classifications, describing two variations of how a child with Asperger's 
syndrome struggles with theory of mind. This only contradicts those accounts of 
autism that see children with Asperger's syndrome as lacking a theory of mind.
129
Before discussing Tustin, let’s consider what my study epistemologically 
entails. Later chapters will argue modern autism merits belief because it exhibits the 
theoretical virtue of unification. Doubt would be cast on this if autism were theory-
laden by bad theories. Autism might be falsely inferred as exhibiting unifications 
when actually it does not. I have sought to show this is not generally the case. 
Undeniably, neither Bettelheim’s nor Rhode & Klauber's classification are identical 
with classifications employed in modern autism. Those psychoanalysts included 
symptoms not present in modern autism and it is unclear their demarcation between 
high and low functioning is identical to that employed in modern autism. Though their
classifications are not identical to modern autism, they still involve unifications which
are quite similar to those of modern autism. Bettelheim and Rhode & Klauber 
unifying together a large number of seemingly unrelated symptoms, including notions 
of higher and lower functioning, thus are also compatible with autism exhibiting the 
theoretical virtue unification. Though the classifications are not identical, the 
theoretical virtue of unification occurred under both cognitive psychology and 
psychoanalysis, suggesting inferring the unification is not dependent upon either 
theory. Belief in autism, offered in chapter six, will require our attribution of the 
theoretical virtue unification to autism to be reliable. If the unification was dependent 
upon either psychoanalysis or cognitive psychology then (without first defending 
those theories) its reliability would be undermined. Being present in both theories 
means the unification seems not to be theory-laden by either theory. If either theory 
turns out mistaken we can still believe in the unification. 
Tustin is much more problematic. Tustin could potentially fit modern autism 
but this depends on what interpretation of Tustin is taken. She identifies encapsulators 
as equivalent to autism and generally encapsulators do resemble low functioning 
autism. However, confusional children can, with difficulty, be interpreted as 
resembling high functioning autism but also as being low functioning whilst some 
seem unrelated to autism. So the clinical pictures are far identical to modern autism. 
More importantly, the classification takes a very different form. She covers a vast 
array of clinical pictures and demarcates them on grounds other than functioning. Her 
approach only weakly unifies, covering far too many symptoms, thus highly lacking in
stringency. This is despite employing many different subclassifications. Tustin loses 
simplicity by employing so many classifications but without gaining in stringency. 
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Her classificatory system would have had some level of unification if her subtypes 
provided very specific clinical pictures but each subtype is less stringent than, for 
example, the subtypes of childhood schizophrenia which Kanner employed. More 
classifications and worse stringency means Tustin does not unify the symptoms well. 
There is a danger psychoanalysis influenced Tustin's classification, the background 
theory influencing the bad classification she produced. We cannot rule out the 
possibility that a classification, one covering individuals that today we would identify 
as autistic (alongside many others), was negatively effected by theory-laden evidence. 
This need not worry us if given the earlier demarcation between firstly, 
consciously using a theory to infer classifications, second, unconsciously doing so, 
thirdly, holding a theory but not using it when inferring classifications or, fourthly, the 
theory having very little effect. Of all texts employed, Tustin is the only text which 
specifically formulated its classification on psychoanalysis or cognitive psychology, 
whereas the other text studied involved psychoanalysts or cognitive psychologists 
constructing classifications without specifically formulating classifications on their 
theory. She consciously employed psychoanalysis when formulating her classification.
In contrast, Bettelheim and Rhode & Klauber did not consciously or unconsciously 
use psychoanalysis when formulating their classifications (or if they did the effects 
were very minimal). Tustin's situation is only problematic because she chooses to 
employ psychoanalysis when inferring symptoms. She did not have to make this 
choice. Without first establishing their epistemological reliability I strongly advise 
against employing either psychoanalysis or cognitive psychology for inferring 
classifications. They are only epistemologically concerning when we actively choose 
to employ them for inferring classifications, an option we need not take. 
3.6 Conclusion
Theory-laden nature of evidence, when involving bad theories, could undermine belief
in both symptoms and classifications. Without actually showing psychoanalysis or 
cognitive psychology are bad theories, in the absence of showing they merit belief 
they must be considered epistemologically insecure, therefore potentially rendering 
any symptoms and classifications dependent upon them as epistemologically insecure.
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My historical study largely suggests most symptoms of modern autism and the 
classification are not reliant upon such theories.
With a few exceptions, most symptoms reported by psychoanalysts did not 
conflict with modern notions of autism. Hallucinations were mentioned by all three 
psychoanalytical sources but very little evidence was presented for them. This might 
be psychoanalyst’s willingness to make interpretations on minimal evidence whilst 
some schizophrenic children did have hallucinations. Abnormal thinking was also 
commonly observed, far in excess of modern notions of autism. Historian of autism 
Evans has argued psychoanalysts were correct to describe abnormal thinking, modern 
psychiatrist failing to observe them because of different theoretical beliefs (2013, 
p.18). Both hallucinations and abnormal thinking provide some evidence of 
psychoanalysis playing a small role in false interpretation of symptoms. There were a 
few cases where Bettelheim appeared to see symptoms associated with modern autism
but claimed these symptoms must not be present because they contradicted his 
psychoanalytical theory but even here theory was not dictating what symptoms were 
observed, merely instead which observations he discounted. Psychoanalysts and 
cognitive psychologists disagree upon causal explanation of symptoms but still 
observe the same symptoms. In these cases theory did not determine what was 
observed. Overall, the symptoms observed are similar enough between autism as 
perceived by psychoanalysts and by cognitive psychologists to conclude most 
symptoms are not dependent upon either theory.
Bettelheim’s and Rhode & Klauber's classifications have substantial 
similarities to the classification of modern autism. Though not identical, they make the
same type of unification, covering many related symptoms to modern autism and 
having a high and low functioning autism. The unification, which I will later argue 
grants belief to autism, is not dependent upon psychoanalysis or cognitive psychology.
The only psychologist or psychoanalysts studied with a classification very different to 
modern autism was Tustin. Of all psychologists and psychoanalysts described only 
Tustin specifically bases classification on psychoanalysis of cognitive psychology. My
history suggests psychoanalysis or cognitive psychology would only be concerning if 
actively employed to formulate classifications. This conclusion does not concern me 
because I argue we should not use such theories for that role. This should concern 
Baron-Cohen (1997), Happe (1995) and Murphy (2006) who desire autism classified 
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upon causal theories. We so far have no reason to believe the theories used for 
interpreting symptoms and classification of autism are bad ones; chapters five and six 
will show they are good ones. 
Plausibly many psychiatric theories are epistemologically insecure. However, 
only those symptoms and classifications which are interpreted by false theories are 
threatened. The two theories applicable to autism which most fit classic theory-laden 
notion of changing theories have relatively little influence on symptoms and 
classification of modern autism. Modern autism has a level of theoretical robustness 
from such theories. 
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4.0 Chapter 4 – A scientific law 
approach to psychiatric classifications
4.1 Introduction
By responding to the pessimistic meta induction, to underdetermination and theory-
laden nature of evidence, we have challenged various arguments against belief. The 
next three chapters make the argument that autism merits belief. In this chapter I 
suggest a new metaphysical picture of the nature of existence in psychiatry, one which
opens up new epistemic arguments which may be applicable to some psychiatric 
classifications. In chapter five I explore, given this new metaphysical picture, how 
psychiatric classifications operate, highlighting a previously unnoticed role for 
psychiatric classifications. Having built up a clearer picture of how psychiatric 
classifications could be real and how they operate, chapter six then shows the new 
epistemic arguments which have been opened up are applicable to autism.
Belief in scientific theories has two components: metaphysical realism (what 
exists) and epistemological realism (justified belief over what exists) (Psillos 2009a, 
p.4). Scientific realists debates usually focus on epistemological realism, establishing 
if we are justified to believe scientific concepts truthfully describe metaphysically real
things. Epistemic anti-realists deny we are justified, accepting metaphysical realism 
but denying epistemic realism is justified. Scientific realism needs both metaphysical 
realism and epistemic realism.23
The introduction outlined numerous concerns which led many to disbelieve in 
current psychiatric classifications and call for their replacement. I argue many base 
disbelief on untenably restrictive metaphysical views of how things are real in 
psychiatry. This then restricts epistemological arguments over psychiatric 
23 Belief also requires semantic realism. This is where scientific terms are taken as literally construed, 
intended to literally refer to the world rather than being simply predictive instruments (Psillos 
2009a, p.4). This positions is roughly instrumentalism, relating to the semantic status of theories 
rather then epistemological questions. This is generally not held in modern philosophy of science. 
“Semantic realism is not contested anymore” (Psillos 2009a, p.5) with even anti-realists being 
semantic realists (Lauden 1984, p.105; Stanford 2006, p.193; Van Fraassen 1980, p.10). I assume 
science should aim to describe real things and not discuss semantic realism again. 
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classifications. Here I show how epistemological arguments rest on overly restrictive 
views of reality which unnecessarily demands high causal unity for psychiatric 
classification to merit belief. By showing how psychiatric classifications can be 
inductive despite lacking strong causes, we show how psychiatric classification can be
informative of regularities in the world. I portray psychiatric classifications as 
scientific laws understood as idealised models for describing regularities (note that my
account of laws is not one of exceptionless regularities true in all possible worlds). My
alternative picture of how psychiatric classifications account for reality leaves many 
current epistemological arguments as unrequired; popular accounts which base belief 
on establishing high causal unity are still potential means to belief but, contrary to 
common arguments, my new picture shows failure to establish causal unity does not 
then entail disbelief. My new picture opens room for new epistemological arguments 
which come in chapter six. 
I start by outlining then criticising Cooper's metaphysical realism. Then I show
how Murphy's metaphysical realism is broadly correct but his epistemic realism 
presupposes a Cooper style metaphysical realism. Both Cooper's and Murphy's 
epistemic arguments mistakenly disallow causal instability. Consequently, I show how
causal instability occurs in science more generally, showing how scientists handle it 
by outlining Bogen and Woodward’s notion of phenomena. Once we see symptoms as 
phenomena we can now understand exactly what it means for symptoms to cluster. I 
show that clusters of symptoms potentially allow psychiatric classifications to be 
causes, explanations or scientific laws. The metaphysics I adopt allows psychiatric 
classifications which are laws to merit belief. Laws do not require causes so we can 
have psychiatric classification which merit belief in the absence of the causes Cooper 
and Murphy consider as required for scientific realism. 
4.2 Psychiatry, natural kinds and the causal structure of the world
Many accounts of psychiatric classifications involve talk of natural kinds (Beebee & 
Sabbarton-Leary 2010, p.23; Cooper 2005, p.55; Haslam 2014, p.18; Kendler, Zachar 
& Craver 2011, p.1146; Meehl 2001, p.509; Murphy 2014b, p.111).24  Also, a natural 
24 Murphy’s 2014b article appears to provide a different metaphysical account to his 2006 book, here I
only refer to his 2014b article.
135
kind approach is adopted implicitly by DSM (Cooper 2007, p.46), psychiatrists 
(Horwitz 2002, p.5) and the general public (Haslam 2000, p.1043). Boyd's account of 
natural kinds is among the most influential accounts. Boyd believes “successful 
induction and explanation always require that we accommodate our categories [natural
kinds] to the causal structure of the world” (Boyd 1991, p.139). Some demand natural 
kinds have essential properties, such as fundamental particles (Ellis 1998, p.32). Most 
believe natural kinds need similar, not identical properties (Boyd 1991, p.142; Dupré 
1993, p.5; Psillos 1999, p.289). Classic examples of these natural kinds are biological 
species, collections of clustering properties classified according to our interests 
(Dupré 1993 p.51) or by nature (Boyd 1991, p.14). Notions of natural kinds fit into a 
scientific realist vision since properties are produced by the causal structure of the 
world. From this general principle we need both understand how natural kinds 
manifest in psychiatry, which I now discuss. Also we need a deeper understanding of 
causation and explanation, which I discuss later in this chapter.
4.2.1 Biological species approach to psychiatric classifications
- 4.2.1.1 Cooper's Position
Cooper endorses natural kinds, writing that 
“if we consider individual cases of mental disorder some can be seen to
be similar to each other. Furthermore some of these similarities will be 
theoretically important, and in some cases patients who are grouped 
together will be alike in fundamental ways… If we take cases of mental
disorders as our domain and plot them onto a multidimensional quality 
space (as in cluster analysis) then we will find clusters of similar cases. 
If we focus on the right properties, then the clusters that such a process 
generates will be inductively powerful” (2012, p.62). 
Properties arise from determining properties where
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“members of a natural kind all have similar determining properties, and
the determining properties determine the other properties of the entities,
[and this means] that we can predict that all members of a natural kind 
will behave similarly” (2005, p.53). 
Cooper does not explicitly define determining properties but says “[t]hese important 
properties are important because they determine many of the other properties 
possessed by members of the kind” (2005, p.51). An example of an underlying 
property is the defective gene in Huntingdon’s which produces characteristic 
symptoms (Cooper 2007, p.63). It appears that determining properties cause (or 
strongly causally influence) many other properties an entity has.
Cooper takes a biological species approach (2007, p.50), relying heavily on 
Dupré's biological species as natural kinds approach. Dupré believes “there is no more
to the discovery of a kind than the discovery of the correlations of properties 
characteristic of the members of a kind” (1993, p.61). Correlations can be grouped in 
multiple ways based upon “goal underlying the intent to classify the object” (Dupré 
1993, p.5). Evolutionary linage or a functional analysis of organisms could group 
animals (Dupré 1993, p.51). Cooper supposes properties exist mind-independently, 
there existing correlating properties we might group into schizophrenia. Just like dogs 
and horses exist as correlations of properties, so too would autism and schizophrenia 
(assuming they were natural kinds). We might subdivide dogs, similarly we might 
subdivide schizophrenia. We might merge dogs and wolves, similarly so we might 
merge schizophrenia and autism. Providing the psychiatric classifications describe real
properties then the classifications merits belief. Cooper's example of evidence 
entailing reality of a disorder has similarities to that employed for biological species. 
“[By saying] Down syndrome is a real condition I mean the following: 
there are people with Down syndrome who form a kind. In important 
respects people with Down syndrome are similar to each other. They 
tend to have characteristic physical appearances, and to have 
intellectual disabilities. In addition there are characteristic genetic 
abnormalities that cause Down syndrome” (Cooper 2012, p.38). 
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Consider the similarities. Firstly, genes are immensely powerful for delineating 
biological species. Secondly, Down syndrome has clear physical characteristics, just 
like animals do. Thirdly, Down syndrome is associated with quite prominent 
behavioural characteristics, intellectual difficulties, just like how animals have 
prominent behavioural characteristics. 
Cooper, however, suggests existing classifications likely do not describe 
natural kinds. Flaws with psychiatric theory and interference by various organisations 
(drug companies, insurance companies) weaken psychiatry epistemologically 
sufficiently that Cooper doubts most DSM classifications are natural kinds (Cooper 
2005, p.150). Mental illnesses exist as biological species but our current classificatory 
system does not generally describe them. This makes Cooper a metaphysical realist, 
since mental illnesses exist, but generally an epistemic anti-realist, since we have not 
located those real mental illnesses. Few current mental disorders have genetic 
associations as strong as Down syndrome, few have associated physical characteristics
and few have symptoms as clear cut as intellectual deficiency. Mental illnesses 
existing metaphysically as biological species mean evidence for epistemic realism are 
out there but not yet found. Consequently, we must be epistemic anti-realists.
Cooper's position is popular, many philosophers believing mental illnesses 
exist as natural kinds but doubt existing classifications identify natural kinds (Kendell 
& Jablensky 2003, p.5; Meehl 1995, p.266; Meehl 2001, p.509; Murphy 2014b, 
p.120), or classifications only meet much weaker criteria of natural kinds than Boyd's 
(Haslam 2014, p.23) or remain silent over reality of current classifications (Beebee & 
Sabbarton-Leary 2010).25 I certainly accept most psychiatric classifications lack 
evidence entailing epistemic realism over metaphysical realism as biological species. 
Consequently, I shall undermine Cooper's argument by providing an alternative to her 
metaphysical picture of mental illnesses as biological species. 
- 4.2.1.2 Problems with Cooper
I now discuss problems with approaches that seek to model psychiatric classifications 
25 Although Kendell & Jablensky (2003) do not mention natural kinds, they adopt a cutting nature at 
its joints approach (Murphy 2014a, p.64), a classic example of psychiatric classifications as natural 
kind in all but name.
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on biological species (though remember biological species approach works for rare 
instances like Down's syndrome).26
Psychiatric classifications typically have higher causal instability than 
biological organisms, typically being the product of INUS conditions (Meehl 2001, 
p.511; Schaffner 2008, p.75; Rodrigues & Banzato 2014, p.53). INUS stands for 
insufficient but nonredundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for an 
effect. This is where numerous causes can produce a result but none guarantee it 
(Mackie 1974, p.63; Psillos 2002, p.87; Salmon 1998, p.22). Psillos gives the example
of a house fire, whereby a fire is caused by the causal combination of a short circuit, 
oxygen and combustible materials. All these three causes are required to cause the 
house fire, since the presence of only two of these do not result in a house fire. So we 
cannot say short circuits always cause house fires, since we might lack flammable 
material. Additionally, we can have house fires without short circuits because we can 
instead have petrol, flame, oxygen and combustible materials. So short circuits can, in 
the correct situations, cause house fires, but they do not guarantee house fires and 
neither are they the only route to house fires. In contrast, biological organisms are 
complex systems where genes are required alongside other causes (Gannet 1999, 
p.359). We can say genes ceteris paribus cause particular traits (Gannet 1999, p.353) 
whereas generally most disorders lack identified genes that even ceteris paribus 
produces the disorder. There are exceptions like Down's syndrome (Gannett 1999, 
p.366) but these are rare. Some philosophers consider genes probabilistic causes rather
than deterministic (Kitcher 1989, p.456) but in psychiatry generally statistical 
correlations between genes and classifications are low (Kendler 2005b, p.1246; 
Murphy 2006, p.239). Most psychiatric classifications have higher causal instability 
compared to biological species.
Psychiatric classifications can be more heavily influenced by environmental 
factors than instances of biological species. Historical and cultural factors affect 
psychiatric disorders, making them “messier” (Kendler 2009, p.1940) than most 
scientific concepts. Some mental disorders heavily depend on environments, requiring
specific historical, social and cultural conditions (Kendler & Zachar 2008, p.378-381).
Environments also affect animals but generally only long term. 
26 Some ideas below have been briefly mentioned in Haslam's recent paper (2014, p.11).
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“Large effects from the environment are far more likely to produce a 
creature that is unviable than one that is very different. Genes thus may 
be thought of as having a homeostatic effect on traits, keeping them 
relatively constant from generation to generation” (Garvey 2007, p.22).
Such strong homeostatic mechanisms seem lacking for most psychiatric 
classifications. 
Individuals often change psychiatric classifications in a manner highly unlike 
biological species. An individual might have depression then anxiety then OCD, the 
symptoms they exhibit changing (Zachar 2014, p.176). The diagnosis given to a 
patient can change radically, even for schizophrenia (Baca-Garcia et al 2007, p.214). 
In contrast, Labradors do not turn into Dobermans. Interbreeding and evolution over 
time can produce vagueness over which species a particular animal belongs to but this 
is little barrier to understanding the biological and behavioural characteristics of 
intermediate animals. 
Psychiatric theories employed to cluster symptoms are highly contestable 
compared to biology. Biological species are primarily clustered by evolution, a 
unifying and all-encompassing theory (Garvey 2007, p.134; Kitcher 1981, p.519) and 
nothing similar exists in psychiatry.
People manifest psychiatric classifications often much more loosely than 
animals manifest species. A diagnosis of depression requires five of nine symptoms, 
whereas we do not think something is a dog only if it has five of nine characteristics 
of dogs. Consequently, we often get individuals with depression that only have five 
symptoms (55%) of the information we consider relevant for establishing if someone 
has depression, whereas we rarely find dogs that only have 55% of the characteristics 
relevant to identify them as dogs. People diagnosed with psychiatric classifications 
seem more loosely connected to the classification than most animals do to species. 
Cooper's biological species approach seems considerably misplaced. She might
respond this merely shows epistemological weakness rather than metaphysical 
differences: ceteris paribus deterministic genes exist but are not identified, or theories 
as powerful as evolution will eventually be developed. A stronger hypothesis is most 
psychiatric classifications have levels of causal disunity untypical of biological 
species. There is plenty of evidence for this. Certainly some mental illnesses do 
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resemble biological species, such as Down's syndrome, Parkinson's and Huntingdon’s.
In chapter six I suggest these psychiatric classifications deserve belief because of this. 
However, the evidence suggests such determining properties are rare, meaning it is 
misleading to believe many psychiatric classifications exist in the manner of 
undiscovered biological species. With rare exceptions, psychiatric classifications as 
currently formulated almost never have identified causes, rather, “our genes seem 
neither to have read DSM-IV nor to particularly respect the diagnostic boundaries it 
established” (Kendler 2010, p.1291). Neither should we believe such causes are still 
out there waiting to be found. 
“We have hunted for big, simple neuropathological explanations for 
psychiatric disorders and have not found them. We have hunted for big,
simple neurochemical explanations for psychiatric disorders and have 
not found them. We have hunted for big, simple genetic explanations 
for psychiatric disorders and have not found them” (Kendler 2005a, 
p.434-435). 
Rare instances of identifying big, simple causes are unlikely to be replicated (Kendler 
2005a, p.434) because stronger causes are much easier to find (Kendler 2005b, 
p.1247), also because causation in psychiatry is “inherently multifactorial” (Kendler &
First 2010, p.264) and because similar biological lesions can produce very different 
symptoms in different individuals (Kendler & First 2010, p.264). Certainly evidence 
suggests autism is very much multi-causal (Happé, Ronald & Plomin 2006, p.3; 
Kendler 2010, p.1292-1293). Consequently, we need an alternative model of 
metaphysical realism in psychiatry than one that thinks of psychiatric disorders as 
being like biological species. Before we consider this, we need consider the nature of 
causes in psychiatry.
4.2.2 Rejecting biological species and the search for causes
- 4.2.2.1 Murphy's Position
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Murphy has written extensively arguing for the idea that psychiatric classifications 
should seek to reflect underlying causes. We shall consider his position before I 
discuss the nature of causes. 
Murphy bases his realism on identifying the causes of psychiatric 
classification. He believes the aim of psychiatric “classification [should be] to track 
genuine structure in nature” (Murphy 2006, p.224). Murphy outlines psychiatric 
classifications as exemplars, “an idealised representation of the symptoms and course 
of a mental illness, and [we should] try to uncover the idealized causal relationships 
that accounts for that idealised picture” (Murphy 2006, p.202). An exemplar is a 
prototypical account of a patient with a classification, basically the image that a 
psychiatrist has in their head when they hear the word 'schizophrenic' (Murphy 2006, 
p.202). Exemplars are idealisations, patients exhibiting varying degrees of symptoms 
of the exemplar and potentially no patients have ever exhibited the full exemplar 
(Murphy 2006, p.202). Classifications for Murphy should be explained exemplars, an 
idealised causal story of the exemplar (Murphy 2006, p.202). 
Murphy has similarities and dissimilarities to Cooper. The similarities are that 
Cooper's natural kinds provide information over what things tend to do (Cooper 2007, 
p.45) and manifestations of the natural kind differ in degrees from one another 
(Cooper 2005, p.52). There are two differences. Firstly, Murphy favours finding 
causes behind classifications whereas Cooper's realism focuses on identifying the 
products of causes without requiring the causes responsible being identified. Secondly,
Murphy places less emphasis on natural kinds. Some mental illnesses have sufficient 
causal basis to be natural kinds (Murphy 2006, p.341) but some do not yet Murphy 
still allows realism over these (Murphy 2006, p.341). Cooper's realism requires a level
of causal unity that Murphy's realism can have but does not require. For Murphy 
finding causes is important, not causal unity.27
Murphy's focus on causes is metaphysically realist but he largely adopts 
epistemic anti-realism, admitting the causes he seeks have largely not been found. 
Adopting Murphy's approach leaves antirealism largely justified. Problems with 
searching for causes are well known and need only summarising. Robins and Guze 
hoped laboratory tests would establish causes (1970, p.107) but these failed and much 
more complicated models are required (Andreasen 1995, p.161). Even an optimistic 
27 This is the general idea of his 2006 book. His 2014b looks much closer to Cooper's position.
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psychiatrist like Pies admits there are no smoking guns but only biomarkers which are 
only “frequently identified” (Pies 2008, p.49) and can only be described as 
“promising” (Pies 2008, p.50). Such optimism may be misplaced. First writes that 
“despite 30 years of intensive effort, the field has been unable to find a single 
biological or genetic marker that is specifically associated with a DSM category” 
(First 2012, p.13). Indeed, Bolton believes 
“there is not much prospect that the science of the etiology of 
psychiatric conditions will deliver a single, optimal classification 
scheme – the reason being that the last few decades of research has 
uncovered systemic complexity, rather than reductionist simplicity” 
(2012, p.6). 
Murphy is aware of such limitations, admitting cases with identified genes like 
Huntingdon’s are rare (Murphy 2006, p.133). Rather, Murphy hopes psychiatry is 
“becoming steadily metaphysically committed as the science develops and driven by a
commitment to uncovering the causal structure of mental illness” (Murphy 2006, 
p.204). Murphy's hopes for epistemic realism are based upon a future hypothetical 
psychiatry.
The future, as Murphy recognizes, will likely not be ideal either. Down's 
syndrome seems near perfect for Murphy's realism (and for Cooper's) because the 
cause is so strong, occurring in almost all people with Down's syndrome and almost 
no one else, allowing tests to have a 99% plus sensitivity (accurately establishing who 
has Down's syndrome) and specificity (accurately establishing who does not have 
Down's syndrome) (Hyett 2014, p.52). Ideally, we will find many such genes to 
reformulate psychiatric classifications on. However, as mentioned above, Kendler 
argues that high probability genes are much easier to find than low probability genes, 
therefore, we likely already have found them and all that remain are low probability 
genes (2005b, p.1247). So employing genes will require reformulating psychiatric 
classification on low probability genes. Recognizing this problem, Murphy suggests 
that generally “the best we can hope for is the development of explanations that trace 
the major symptom-types of each disorder to the pathological processes that give rise 
to them” (Murphy 2006, p.203). He suggests biological processes and psychological 
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models (Murphy 2006, p.215) as examples of causes that might be used to restructure 
psychiatric classification.
- 4.2.2.2 Problems with Murphy
Murphy's metaphysical picture sits badly with his epistemic arguments. Assuming we 
found them, consider how these causes relate to existing classifications. They may 
largely match existing classifications, suggesting existing classifications are roughly 
correct and merit epistemic realism, leaving Murphy's pessimism largely misplaced. 
Of course, this possibility is only known once we find those causes. Consider the 
alternative, our classifications are radically mistaken, the causes found have no 
connection to our existing classifications and they need radically reformulating. Let’s 
consider two problems with this second situation that undermine Murphy's optimism. 
If existing classifications are fundamentally mistaken then causal investigation 
may be deeply flawed (Cuthbert & Insel 2013, p.3; Jablensky 1999, p.142; Poland 
2014, p.46; Sullivan 2014, p.257), undermining Murphy's epistemic realism about the 
future. Deeply mistaken classifications might significantly constrain how scientist’s 
conduct their search for biological causes and negatively influence what they take 
causes to be. Also, having found causes, false classifications may influence judgments
over which causes are or are not responsible for classifications. A cause may appear to
fit a psychiatric classification, however, assume that psychiatric classification does not
reflect reality. If the psychiatric classification was improved, made more realistic, then
the gene may no longer fit. This is especially likely for classifications  produced by 
many causes of low probabilistic effects. Scientists might emphasize the presence of 
those genes in a psychiatric classification, consider their discovery a major scientific 
advance. Yet many of those low effect genes may also be present in many other 
symptom clusters (and potentially non-pathological populations). Scientists might 
have found some of those genes have a higher effect size within symptom clusters 
which better reflect the behaviour of individuals but this may go largely unnoticed 
because those other symptom clusters are not official DSM diagnoses and thus never 
tested. Where low effect genes are present in many different symptom clusters (even 
in non-pathological populations) our ability to establish causes and judge how they 
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result in psychiatric classifications might be substantially reduced compared to 
biological investigation of causes of animals.
Murphy could sidestep this problem by ignoring existing classifications like 
the RDoC attempts but this creates additional problems. Here we do not have false 
classifications holding back biological investigation but we are now in largely 
uncharted territory. The history of medicine and biology shows few instances of 
scientists searching for causes in complete independence of existing classifications. 
Biological evidence can have high levels of independence, evidence produced in 
support of one theoretical claim might end up being employed to support some other 
unrelated, non-competing theory (Leonelli 2009, p.747). So although evidence is not 
constrained to the theory which it was investigated for, at some point it needs relating 
to theory. In biology, it can be related to biological categories, which are usually based
on good science. In contrast, in psychiatry it either needs relating to (supposedly) bad 
psychiatric classifications or relating to hypothetical psychiatric classifications which 
have not yet been constructed. RDoC attempts something relatively unique, requiring 
biological science to accomplish more when applied to psychiatric classification than 
is generally required for biological classification.
Additionally, whether employing existing classifications or not, linking causes 
in psychiatry to classifications faces more challenges than in biology. The failure of 
psychiatry to find causes of significant effect has led to much philosophical discussion
about multi-level explanations (see the recent book Kendler & Parnas (2008) edited). 
Also much discussed is the importance of factoring in multiple types of evidence, such
as clinical and biological, when validating psychiatric classifications (see the recent 
book Zachar, Stoyanov, Aragona & Jablensky (2014) edited). Poland writes that “any 
given pattern of behaviour and other clinically identified features will mask a wide 
range of distinct causal processes and a wide range of distinct features at all levels of 
analysis (Poland 2014, p.43). Murphy endorses this picture, different methods and 
different disciplines describing different levels (Murphy 2006, p.121) with interactions
across levels spanning biological, psychological and environmental (Murphy 2006, 
p.141). Integrating these disciplines is immensely challenging, the “difficulty of which
is hard to overestimate” (Kendler 2005b, p.438). Tracing such multi-level 
explanations, such as gene to disorder, is immensely complicated and cannot currently
be done (Kendler 2005a, p.1249). For example, Sun et al (2010, p.5) found 24 
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possible causal pathways which can lead to schizophrenia. Multi-level explanations 
occur in biology but biologist can identify a cause, say a gene, and then use idealised 
multi-level explanations to link that gene to the end physical or behavioural 
characteristic. In psychiatry we rare have that initial starting point of highly 
probabilistically important genes, instead employing the multi-level explanation itself 
as the cause for demarcating classifications. This is a much more complicated 
situation. Rather than an animal's causal basis resting on high probability genes (the 
easy bit) which combines with other factors to produce an animal (the multi-level 
difficult bit), the causal basis of psychiatric classifications will be the difficult multiple
level explanation. The more content placed in a model and the more levels of 
explanations involved the more complicated the model becomes (Zachar 2012, p.195) 
but without this content important factors may be lacking. Ceteris parabus, some 
genes do have near deterministic effects. By contrast, simplifying multi-level models 
risks ignoring important causes that cannot be simply idealised away ceteris parabus 
without producing something vastly more misleading than ceteris parabus 
explanations of biological species. Some biologists downplay the importance of genes,
so called evo-devo emphasizing the importance of development (Garvey 2007, p.73) 
but nothing analogous currently exists in psychiatry. Also, even were multi-level 
explanations possible, philosophy of psychiatry has yet to attempt to describe what a 
multi-level explanation in psychiatry would look like (Campbell 2008, p.199). These 
problems are much more complicated than in biology. 
Murphy hopes allying psychiatry with biology will make psychiatry more 
successful but the reasons why biology has been successful appear absent in 
psychiatry. Animals have far greater causal stability than most mental illnesses, 
making finding causes much easier. Also, most biological species were broadly correct
prior to finding causes. The physical and behavioural characteristics associated with 
most species did not change radically when evolution was discovered (Dupré 1993, 
p153; Kitcher 1993a, p.32), also, Linnaean classifications match modern 
classifications quite well (Garvey 2007, p.131). This seems likely for medicine more 
generally, Solomon writing that “the rest of medicine has much more agreement about
disease classification and rarely introduces diagnostic categories that are as complex 
and difficult to apply as those in the DSM” (Solomon 2015, p.70). For psychiatry we 
face the alternative, modern classifications as fundamentally mistaken. Plausibly, 
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causal investigation was successful in biology because categorization of animals was 
broadly already correct and high probability causes exist. Unlike biology, psychiatry 
lacks stable and broadly correct classifications as starting point for biological 
investigation. Also, biological causes typically have much lower effect in psychiatry 
than in biology. Differences between both sciences weaken the inference that it will be
successful in psychiatry, undermining Murphy's optimism.
Murphy's metaphysical picture improves on Cooper's since Murphy allows 
realism over causally disunified things. Cooper's realism over mental illnesses as 
biological species rests on determining properties but causal properties in psychiatry 
are far less determining. This leaves mental disorders as insufficiently causally unified
to be adequately modeled as biological species. However, Murphy's epistemological 
argument for realism seemingly presupposes many parallels with biological species. 
His epistemological optimism seems based on a metaphysical realism he rightly 
rejects, his epistemological optimism requiring stable causes which his metaphysics 
does not require. I will supply new epistemological arguments in chapter six but doing
so will be based upon supplying a new metaphysical picture, which I now do.
4.3 Psychiatry, causal disunity and laws
4.3.1 Physical Systems and phenomena
Cooper links inductive power with determining properties whilst Murphy links 
success with causal mechanisms. I will show how psychiatric classifications can be 
inductive (and therefore scientifically valuable) without resting on determining 
properties or causal mechanisms. Some accounts of induction believe induction 
requires a presupposition of uniformity (Howson 2000 p.182; Macnamara 1991, p.30).
Autism would not count as uniform given its underlying causal disunity. However, 
accounts of induction which require presupposition of uniformity bare little 
relationship to science (or indeed inductions outside of science) (Lipton 2004, p.12). 
Science generally seeks to describe physical systems. A physical system is 
where many different causes interact to produce a typically non-uniform process. 
Examples of physical systems are severe storms, gas jets and turbulent flow of water 
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in a basin (Winsberg 2001, p.443).28 Similar to the causal instability I have described, 
the 
“behaviour of most real physical systems is the result of the interaction 
of a very large number of distinct causal influences, which may not 
recur together in a regular or uniform fashion at all… the behaviour of 
some actual object in an electromagnetic field will reflect not just the 
electromagnetic force… but will also reflect the gravitational force 
incident on the particle, the effect of air resistance, and so forth… 
There will be no single law describing the net effect of all these factors 
on the objects” (Woodward 1992, p.194; also Giere 1999, p.24). 
Physical systems usually have high levels of instability, changing from one moment to
the next. Despite this, inductive and causal claims are still possible. We should 
consider an autistic person in an environment as a physical system, disunified causes 
internal to the person plus unstable causes from the environment interacting to create a
non-uniform process called autism.
Scientists cope with unstable causes by isolating different causes and studying 
them independently. This typically occurs in laboratory settings, scientists creating 
situations where causes are controlled. For example, scientists might create a vacuum 
to analyse the effect of gravity in the absence of air resistance. This would ideally 
allow scientists to understand how each cause operates individually, allowing 
scientists to combine all those causes together to understand the causes affecting the 
phenomena. Unfortunately, this process has severe limitations for three reasons. 
Firstly, studying different causes in complete isolation is generally impossible, 
there are almost always multiple causes influencing the experiment. Cartwright writes 
that 
“however small we choose the masses in tests of Coulomb's law, we 
never totally eliminate the gravitational interaction between them; in 
Galilean experiments on inertia, the plane is never perfectly smooth 
nor the air resistance equal to zero; we may send our experiments 
28 Note that a physical system does not simply mean physics. A society could be seen as a physical 
system, just one harder to measure than turbulent water.
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deep into space, but the effect of the large massive bodies in the 
universe can never be entirely eliminated; and we can perform them 
at cryogenic temperatures, but the conditions will never, in fact, reach
the ideal” (Cartwright 1999, p.84). 
Secondly, there are too many causal factors present at any moment for scientists to 
account for them all. Trying to factor into account all causes is impossible, 
idealisations are required “to avoid computational intractabilities” (Bogen & 
Woodward 1988, p.324). Neither scientists nor their computers can make such 
calculations. Scientists need to limit the number of causal factors they attempt to 
accommodate. Thirdly, scientists need a level of generality to apply theories to 
multiple instances. Scientists often “rely on idealizations, approximations, and 
simplifications of various kinds... in order to secure generality” (Bogen & Woodward 
1988, p.324). Scientists might establish the best possible causal description of a 
physical system on a specific day in a specific situation yet find that specific causal 
description near useless when applied to other seemingly similar physical systems – 
say a given leaf on a given day compared to another leaf on another day. Rather, 
scientists produce general theories accounting for the most common and most 
important causes. These are the means for understanding physical systems so, I claim, 
they are the means for understanding an individual with autism in a particular 
environment. Showing autism contexualised to specific instances helps understand 
what autism decontextualised from specific instances is, so lets consider Bogen & 
Woodward's account in greater detail. 
4.3.2 Symptoms as phenomena
Bogen & Woodward famously demarcated between data and phenomena. Historically,
philosophers of science believed data proves theories. Bogen & Woodward showed an
important intermediate step. Data is localised to specific conditions, say a particular 
experiment, whereas phenomena is more generalisable, yielded by many different 
procedures such as different types of experiment (Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.317). 
“Data typically result from complex, loosely connected, short-lived assemblies of 
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causal factors... The causes that produce data sets are never exactly the same from one
trial to another” (Bogen 2010, p.789). Specific experimental set-ups produce specific 
results due to different set-ups involving some different causes. Many causes are not 
relevant to the phenomena, since “in typical cases data are the result of many causal 
factors and at most [only] some of these will have to do with the phenomena of 
interest” (Woodward 2010, p.167). For example, 
“the outcome of any given application of a thermometer to a lead 
sample depends not only on the melting point of lead, but also on its 
purity, on the workings of the thermometer, on the way it applied and 
read, on interactions between the initial temperature of the thermometer
and that of the sample, and a variety of other background conditions” 
(Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.309).
Thus data is yielded by experiments produced by specific causal factors but for 
scientific purposes we require a more generalizable notion. One measurement of 
melting lead might produce 326.7 degrees, another 327.2 degrees (the data) but the 
figure we arrive at (the phenomena) is 327 degrees. We might use statistics to reach 
327 degrees or we might derive it from theories about molecules (I discuss 
phenomena formulation in chapter five). I now show how phenomena is used in 
science, how symptoms are phenomena and how this alleviates many concerns of 
Cooper and Murphy over symptoms.
Phenomena are idealised models, abstracting away many causes (Bogen 2010, 
p.781; Massimi 2008, p.13; Psillos 2009b, p.87;  Teller 2010, p.820; Woodward 2011, 
p.170). Not fully accurately representing reality means they are models. Psillos writes 
that 
“phenomena (e.g., the melting point of a substance or the path of a 
planet) are abstracted from the data by means of a number of 
sophisticated modeling techniques based on a rather substantive set of 
assumptions and theories” (Psillos 2009, p.87) 
and “nothing worldly satisfies the description associated with a model” (Psillos 2011a,
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p.5), providing the example of the linear harmonic oscillator. Idealised models involve
“abstraction [where] some features of the system under study are 
neglected/omitted... [and/or] idealisation, [in which] there is 
misrepresentation – the model attributes properties to the system it does
not have and/or denies that the system has properties that it in fact 
possesses” (Psillos 2011a, p.7). 
Note that phenomena as idealisation is fully compatible with various types of realist 
approaches (Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.337; Giere 2004, p.750; Massimi 2012, 
p.49; Psillos 2011a, p.4).
The distinction between data and phenomena fits psychiatry. Symptoms 
(phenomena) are idealized from tendencies to exhibit certain behaviour whereas 
behaviour (data) manifests in particular contexts, responding to additional specific 
causal factors alongside causes specific to the symptom. Take, for example, an 
individual who has the symptom of having low social skills. The symptom has 
biological and/or psychological causes but manifestations of low social skills – 
specific words spoken, degree and nature of social misjudgment – are also causally 
influenced by many additional factors. For example, who an individual is speaking to, 
for what purpose, the mood of the individual, even gender, age, time of day or time of 
year. In contrast, the symptom low social skills have generality. An individual has the 
symptom low social skills whether at work, at school and even when speaking to those
rare others whom they exhibit normal levels of social skills around. Symptoms are 
conceptualised in a broad, generalisable manner, low social skills covering an 
immense variety of behaviour. There are many means of measuring low social skills, 
numerous questionnaires and experimental methods. Qualifying as having low social 
skills requires scoring below a particular figure rather than needing one specific 
magnitude. Psychological tests and statistical analysis reduce incidental factors, most 
generalised symptoms are measurable by literally hundreds of context specific 
experiments and psychiatrists have some competency at abstracting away incidental 
factors when assessing patients.
Phenomena, rather than data, are the basis of inductions. 
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“What we call phenomena include stable regularities produced and 
sustained by a relatively small number of causal factors that are present
and that interact in pretty much the same way within a range of 
different background conditions at different places and times” (Bogen 
2010, p.779). 
Similarly, phenomena have “stable, repeatable characteristics” (Woodward 2010, 
p.794). Also, phenomena are used in predictions (Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.326; 
see also Glymour 2000, p.30; Massimi 2014, p.421; Schindler 2007, p.162). Stable, 
repeatable and useful for predictions means phenomena can be used for inductions. 
Inductions require neither a certain property nor a certain cause to always be present; 
at most inductions need degrees of uniformity.
Scientists have choices over how to formulate phenomena (Feest 2011, p.68; 
Harris 2003, p.1516; Massimi 2008, p.34; McAllister 2007, p.886; Woodward 2011, 
p.174).29 For the phenomena of how often a coin lands on each side, “a researcher who
employs a significant test with a significance level of 0.05 has a different attitude... 
than a researcher who employs a significance level of 0.001) (Woodward 2011, 
p.176). One level of precision results in one phenomenon, another level in another 
phenomena (Woodward 2011, p.174). Here goals influence what data we obtain, 
influencing the phenomena we establish. Also, the same data can yield different but 
consistent phenomena (Brading 2010, p.838; Woodward 2011, p.175). We might 
interpret the same data differently depending on goals and theories. Finally there can 
be multiple levels of phenomena, one phenomena which has many subphenomena 
(Falkenburg 2011, p.161; Teller 2010, p.818). These may or may not cause the 
phenomena. Let’s consider all this. Different goals may result in different data being 
produced. Different goals may result in the same data being interpreted differently. 
Different goals influence employing a particular phenomena or sub-phenomena. This 
means that the inductive regularities we find depend on our goals. Woodward writes, 
“inductive inference... relies on more or less explicit assumptions about epistemic 
goals or ends, including attitudes towards risk” (Woodward 2011, p.172). Similarly, 
29 In contrast, Bogen considers phenomena as interest independent, though he considers data as 
interest dependent and from data phenomena are built (2010, p.781). He might mean that given a 
particular set of data then certain phenomena will entail, i.e. data is interest relative but the 
subsequent phenomena is not. This would leave him compatible with my account. Otherwise, I 
cannot make sense of his claim. 
152
we can conceptualise regularities as coarse or fine-grained (Teller 2010, p.821), Teller 
writing that “[n]ature constrains what options we have, but from among nature's 
options the regularities that emerge are guided by our choices” (Teller 2004, p.739). 
Relatedly, projectability (inductiveness) may depend on level of detail (Batterman 
2002, p.37) or level of noise (McAllister 2011, p.80). Employing phenomena 
inductively allows us multiple ways to formulate inductions.
We understand physical systems and phenomena through building models. The
nature of the model will partially depend on our goals, on tractability and on theories. 
Often simpler, less accurate theories are preferred (Chakravartty, 2007 p.233). Models 
are constrained by “what could be modelled manageably and reliably” (MacLeod & 
Nersessian 2013, p.545). Various mathematical techniques are used to suppress 
complexity (Macleod & Nersessian 2013, p.539; Wilson 2010, p.495). More detail 
often means less tractability (Batterman 2002, p.22), reduces generality (Rohwer & 
Rice 2013, p.336) and applicability to future situations (Myrvold & Harper 2002, 
p.137). Such ideas seem additional developments of Bogen & Woodward's claim that 
idealisations are required “to avoid computational intractabilities” (1988, p.324). 
Modeling all causes of physical systems or phenomena in a physical system is 
generally impossible.
Phenomena show we can have inductions despite causal instability. The 
stability of inductions is not based upon the presence of one single cause or 
determining property but from the idealisation, conceptualising phenomena in a 
manner which is tractable rather than conceptualising phenomena to track every 
possible cause. Symptoms, then, do not need determining properties or Murphy style 
causal mechanisms to be inductive. 
Since classification is composed of symptoms we have some indication of how
classification contributes inductively. This is important because inductions then allow 
laws. This will be fully outlined after the next section. 
4.4 What are classifications?
We have seen Cooper and Murphy argue psychiatric classifications need have 
determining properties or underlying causal mechanisms to merit belief. In the 
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absence of determining properties or causal mechanisms which explain the psychiatric
classification surely all psychiatric classifications do is probabilistically correlate co-
occurrences of symptoms? This situation would seemingly leave the sceptic correct. 
Remember how Cushing, described in the introduction, considers all possible things 
autism could be identified with – cognitive psychology, neuroscience, genetics – and 
since autism is not equatable with any of these he concludes autism is not a “thing” 
(Cushing 2013, p.38) and therefore needs replacing with something better (Cushing 
2013, p.41). We will see, however, that probabilistic relationships are heavily involved
in causes, explanations and laws. Consequently, psychiatric classifications can be 
closely related to causes, explanations and laws. From here, we can see that Cooper 
and Murphy have been unfairly downplaying the role of psychiatric classifications; 
they can provide causes, explanations and laws without determining properties or 
deeper causal mechanisms. 
4.4.1 Causes
Let’s start with causes. “When an apparently unconnected event occurs in conjunction 
more frequently than would be expected if they were independent then assume there 
was a common cause” (Salmon, 1998 p.110). If low social skills and intolerance of 
criticism co-occur more frequently than chance then a common cause seems possible. 
Sufficient statistical co-occurrences lead us to believe that common causes are present.
Similarly, Salmon argues explanations are statements of statistical relevancy (Salmon 
1984, p.37). One cause can lead to different effects so causal explanation is not saying
cause A leads to effect B but instead a statement of the relevant causal factors making 
something less or more likely to happen (Salmon 1998, p.354). Claiming A causes B 
just means B has a statistical probability of occurring after A has occurred. For 
example, mixing sodium and oxygen has a very high statistical probability of causing 
sodium oxide though not 100% given impurities and various atmospheric conditions. 
Recessions have a statistical probability of causing inflation, one quite low because 
inflation also depends on imports and quantitative easing.
Salmon argues theoretical explanations are employed to join together causal 
connections. We observe the product of causes and fill in gaps between those effects 
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by positing theoretical explanations based on a belief in the common cause (Salmon 
1998, p.113). Theoretical entities are posited to fill in gaps in our knowledge rather 
than simply charting how the causes of an independently identified entity lead to 
effects (Salmon 1998, p.109). Thus we might posit genes or abnormal psychology as 
leading to certain effects, such as symptoms. In their absence we can posit autism, a 
statement about statistical probability of effects plus belief common causes are 
typically responsible for statistically co-occurring effects. This in no way entails a 
common cause is simply one thing, it does not entail autism is one uniform thing. To 
assign a cause is to assign statistically relevant factors, autism itself is a statistical 
relevant factor which itself will be produced by many other unknown statistically 
relevant factors (biological, psychological, environmental). Arguments over the 
quality of autism as an explanation will be considered in chapter six. For now, we can 
note that scientists often create theories that join together effects and this is also true 
for psychiatry. Autism is a theoretical explanation contributing to causal explanations 
of individual symptoms.  Autism groups together many unknown causes into one big 
cause which we call autism. Here we invoke a different notion of causation to those 
typically employed. Rather than causation as discrete causes which either are present 
or are not, instead we think of causation as what is required to explain effects. Autism 
is the cause which explains the probabilistic co-occurrence of symptoms, it does not 
entail that autism is, or is composed of, a single discrete cause or many regularly 
occurring discrete causes.
4.4.2 Mechanism
A related concept to causation is mechanism. “A mechanism, nowadays, is virtually 
any relatively stable arrangement of entities such that, by engaging in certain 
interactions, a function is performed or an effect is brought about” (Psillos 2011b, 
p.772). “What fixes the explanatory relevant description is surely the function it [the 
mechanism] performs” (Psillos 2011b, p.785). “When it comes to the search for 
[causal] mechanisms, anything can count as a quasi-mechanism provided it performs a
function that is meant to explain” (Psillos 2011b, p.786; see also Lipton 2004, p.33).30 
30  Psillos does not use the phrase ‘quasi-mechanism’ derogatively, rather, he considers ‘quasi-
mechanisms’ as the only type of mechanism possible, rejecting purely mechanical accounts which 
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Mechanisms are not A pushes B but collections of entities we group together based 
upon particular effects that interests us. We posit mechanisms relevant to the effect 
which interests us, joining together diverse entities because they produce a particular 
outcome. Relatedly, Bogen argues belief in phenomena only makes sense if we 
believe something causes it (Bogen 2011, p.16). Like Salmon, Bogen is not stringent 
over the causally responsible thing. Bogen notes that laws are often identified long 
before how they operate is established. This can provide a “reasonable belief that there
is a mechanism of some kind to do the job [although this] wouldn't warrant as much 
confidence as well confirmed ideas about how the mechanism operates” (Bogen 2011,
p.20). Autism is short hand for the unknown biological and psychological entities that 
mechanistically produce symptoms.
These accounts of causation and mechanism often fit psychiatry well. 
Psychiatry is often highly causally unstable, “specific combinations of the same 
antecedent causes can lead to different clinical outcomes (“multi-finality”) and 
different antecedent can lead to the same outcome through common developmental 
pathways (“equi-finality”)” (Cloninger 2014, p.205; also Jablensky 2012, p.87; 
Kendler 2005b, p.1247; Meehl 2001, p.509). Tracing causes to effects involves 
choices, deciding how we combine many low probability causes in a manner that 
produces effects. The requirement of multi-level explanations also requires choices 
over how we trace interactions of levels to symptoms. We cannot take a 1.2% effect 
size gene and see what it causally results in; rather, we start with the classification and
then link it to other regularities like genes. There are instances, like Down's syndrome,
where high probability causes are linked to stable sets of symptoms but this is not how
things generally exist in psychiatry. 
4.4.3 Explanations
Kitcher provides an account of explanations, seeing explanations as unifying diverse 
phenomena. For example, evolution and Newton's gravitation link together seemingly 
diverse phenomena (Kitcher 1981, p.519). 
require causation purely “in terms of pushing and pulling” (Psillos 2011b, p.774, emphasis original).
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“connections, common patterns, in what initially appeared to be 
different situations... Science advances our understanding of nature by 
showing us how to derive descriptions of many phenomena, using the 
same patterns of derivation again and again, and, in demonstrating 
this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of types of facts we have to
accept as ultimate (or brute [unexplained])” (Kitcher 1989, p.432 
emphasis original).
Theories reduce the number of unconnected facts, increasing “systemitization of our 
beliefs” (Kitcher 1989, p.476). Derivations need not come from a few grand equations
and often only supply probabilistic explanations. For example, the “derivations that 
are provided by genetics show why certain distributions of genes and traits are 
expected” (Kitcher 1989, p.456). This is statistical derivation, certain genes increase 
probability of certain traits occurring. Similarly, people exhibit much seemingly 
unrelated behaviour but employing autism reduces the number of unexplained 
phenomena, “seeing connections, common patterns, in what initially appeared to be 
different situations” (Kitcher 1989, p.432). The presence of autism means certain 
symptoms are statistically probable and autism is an explanation of those symptoms. 
Note that explanations do not need further explanations (Lipton 2004, p.22); we do 
not then need an explanation of autism for autism to be an explanation. 
Kitcher constrains legitimate explanations to “those derivations which 
collectively provide the best systemitization of our beliefs” (Kitcher 1989, p.430) by 
making “the best tradeoff between minimizing the number of patterns of derivation 
employed and maximizing the number of conclusions generated” (Kitcher 1989, 
p.432), emphasising building a system of economy of thought (Kitcher 1993a, p.171). 
Chapter six will argue autism is a plausible candidate for this unificatory goal to best 
systematise our knowledge, vastly reducing unsystematised phenomena. Psillos 
associates Kitcher with the notion of laws which Psillos adopts (2002, p.264). For 
Psillos, the best laws, just like the best explanations, are those which are part of the 
simplest and strongest system, roughly Kitcher's trade-off. 
4.4.4 Laws
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Traditionally, laws are often considered exceptionless regularities but many or even all
laws are not exceptionless (Cartwright 1999, p.34; Giere 2004, p.745; Psillos 2002, 
p.145; Teller 2004, p.731; Woodward 2000, p.228). There are many different accounts 
of laws but since I am approaching scientific realism from the perspective of Psillos I 
shall employ Psillos'. This is especially important because, as discussed in chapter six,
his account of laws is central to his account of inference to the best explanation which 
is required for scientific realism. Additionally, my discussion in chapter five of 
systematisation is important partly because systematisation can strengthen psychiatry 
inductively and thus strengthen scientific laws. Psillos takes a Humean approach 
whereby laws are a special type of regularity. “According to this tradition, there are 
only regularities, that is, sequences of event types, which happen in constant 
conjunction: whenever one occurs, it is invariably followed by the other... when a 
metal gets heated, it expands” (Psillos 2002, p.139). This would suggest all 
regularities are laws, however, laws are
“sufficiently different from accidents to demand a different treatment. 
After all, there is a clear intuitive difference between the regularity that 
all apples in the fruit bowl on the table are ripe and the regularity that 
all metals expand when heated. Even if all laws are regularities, not all 
regularities are laws” (Psillos 2002, p.139). 
Psillos demarcates between laws and accidents not upon some strong metaphysical 
grounds but upon what we desire science to do. For Psillos, the correct laws are those 
which are part of the best balance between strength, simplicity and stringency of our 
systematised knowledge. “Laws are those regularities that are members of a coherent 
system of regularities, in particular, a system that can be represented as a deductive 
axiomatic system striking a good balance between simplicity and strength” (Psillos 
2002, p.149 emphasis original). Simplicity is where we employ as few laws as 
possible. Strength is where we explain as much as possible. The strength of an 
individual law has two components, strength is where law covers as much phenomena 
as possible and stringency is where the statistical probabilities it describes should be 
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stringent, as high as possible.31 We might have a law which covered everything in the 
universe but was near totally incapable of describing how those things related. 
Equally, we might have a law which showed two phenomena were one hundred 
percent correlated but was only applicable to two specific instances of phenomena 
such as 'when I enter my house I always open a window'. Neither of these would be 
part of the best balance between simplicity, strength and stringency. In contrast, 
Newton's laws have near universal applicability whilst also being extremely stringent 
in how they portray probabilistic relationships (plausibly so high as to often be called 
deterministic). For Psillos, “accidents are those regularities that do not find a place in 
the simplest and strongest true deductive system that systematizes our knowledge of 
the world” (Psillos 2002, p.150-151). Being laws rather than just lawlike is a route 
towards scientific realism.
Under Psillos' Humean approach, laws determine causes (2002, p.293). He 
believes causes are just probabilistic relationships of regularities derived from laws 
(2002, p.293) and the probabilistic relationship causes describe depend upon 
demarcating laws (2007, p.105). Some laws are not causal, Psillos giving the example 
of coexistence (2002, p.171), examples of which are relationships between length and 
period of pendulums, pressure, volume and temperature in gases, electrical 
conductivity in metals relates to thermal conductivity. Grouping together 
characteristics into a classification are instances of coexistence (Weber 1999, p.485) 
and these are explanatory (Weber 1999, p.486). Whilst causes are a potential route for 
belief the law itself can potentially merit belief in the absence of causes. Also, 
lawfully describing probabilistic relationships between one set of regularities 
(symptoms) with another (biological, psychological and environmental regularities 
typically called causes) is easier when employing more laws. The more laws 
employed the more specific they can be. By employing more laws each law could 
describe a narrower range of probabilistic relationships or some laws might have very 
wide coverage whilst others describe a narrower range of probabilistic relationships. 
Describing a narrower range can strengthen the probabilistic relationships, so much so
that they might be considered causal. A single law might state that after a regularity 
occurs then many other regularities can occur, multiple laws would allow narrowing 
down of probabilities. Imagine a law describes how the co-occurrence of regularity A, 
31 Psillos typically just talk of strength vs simplicity, only talking of stringency when discussing what 
strength entails. For convenience I talk about strength, simplicity and stringency. 
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B, C, D and E has a 70% chance of no subsequent regularity occurring and a 10% 
chance each of regularity X, Y and Z occurring. Now imagine an alternative law 
which states the co-occurrence of A, B and C has a 80% chance of no subsequent 
regularity occurring, a 20% chance of regularity X occurring and a 0% chance of Y or 
Z occurring (i.e. Y and Z do not occur without regularity D or E). Assume we could 
also employ another two laws which equally allowed greater probabilities of Y 
occuring, and Z occurring, following a certain combination of A, B, C, D and E. By 
employing these three laws we can increase the specificity of the probabilistic 
relationships. This makes the probabilistic relationship more causal by increasing the 
probabilistic relationships of certain regularities occurring following other regularities 
occurring. More law make deriving causes easier. In psychiatric terms, linking a set of
symptoms with biological, psychological and environmental regularities becomes 
easier, so much so that we might take those probabilistic relationships as causal. 
However, “simplicity and strength pull in opposite directions” (Psillos 2002, p.149) 
since simplicity demands fewer laws whereas more laws makes fully accounting for 
all phenomena easier. A system of many laws, each of which has relatively narrow 
coverage, is often quite easy to demarcate strong causes from but runs contrary to the 
simplicity constraint of laws. The best balance between strength and simplicity might 
be one with fewer laws and fewer (or weaker) causes, rather than more laws and more 
(or stronger) causes (I cover this in greater detail in chapter 6).
Though Salmon's and Kitcher's approach could fit, I endorse Psillos' account of
laws. Under this, a philosophically reconstructed science takes a set of regularities, 
deriving laws from the statistical co-occurrences of those regularities, the law being 
explained by an entity with causal properties. The most sophisticated account of law 
in science is a model based regularity guide as advocated by Giere and Teller, one 
endorsed by Psillos. Laws of nature “cannot by themselves be used to make any direct
claims about the world” (Giere 2010, p.270), rather, 
“[t]hey function more like recipes for constructing models than like 
general [universal] statements... the behaviour of many types of real 
world systems can in fact successfully be represented by models 
constructed using this recipe” (Giere 1994, p.293; also Winsberg 2001, 
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These highly idealised laws to which we can add more detail, can be used to create 
more specific models, eventually constructing models representing physical systems. 
Teller describes such models as “regularity guides” (Teller 2004, p.735). These 
heavily relate to previously discussed notions. Unifications and explanations act as 
regularity guides (Teller, 2004 p.740), and they relate to causes (Giere 1999, p.185), 
idealised models from which regularities of physical systems can be represented. The 
idea that regularity guides can be used to produce a hierarchy of models which can be 
used to guide building nested sets of regularity formulations also perfectly fits Bogen 
and Woodward's notion of phenomena (Teller 2010, p.825). Highly abstract theories 
connect to the less abstract phenomena which are connected to non-abstract instances 
of data. This position is fully compatible with scientific realism and Psillos cites Giere
in support of his account of how models and theories relate (Psillos 2011a, p.7). For 
Psillos, “the truth of theories does not give them straightforward representational 
content vis-a-vis the physical world. Their representational content is mediated (at 
least partly) by abstract objects – the models” (Psillos 2011a, p.9) and he describes 
models as “abstract objects that can stand in representation relations to worldly 
systems” (Psillos 2011a, p.8). Psillos argues relationships between these layers of 
models can be explanationary without being causal, writing that “not all explanation is
causal (e.g., the explanation of low-level law by reference to high level laws)” (Psillos
2010, p.957). Theories represent the world through the models built from those 
theories and there is no need for relationships between different layers to be causal. 
- 4.4.4.1 Autism as a law
Regularity guide models are how we should understand autism. Recall that Cushing 
thinks autism need be associated with a concrete thing rather than behavioural 
correlates to be real (Cushing 2013, p.38) but laws are abstract models for guiding the 
building of more detailed models rather than concrete things. People exhibit instances 
of behaviour, call these data. We abstract from those something more abstract but 
more generalizable, call these phenomena or symptoms. The co-occurrence of the 
symptoms we explain or believe caused by autism, a model acting as a regularity 
guide, a statement about statistical probabilities. Autism systematises phenomena, 
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showing occurrence of certain phenomena has a probabilistic relationship with other 
phenomena, guiding the building of models of symptoms. We might apply those 
symptoms to an individual, combining autism with factors related to their individual 
psychology, economic status, geographic locations, etc., and also considering which 
specific symptoms of autism the individual exhibits, to produce more concrete 
models. We might apply these to a physical system, an autistic individual in a specific 
situation. All stages add details, sharpen the probabilities. These probabilities can be 
implicit judgements rather than mathematical calculations, the important point is that 
autism is playing a significant role in formulating such judgements. Imagine a 
physical system, an autistic individual in a library wishing to borrow a book already 
on loan. The abstract model autism predicts substantially higher probabilities of a 
meltdown than models of typical humans. We then establish what particular symptoms
of autism that individual has, further sharpening the probabilities. We can add non-
pathological traits, non-autistic symptoms, socio-economic status, geographic 
location, etc., further sharpening the probabilities. Autism, by itself, suggests high 
probabilities of meltdown and each more detailed model either increases or decreases 
the probabilities, assisting an informed judgement over expectations that particular 
individual on that particular day will have a meltdown. Autism is an abstract model 
that guides the building of less abstract models, each model providing rough statistical
probabilities of regularities occurring. This abstract model allows us to make general 
claims about specific individuals. As occurs in physics,
“[g]enerality requires abstractness: otherwise the general cannot cover 
the particular. There is not a theory of concrete springs, and another of 
concrete pendula... there is a theory of the LHO [Linear Harmonic 
Oscillator] which covers many concrete structures that are inexact 
tokens of the LHO” (Psillos 2010, p.951)
Thus autism can be explanatory and inductive without being a concrete thing or 
having a strong causal basis. 
- 4.4.4.2 Autism as an entity
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Entities for Psillos are conceptualised based upon explanatory requirements, to 
account for regularities via laws. “The process of positing theoretical entities... is 
associated with specific problems-situations, in which an entity is posited in order to 
stand for the cause of some phenomena” (Psillos 1999, p.294; also Kitcher 1993a, 
p.172; Salmon 1998, p.109). For Psillos, entities are clusters of properties demarcated 
upon causal relationships they enter into; which causal relationships obtain depend 
upon laws – which are an idealised description of regularities. Similarly, a natural 
kinds are “functionally relevant clusters of properties” (Massimi, 2014 p.428). 
Systematised phenomena are further systematized through providing theoretical 
explanation of phenomena by conceptualizing entities with properties. For Kitcher, the
“causal structure of the world, the division of things into kinds, the objective 
dependencies among phenomena are all generated from our efforts at organisation” 
(Kitcher 1993a, p.172). Sometimes, already conceptualised entities can be appealed to
when explaining regularities by laws (see Massimi 2007, p.250). A new regularity in, 
for example, fundamental physics could likely be accounted for by an already 
employed fundamental particle. If none can account for the regularity then 
conceptualising a new one is legitimate. Conceptualising entities with causal powers 
which give rise to lawful regularities is legitimate. Autism is an entity which causally 
explains symptoms and about which we know of through the lawful relations it gives 
rise to, the idealised statistical probabilities of regularities described by the 
classification. 
4.5 Mind-independence, causes and regularities
Cooper and Murphy seemingly value causes because they are taken as mind-
independent parts of reality. Cooper sees clustering properties which are grouped into 
natural kinds as “reflect[ing] real structures in nature” (Cooper 2005, p.49) and 
Murphy says the “causes of mental illness [that] are genuinely out there in the 
structure of the world, waiting to be discovered” (Murphy 2014a, p.62). 
Unfortunately, exactly what is meant by the world having a real structure or an 
objective structure is left unstated. Let’s compare this with Psillos' account.
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Psillos sees regularities, rather than causes, as mind-independent. “Regularities
are  real and  mind-independent:  they  would  exist  as  (perhaps  very complicated) 
patterns among events even if there were no minds around” (2015, p.18). From this, 
Psillos' approach to laws is objective, since “we can claim that there exists a true 
deductive system of (our knowledge of) the world [balancing strength, simplicity and 
stringency], irrespective of whether or not we may ever come to know it” (Psillos 
2002, p.150). There exists a best balance of our knowledge but we only make 
subjective judgements over what that best balance is (2002, p.210). Though we may 
model regularities as phenomena based upon our purposes, the laws we employ to 
describe those phenomena will still differ in degree to the objective structure of the 
mind independent regularities. Consequently the best balance is absolute truth 
whereas our subjective judgements only give degrees of closeness to that best balance,
meaning science deals with approximate rather than absolute truth. 
On this account regularities are mind-independent. We model these regularities
by generating data and abstracting phenomena based upon our interests. Salmon's 
causes, Kitcher's explanations and Psillos' laws are all derived from attempts to 
account for phenomena. Scientists see phenomena co-occur probabilistically, either 
occurring together or one following the other. They account for this co-occurrence by 
employing Salmon style causes, Kitcher style explanations and Psillos style laws. In 
each case, the cause, explanation or law is not mind-independent waiting to be found 
in any strong sense. They are constructed to attempt to best explain the phenomena. 
Causes are not mind-independent in the manner Cooper and Murphy defend. Murphy 
cites Kitcher in his defence (2014a, p.66) but Kitcher explicitly states 
“there is no sense to the notion of causal relevance independent of that 
of explanatory relevance and that there is no sense to the notion of 
explanatory relevancy except that of figuring in the systematization of 
belief in the limit of scientific inquiry, as guided by the search for 
unification” (Kitcher 1989, p.499). 
Also, “I recommend rejecting the idea that there are causal truths that are independent 
of our search for order in the phenomena” (Kitcher 1989, p.497; see also Kitcher 
2001, p.187).
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We now have a fundamental starting point. Cooper and Murphy take a cause 
first approach. They see causes as real and from these causes they want our theories 
about the world to be derived. In contrast, Salmon, Kitcher and Psillos take a 
regularity first approach. Regularities are real and from theories describing regularities
modelled as phenomena we derive causes (mediated by explanations for Kitcher and 
laws for Psillos). I endorse a regularity first approach rather than a cause first 
approach. 
4.6 Conclusion
Metaphysical realism can constrain epistemological realism. The evidence required 
for true theories which accurately describe reality depends upon the nature of reality. 
By outlining a new metaphysical picture for psychiatry, a new way in which things 
exist, we allow different types of evidence to entail belief over theories describing 
reality. In this chapter I outline a new metaphysical picture; the new epistemological 
arguments will come in chapters five and six. 
The metaphysical realism Cooper explicitly adopts and Murphy implicitly 
adopts restricts their epistemic realism. They require very specific epistemic 
conditions to consider a psychiatric classification as meriting belief. By outlining a 
philosophical account of causation, including showing its connection to explanations, 
laws and entities, we better understand the role causation plays. We also understand 
how other things can potentially contribute epistemically as much or more than 
Cooper's determining properties and Murphy's causal mechanisms. If Cooper's 
determining properties or Murphy's causal mechanisms are not required for belief then
we should not automatically adopt epistemic anti-realism over psychiatric 
classification lacking these.
Popular accounts of causes, explanations and laws all heavily relate to 
statistical relationships between otherwise seemingly independent things. In this sense
autism could be a Salmon style common cause theoretical entity, a Kitcher style 
unifying explanation or a Psillos style law. The approach to reality I adopt here is 
Psillos's account of scientific laws. This is regularity first, rather than causes first. For 
Psillos, a philosophically reconstructed science takes regularities, establishes law-like 
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relationships then derives entities which causally explain those regularities. I have 
shown that symptoms should be understood as phenomena, which means they are 
regularities. I have also shown regularities are often not causally unified, the product 
of many unstable causes, yet they still work inductively. This means symptoms can 
work inductively without Cooper's determining properties or Murphy's causal 
mechanisms. Rather, the stable cause that is responsible for the symptoms (plus its 
interaction with the environment) is an entity constructed to explain those regularities. 
We can assign autism as an entity which we primarily know of via the lawful 
probabilistic relationships of symptoms which autism causally explains. For this, we 
do not need Cooper's determining properties or Murphy's causal mechanisms. These 
might assist epistemological arguments for belief in psychiatric classification but they 
are not necessary.
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5.0 Chapter 5 – The interaction between 
symptoms and classifications
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I argue psychiatric classifications can play a more important role than 
often assumed. Psychiatric classifications group together symptoms. This seems to 
suggest symptoms have a level of independence from classifications; we detect 
symptoms then make independent decisions about how to classify them. Even if 
historically symptoms are detected after the classification was formulated, it is 
assumed that in principle those symptoms could have been detected without the 
classification. I argue this picture can be deeply mistaken. Symptoms can have far 
greater connection to classification than typically assumed since psychiatric 
classifications can influence symptom formulation. The behaviour considered 
indicative of a symptom may depend upon classifications, literally identical behaviour
being considered instances of different symptoms due to a psychiatric classification. 
This process can potentially increase the epistemic strength of psychiatric symptoms 
which in turn strengthens our belief in psychiatric classifications.
My argument challenges the belief that classifications add nothing or that 
classifications without identified or inferred causes are highly inadequate. Murphy 
believes psychiatry is unsuccessful and classifications need basing on theories 
(Murphy 2006, p.11). Remember how Cushing, editor of a recent book entitled The 
Philosophy of Autism, gives a particularly striking example of devaluing 
classifications. Attempting to locate autism in the world, Cushing fails to find autism 
within psychology, genetics or neuroscience (Cushing 2013, p.41) and believes autism
only exists behaviourally which makes it “arbitrary or solely politically/economically 
motivated” (Cushing 2013, p.38). From this he claims “progress can only come from 
abandoning it [the classification of autism] and starting from scratch” (Cushing 2013, 
p.41). Although not wishing to abandon the entire classification, leading autism 
researchers believe autism needs basing upon theory, such as theory of mind (Baron-
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Cohen 1997, p.137; Happé 1994, p.98). Social constructivists often advocate even 
more extreme solutions, the complete abandonment of psychiatric classifications in 
preference for focusing on symptoms for research and diagnosis (Bentall 1992a, p.50; 
Boyle 1990, p.83). Highlighting the important role classifications can play should 
dampen dissatisfaction with classifications and dampen the desire to base 
classifications on external theory or abandon classification.
Classifications play an important role in systematizing experience. Behaviour 
is systematised into symptoms, scientifically useful behavioural characteristics. 
Symptoms are not ready-made, waiting to be detected but are created through 
combining behaviour with concepts. My claims here build on those of chapter four 
which outlined symptoms as phenomena, idealised models designed based upon our 
interests. Combining behaviour with concepts places behaviour within a 
systematitised science, turning the world from unordered appearances to structured 
scientific concepts. From this novel position I can show a crucial role for 
classifications, acting as concepts to conceptualise behaviour and produce symptoms. 
This process can epistemically strengthen symptoms by making them more 
statistically relevant to the world, increasing their inductive adequacy by more 
accurately portraying reality. Since psychiatric classifications are laws describing 
statistical probabilities of symptoms, strengthening the symptoms also strengthens the 
applicability of the laws to reality, epistemically improving psychiatric classifications.
This means symptoms have greater dependence on classifications than often 
assumed. This places limits on moving symptoms between classifications or joining 
and merging classification since doing so may require changing the formulation of the
symptom. It also limits investigating the causal basis of symptoms independent of 
existing classifications such as advocated by RDoC since existing classifications may 
have influenced symptom formulation. Finally, this limits the possibility of completely
abandoning classifications since symptoms may have been formulated upon 
classifications.
Note that by saying symptoms are not ready-made and are created by 
classifications I do not mean Hacking's looping effects (1999, p.117), it has no relation
to his claim people act differently once classified. His argument and my arguments 
add and detract nothing from each other, they are totally unrelated.
I start by outlining Massimi's concept of systematisation, the bringing of 
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unordered appearances into systematised phenomena, and then show how symptoms 
should be considered systematized concepts. I then show how the classification can be
employed to systematise appearances into symptoms, meaning symptom formulation 
can depend upon classifications. I then explore various epistemic advantages this 
brings to symptoms and classifications before using this position to show how it 
places limits upon attempts to modify classifications. 
5.2 Classifications and Symptoms
5.2.1 Classifications
Classifications group together symptoms. We generate facts about people deemed 
mentally ill and build classifications covering those facts. What exactly are 
classifications built from? The common but slightly misleading answer is symptoms, 
building classifications from statistical analysis of symptoms, determining how often 
symptoms co-occur through factor or cluster analysis. 
“When a psychiatrist identifies a syndrome on the basis of observations
of a select sample of patients he notes that certain behaviours and signs 
go together and form a functional unity... Factor analysis is simply a 
more systematic rigorous procedure” (Lorr 1966, p.5). 
The “factors identified would represent the behaviour syndromes which are now 
established entirely through clinical observation” (Lorr, 1966, p.5). The word 'entirely'
here is instructive. On this picture we observe behaviours without needing to employ 
classifications. Classifications are built from symptoms but supposedly not the 
reverse, we supposedly do not build symptoms from classifications. There are 
certainly additional possible steps to building classifications, such as corroboration 
with other factors (Kincaird 2014, p.151; Meehl 1995, p273) or establishing causal 
mechanisms (Murphy 2006, p.5). Also, building classification requires judgements 
over how to group symptoms, ones based upon our interests (Cooper, 2005, p.50; 
Murphy 2006, p.316; Zachar 2014, p.154). All these notions are still based upon 
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seeing symptoms as being the foundation of classifications. Classifications are 
certainly built from symptoms but I shall argue that the reverse can also be true, 
symptom formulations can often depend upon classifications. Let’s first consider what
symptoms are.
5.2.2 Symptoms
Typically, symptoms are roughly described as behavioural characteristics. Referring to
the DSM, Jablensky says “[t]he primary material out of which the diagnostic entities 
in psychiatry are constructed consists of patterns of human behaviour” (Jablensky 
1999, p.140). Murphy describes symptoms as “observable characteristics” (Murphy 
2006, p.209). Certain humans exhibit certain behaviour with sufficient regularity, their
behaviour forming a pattern, a behavioural tendency or characteristic. 
Symptoms are behavioural characteristics, a tendency to exhibit certain 
behaviour. This means symptoms and actual instances of behaviour are two different 
things. We observe instances of behaviour and from this we infer a behavioural 
characteristic. As discussed in chapter four, behaviour manifests in particular contexts,
responding to various causal factors, more than the causes we might specifically 
attribute to a symptom. Low social skills have particular biological and/or 
psychological causes. In common speaking, these cause the symptom. However, 
exactly how those low social skills manifest – the words spoken, the degree and nature
of the social misjudgement – will also be influenced by many other causal factors such
as where the individual is, who and how many people they are talking to, why they are
talking, their gender, their age, even day or time of day. We observe behaviour 
manifested in a context, produced by both those psychological and biological causes 
attributable to the symptom and those other causal factors specific to that situation. In 
contrast, the symptom low social skills have a level of generality not present in 
behavioural manifestations of the behaviour. An individual has the symptom low 
social skills whether at work, at school and even speaking to the few individuals 
whom they are capable of exhibiting normal levels of social skills around. This 
abstracted, generalised notion of low social skills is distinct from instances of 
behaviour.
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Excessive causal factors affect all sciences and motivate Bogen & Woodward's
famous distinction between data and phenomena. As described in chapter four, data is 
localised to specific conditions, say a particular experiment, whereas phenomena is 
generalizable and yielded by many different procedures such as many different types 
of experiment (Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.317). Similarly with behaviour and 
symptoms, instances of behaviour involve many specific causal factors absent in more
generalized behavioural characteristics (symptom). Philosophers disagree upon 
exactly how phenomena is formulated, some emphasising phenomena as built from 
theories (Brading 2010, p.830; Massimi 2007, p.249; Psillos 2009b, p.87; Schindler 
2007, p.162; Teller 2010, p.824; Woodward 2010, p.797) or at least determined by 
some non-empirical considerations (Bogen 2010, p.779; Glymour 2000, p.32; 
Woodward 2010, p.797). Without denying the possibility of purely employing 
statistical analysis of data which McAllister (2007, p.225) favours and Woodwood 
sometimes considers sufficient for phenomena formulation (2011, p.171), below I 
show how classifications can be employed to decide which causal factors are relevant 
and which incidental. Classifications thereby contribute to formulating the symptom. 
In this sense symptoms can depend upon classifications, in contrast to the typical 
portrayal of symptoms which has formulation being independent of classifications. I 
outline this through Massimi's account of systematicity.
5.3 Systematicity
5.3.1 Constructing Symptoms
Bogen & Woodward have not fully outlined exactly what phenomena are. Bogen 
nicely describes them as “ontological furniture” (Bogen 2011, p.8) employed in 
science. Both Bogen & Woodward take a realist approach to phenomena (1988, 
p.337). Massimi suggests they believe phenomena to be out there for scientists to 
discover (even if phenomena only occur under experimental conditions) (2011a, 
p.109). This seems a plausible reading of their pioneering 1988 paper but, as discussed
in chapter four, Woodward more recently argues phenomena is relative to purpose 
(Woodward 2011, p.174) (Bogen is more ambiguous (2010, p.781)). This leaves 
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phenomena sitting between two clear positions of being real and being constructed. 
Bogen & Woodward need further philosophical work to argue phenomena fit both 
categories; Massimi has produced a detailed account which accommodates 
phenomena as both real and being constructed. 
Massimi sees “conceptually determined appearance or phenomena as the 
proper object of scientific knowledge” (Massimi 2008, p.14, emphasis original). 
Science is the act of subsuming appearances under concepts, producing conceptually 
determined experiences (Massimi 2008, p.11). She shows how in Galileo's 
experiments 
“the goal of the inclined plane experiment was to extract from the 
appearance (motion of a bronze ball along an inclined plane) the 
property of uniform acceleration.... we should not think that what we 
observe, say, a free-falling object, is the rough-and-ready observable 
phenomena... If we stick to the level of observable[s]... Galileo may 
seem no more right than Aristotle” (Massimi 2008, p.25). 
In this sense, “phenomena are something that... we make, rather than something that 
comes to us as ready-made in nature” (Massimi 2008, p.8, emphasis original). There 
are important differences between the appearance of the ball and the property of 
uniform acceleration, they are not the same thing. Similarly, in psychiatry we subsume
appearances under concepts and this produces symptoms which are quite distinct from
observations of instances of behaviour. We do not simply use theory to understand 
observation, rather, we modify what we observe using theories to create symptoms. 
Let’s compare symptoms and appearances. Consider an individual with the 
symptom low social skills. Throughout their pre-diagnosis life many observations 
have been made and many behavioural characteristics have been formulated. They are 
rude, insensitive, slow, unintelligent, self-centred, etc. However, we eventually 
diagnose this individual as having low social skills. Thus behavioural characteristics 
change, the individual now having the behavioural characteristic low social skills 
rather than behavioural characteristics rude, insensitive, slow, unintelligent, self-
centred. It could be responded the individual has low social skills and those other 
172
behavioural characteristics, or low social skills covers those other behavioural 
characteristics. However, total behaviour associated with low social skills is different 
to total behaviour associated with the combination of being rude, insensitive, slow, 
unintelligent, self-centred, etc. Some behaviour associated with behavioural 
characteristic being rude (and the others) will not occur in low social skills, some 
behaviour will be missing. Also, there will be additional behaviour associated with 
low social skills not associated with behavioural characteristics of being rude. The 
individual may exhibit similar behaviour prior to and after diagnosis but the 
behavioural characteristics we associated with the individual – and therefore what 
specific behaviour we believe they will manifest – changes, pre-scientific appearances
being different to the symptoms assigned.
Chapter four outlined symptoms as phenomena, providing probabilistic 
statements about likely behaviour. This is how behavioural characteristics should be 
understood; having behavioural characteristic of being rude means we believe, given 
suitable opportunity, someone is significantly more likely to be rude than your average
person. The combined regularity guides of being rude, slow, unintelligent and self-
centred are different to the regularity guide of low social skills. Symptoms change the 
probability statements, both of which behaviour is expected and their probabilities. We
take the same behaviour (someone prior to diagnosis and afterwards) and generalised 
it differently to give different statistical probabilities of likely behaviour. Scientists 
need to decide which data is relevant and which incidental for phenomena (Bogen & 
Woodwood 1988, p.317), needing to pick data sufficiently caused by phenomena 
under investigation. Massimi writes that the “phenomena we infer depends on the way
we have carved and 'massaged' those data” (Massimi 2011, p.104). Similarly, 
“[d]ecisions to ignore or discard data play a central role in virtually all data-to-
phenomena reasoning” (Woodward 2000, p.177). Our individual diagnosed with low 
social skills may exhibit an entire range of behaviour, including behavioural 
manifestations of rudeness not associated with low social skills but at much lower 
statistical frequencies than those we consider as having the behavioural characteristic 
rudeness. For formulating symptoms, aspects of rudeness not covered by low social 
skills are abstracted away, the symptoms they have provide no higher than average 
probability for such instances.
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Our justification for this distinction is systematization. We desire a workable 
science, probabilistic statements better allowing prediction, control and interaction 
with the world. Any individual could exhibit almost any behaviour and any 
behavioural characteristic can manifest in many different ways. Producing science 
requires substantial selectivity; it’s not possible to mention every possible behavioural 
occurrence. This limitation requires taking some behaviour as relevant and some not. 
Our major motive is statistical significance; only behaviour sufficiently likely to occur
is systematised into instances of a symptom. Hence whether an individual has low 
social skills or rudeness depends upon how often they exhibit behavioural 
manifestations of rudeness not associated with low social skills. Rudeness present at 
average levels means just low social skills, present above a statistical threshold and 
they have rudeness (potentially with low social skills as well). The importance of 
behaviour may also influence the thresholds at which it is considered noteworthy. For 
example, suicide is such a significant event that even those who have a relatively low 
chance of killing themselves may be noted as being at “risk of suicide”. Pragmatic 
reasons fully justify being selective over which behaviour is systematised into a 
symptom. 
Symptoms are thus created rather than being ready-made waiting to be 
discovered. The symptoms associated with autism are systematized, creating 
something quite different to appearances, both prior to the historical conceptualisation 
of autism and typically prior to knowing someone is autistic.
5.3.2 Employing classifications to systematise symptoms
Formulating symptoms requires deciding which causal factors are localised and 
incidental causal factors and which are part of the symptom. I now show how 
classifications can be employed to make this decision. Imagine two different 
individuals exhibit literally identical behaviour in a particular situation. Imagine both 
individuals exhibit anxiety and the environmental cause was an unexpected change, a 
belief a particular course of events will occur and anxiety resulting when unexpected 
environmental changes results in an alternative course of events occurring. If 
sufficient in intensity and if occurring sufficiently often then the behaviour likely 
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counts as a manifestation of a symptom. This symptom likely would be formulated as 
anxiety, a symptom with many diverse causes. The unexpected change is a localised 
causal factor, not considered part of the symptom, much like how the individual being 
male, it being Tuesday and feeling insecure may causally influence behaviour 
expressed but are localized to that manifestation rather than being part of the 
abstracted symptom. This, however, can change when a wider range of behaviour is 
considered, taking into account behaviour other than this anxiety resulting from the 
unexpected change. Imagine one individual generally acts within boundaries of 
normality whereas the other individual exhibits many symptoms of autism, sufficient 
that they have a diagnosis of autism. Autistic individuals often struggle with 
unexpected changes. An autistic person exhibiting anxiety following an unexpected 
change will likely not be assigned the symptom anxiety; they are assigned the 
symptom disliking unexpected changes. The classification changes a causal factor 
from being a localised causal factor present in specific manifestations to being part of 
the symptom. The symptom anxiety considers the unexpected change as one of many 
possible causes of anxiety, assigning the cause to localised manifestations of anxiety 
rather than considering the cause part of the symptom anxiety. In contrast, the 
symptom disliking unexpected changes considers the unexpected change as part of the
symptom rather than just another localised causal factor like the individual being male
and it being Tuesday. Which symptom an individual is considered to manifest can thus
depend upon a classification.
Disliking unexpected changes is considered typical in autism, but is rarely 
discussed outside of the literature on autism. The forty four pages on anxiety in DSM-
5 do not mention disliking unexpected changes whereas they are mentioned in the five
pages on autism. The closest notion found in the anxiety literature applicable to non-
autistic individuals is intolerance of uncertainty. This is when “faced with ambiguous 
situations, the uncertainty schema will be activated and could lead to the perception of
difficulties where problems do not really exist, leading to non-reality based worries” 
(Freeston 1994, p.800). Intolerance of uncertainty is distinct from other aspects of 
anxiety worry over uncertain future events (Rosen et al 2014, p.68) and perception of 
threat (Bredemeier & Berenbaum 2008, p.36). Factor analysis of publications on 
intolerance of uncertainty showed researchers focus on two elements, desire for 
predictability and feeling stuck over decision making (Birrell et al 2011, p.1205). This 
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is very different to notions of autistic people reacting strongly to environmental 
changes, typically ones neither feared nor predicted in advance. Notions similar to 
disliking unexpected changes are present to a limited degree in intolerance of 
uncertainty. Of the twenty questions on the intolerance of uncertainty scale, two are 
“[u]nforeseen events upset me greatly” (USC, p.1) and “[o]ne should always look 
ahead so as to avoid surprises” (USC, p.1). These are among the most highest scoring 
items (Freeston 1994, p.798). Though relatively rare, disliking unexpected changes 
can be present among non-autistic people who exhibit anxiety. However, this is 
conceptualised as part of intolerance of uncertainty, itself conceptualised as related to 
worry which is conceptualised as related to anxiety. A non-autistic individual who 
reports anxiety following unexpected changes would likely be noted as exhibiting 
'anxiety' and/or 'worry'. In contrast, the autistic individual would be very likely to be 
given the symptom 'disliking unexpected changes', whether or not also given the 
symptom 'anxiety'.
Additionally, classifications often enable judgments as to whether behaviour is 
relevant or irrelevant. Systematisation emphasises economy of thought, reducing 
needless conceptual baggage. Statistical relevancy is often a good measurement of 
relevancy and formulating symptoms on classifications can improve statistical 
relevancy. Of all the myriad factors potentially accompanying symptoms, some will 
occur very frequently and some very infrequently. For the general population anxiety 
is infrequently caused by unexpected changes whereas for autistic people anxiety is 
often caused by unexpected changes. Given pragmatic goals, we need to decide what 
factors are sufficiently common to merit mention within the DSM, on training courses,
on undergraduate psychology degrees, etc. We could list days of the week, describing 
statistical correlations between days of the week and anxiety (perhaps anxiety 
increases on Mondays after restarting work) but such factors are likely vastly much 
less significant than many others. Only considering certain factors as relevant rather 
than incidental is justified; leaving days of the week as likely just conceptual baggage.
Statistical occurrences above pragmatically determined thresholds are good reason to 
demarcate relevant from incidental when formulating symptoms. 
Since statistical relevancy is relative to populations these statistical 
occurrences should be relative to psychiatric classifications and psychiatry would be 
worse of if they were not. For practical purposes, unexpected changes is best 
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formulated as relevant only for the population where it is quite common and has 
substantial impact, namely autistic people rather than all humanity. Classifications are 
good reason to conceptualise the identical behaviour as displaying either anxiety or 
disliking unexpected changes.
Alternatively, we could create a classification 'unexpected changes anxiety' 
disorder with the symptom anxiety which includes unexpected changes within its 
formulation just so we can apply this symptom to the few non-autistic people for 
whom anxiety is regularly caused by unexpected changes. So we have general anxiety 
disorder with the symptom anxiety which does not mention unexpected changes and 
we have the new classification, 'unexpected changes anxiety' disorder, with the 
symptom anxiety that does mention unexpected changes. Here though we risk over-
inflating the number of classifications we employ. Let’s recall Kitcher's approach from
chapter four. He desires “the best tradeoff between minimizing the number of patterns 
of derivation employed and maximizing the number of conclusions generated” 
(Kitcher 1989, p.432). Similarly, I have argued the psychiatric classification of autism 
is a scientific law and, as discussed in chapter six, Psillos argues scientific laws are 
legitimate if part of the best tradeoff between strength (covering as many things as 
possible), simplicity (employing a few laws as possible) and stringency (whilst being 
stringent in how those things co-occur) (2002, p.149). If we add a new classification 
whilst only slightly increasing the coverage of science, we only very slightly make the
phenomena we conceptualise more applicable to the world. This does not enhance the 
goals of systematisation, the aim of employing as few classifications as possible 
whilst covering as much phenomena as possible. Creating a whole new classification 
whilst only adding single rarely occurring phenomena is not generally good 
systematisation.
5.4 Systematicity helping with other background theories and ethics
Determining between relevant and incidental behaviour when formulating symptoms 
often involves theories and ethics. These can be controversial but systematicity can 
reduce some of the difficulties. Let’s consider theories first.
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5.4.1 Theories
Consider delusions as an example. In deciding that someone has the symptom of being
deluded we must decide which factors are relevant and which incidental and 
sometimes we employ theories for this. Typically, the subject matter of delusions is 
considered incidental, being a delusion whether about dogs or chairs. However, DSM 
controversially considers certain content as relevant. “Ideas that appear to be 
delusional in one culture (e.g., witchcraft) may be commonly held in another” (APA 
2013, p.103). This is even stronger in an earlier edition; the DSM-IV states religious 
content are not delusions if “ordinarily accepted by other members of the person's 
culture or subculture” (APA 1994, p.xxiv). In the case of religious content we interpret
the behaviour differently depending on the content of the belief, and no longer see the 
behavioural manifestations as the symptom delusions. Dogs or chairs are incidental 
but common religious experiences are not incidental and this changes imagining non-
existent things from being a symptom into a non-symptom.
Many philosophers dislike this approach, either objecting or desiring the 
exclusion clause be justified. Let’s consider the problems. Many approaches define or 
explain delusions through belief formation, seeing delusions produced by errors in 
belief formation. However, such approaches risk counting many “normal” people as 
deluded - as most people hold some beliefs without much evidence or in-spite of 
evidence (Gillett & Mullen 2014a, p.32). The mechanism responsible for delusions is 
contested, there is disagreement between rationalist approach where mistaken beliefs 
causes abnormal feelings or empiricist approach where abnormal feeling causes 
mistaken beliefs (Campbell 2001, p.91). Mechanistic approaches also disagree over 
whether delusions are sharply separated from normality or lie on a continuum, 
schizophrenia at the bottom and normality near the top (Radden 2014, p.45). Some 
prefer demarcating delusions on values rather than mechanisms but this 
problematically requires identifying the correct values (Bentall 2014, p.40). Even 
endorsing the DSM distinction between common vs uncommon beliefs creates 
problems since different parts of a culture vary over what is considered common, such
as different religions having different standard practices (Rashed 2010, p. 201). Some 
question if adequately demarcating delusions from non-delusions using philosophy is 
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possible, Radden writing that “attempts to define delusions in contrast to them by 
appeal to their truth value, or how they have been acquired or maintained, will face 
daunting double counterexamples at every turn” (Radden 2014, p.43). Similarly, 
helpful interventions by psychiatrists may be “distorted if our efforts have to be shoe-
horned into an over intellectualised view of human psychology” (Gillett & Mullen 
2014b, p.48).
Systematicity can help relieve such problems. Systematicity emphasises 
symptom formulation upon the most relevant factors. Imagine if half of all 
behavioural manifestations of the existing notion of delusions involved computers 
possessing the individual. Here we might formulate such behavioural manifestations 
as a different symptom, since perhaps this particular content can be associated with 
additional behavioural manifestations, has theoretical connotations not present from 
typical content or that specific content might lead to specific treatments. Similarly so 
with common religious experience type delusions. In this regard, conceptualising 
religious based delusions differently to typical delusions maybe justified on grounds 
of systematicity.
Systematicity also suggests a radically different approach to symptom 
formulation than employed by philosophers of psychiatry. Remember systematicity is 
population dependent. What counts as relevant or incidental depends on the 
population. Systematicity suggests there is no correct definition or explanation of 
delusions as such, only of delusions given a particular population. Philosophers 
implicitly set the population as all humanity. Consequently, the definition of delusions 
offered need ideally be sufficiently general to potentially cover all humans whilst 
sufficiently specific to avoid counter-examples. The generality is required so 
philosophers cannot respond 'but what about this person who is deluded and your 
theory cannot account for them'. The specificity is required so philosophers cannot 
respond 'but what about this person who is not deluded but your theory suggests they 
are'. This task seems impossibly difficult, no philosopher yet succeeding. 
Systematicity suggests an alternative approach, defining delusions based upon 
populations smaller than all humanity. 
We might define (or explain) delusions relative to two populations, one 
composing all schizophrenic individuals and one composing everyone else. Factors 
can change from incidental to relevant depending upon the population. Delusions 
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associated with schizophrenia statistically take a wide variety of forms whereas in 
non-schizophrenic individuals unjustified beliefs with the content of common 
religious experience (alongside seeing ghosts and UFOs) are more common among all
content of delusions. This should be a factor in symptom formulation. If common 
religious experiences becomes statistically insignificant as content of delusions by 
schizophrenic individuals then delusions with such content by schizophrenic 
individuals are simply delusions. If common religious experience are much more 
statistically common than most content associated with delusions then arguably we 
should formulate delusions with such content differently. We could make common 
religious experience not delusions for non-schizophrenic individuals but delusions for 
schizophrenic individuals. Note that a related approach is commonplace, since we do 
not simply just have delusions but also have specific delusions like paranoia and 
Capgras delusion. These, however, are taken as different types of symptoms 
formulated of different behaviour. The Capgras delusion is recognised as different to a
standard schizophrenic delusion. Also, each different type of delusion can occur in 
many different psychiatric classifications. The process I describe is where the same 
behaviour counts as different symptoms based upon classifications. Let’s consider the 
advantages.
Allowing the definition of delusion to be specific to population allows more 
relevant formulations of delusions. Statistical significance of various behavioural 
manifestations taken as instances of delusions may be differently measured by 
schizophrenic individuals compared to a wider population. Certain behavioural 
manifestations being more common in schizophrenia and having additional 
connotations (statistical correlation to additional distress, statistically correlated with 
further behaviour or amenability to specific treatment) plausibly makes such 
behavioural manifestations worth mentioning in DSM, training courses and 
undergraduate degrees. Meanwhile, they might be too common to merit mentioning 
for the wider population. Secondly, population specific definitions of delusions reduce
possible counter-examples. Assume we demarcate delusions as involving irrational 
thinking. Measuring all humanity supplies endless counter-examples of non-deluded 
individuals being irrational. These counter-examples are irrelevant to more specific 
populations, the irrationality of non-schizophrenic individuals becomes irrelevant to a 
notion of delusion defined for the population of schizophrenia.  
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Philosophy of psychiatry is deeply mistaken to search for the correct definition
or explanation of delusions. Assuming a near universally accepted definition of 
delusions were established, perhaps concrete necessary and sufficient conditions, this 
in no way entails inclusion in a systematized science. Rather, necessary and sufficient 
conditions must be statistically significant. Correct definitions and correct 
explanations should be population specific. On this basis, classification can have an 
immensely useful role in setting populations. 
5.4.2 Ethics
Classifications can also help with ethical problems. The DSM demands mental illness 
cannot just be normal behaviour or reactions to society, they must “reflects a 
dysfunction in the psychological, biological or developmental processes underlying 
mental functioning” (APA 2013, p.20). “Socially deviant behaviour (e.g., political, 
religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primary between the individual and society 
are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in 
the individual” (APA 2013, p.20). Also, “[m]ental disorders are usually associated 
with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other important 
activities” (APA 2013, p.20). An individual can exhibit a symptom pattern without 
actually suffering, only a propensity to suffer is required. Following the DSM, we 
look at individual behaviour and decide if it meets both these criteria, being caused by 
a dysfunction and causing suffering. Having decided which behaviour meets these 
criteria we then see how that behaviour clusters, thus forming a classification. This 
approach can be problematic and these problems can be partially alleviated using a 
classification to help decide when any particular behaviour meets either criteria. 
Classification can easily help sidestep the first criteria of requiring the 
behaviour be caused by a dysfunction. Very few symptoms have identified biological 
or psychological mechanisms. Therefore, we can instead consider if the classification 
which groups those symptoms has a mechanism which is causally responsible for 
multiple symptoms. Whilst most classifications also do not have identified causes, 
some classifications have very diverse co-occurring symptoms and repeat across so 
many people that it seems highly implausible that a biological and/or psychological 
181
dysfunction is not present (Cooper 2007, p.46; Murphy 2006, p.319). This is not to 
suggest it is a strong cause or mechanism (I argued in chapter four that Cooper and 
Murphy were mistaken to rely upon strong causes or mechanisms), merely that 
stability of the classification suggest some abnormal mechanisms are present. As 
Psillos writes, “[w]hen it comes to the search for [causal] mechanisms, anything can 
count as a quasi-mechanism provided it performs a function that is meant to explain” 
(Psillos 2011b, p.786; see also Lipton 2004, p.33). Classifications help ethical 
problems by helping decide if behavioural characteristics are likely generated by a 
mechanism and therefore a symptom.
More difficult is the association between psychiatric classifications and 
suffering. This leads to controversy, for example, grief is a normal response to death 
of someone significant to the individual and it is unclear when grief should be so 
excessive as to be medicalised (Wakefield 2012, p.510). Bolton endorses the DSM-IV 
definition of disorder but argues this means demarcation between illness and 
normality depends on individual psychology, individual life circumstances and 
cultural expectations (Bolton 2013, p.445). This is concerning because these might be 
far more important than the classification itself for causing suffering. Therefore, we 
risk the association between the symptom and suffering just being artificial noise, 
actually caused by some other factors. Imagine a symptom were statistically 
associated with suffering, 5% of the individuals diagnosed suffered greater than 
average. However, imagine individual personality (say, being positive) or life 
circumstance (say, poor housing) had a greater than 5% association with suffering. 
This makes it difficult to say if any given behavioural manifestation of that 
classification actually is an instance of suffering, thereby resulting in difficulty 
establishing the correlation between that behavioural manifestation and suffering. 
Also, cultures may disagree significantly over what, and how much, is normal 
suffering, limiting our ability to apply the classification widely. When formulating 
behavioural manifestations into symptoms we need judge if those behavioural 
manifestations have statistical associations with abnormal suffering and this can be 
problematic. Other factors may overshadow that link by being more associated with 
suffering and some associations with suffering are so dependent upon cultural 
expectations. Consequently, uncertainty over behavioural manifestations means 
uncertainty over what factors are relevant for symptom formulation. 
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We can avoid such problems by changing the population from which statistical
probabilities are measured. In the above paragraph I implicitly used all humanity as 
the population. We take an average human as exhibiting average levels of suffering 
then try to establish how much the presence of a symptom influences the likelihood of
suffering among average humans. Measured by all humanity, being shy might have 
some statistical correlation to suffering but vast numbers of other factors could have 
higher correlations with suffering. It is possible the statistical correlation is driven by 
other factors than shyness. Here classifications can help. If we set the population as a 
particular classification rather than all humanity and if that classification had a 5% 
association with suffering then those other factors are less likely to overshadow the 
association between a particular symptom and suffering but overshadowing could still 
easily happen. Autism is heavily associated with suffering, with studies showing 40% 
of autistic children and adolescents meeting a clinical diagnosis for anxiety (Francisca 
et al 2011, p.309) and 43% of autistic adults meeting a clinical diagnosis for 
depression (Sterling et al 2008, p.1013). The association with suffering is less 
sensitive to individual personality, individual circumstance and cultural expectations 
than a psychiatric classification with only a 5% association with suffering. This 
approach simply shows there is a range of behaviour which is associated with 
suffering and we can be sure of that association because the association is so high. 
This is not to claim any particular symptoms specifically causes suffering in all 
autistic individuals, or that all autistic individual suffer, only that high numbers of 
autistic people undergo periods of suffering. Rather it suggests our belief that autism 
has a strong statistical association with suffering among a population of individuals is 
on much safer grounds than similar beliefs for diagnostic categories less associated 
with suffering. It shows that the symptoms do have a strong association with suffering,
substantially reducing the possibility that the association with suffering is just 
statistical noise and that the suffering is not related to being autistic but is actually 
caused by some other factor. This is difficult to establish when implicitly employing 
all humanity as a population for measurement, consequently, when classifications are 
sufficiently associated with suffering this assists symptom formulation. 
5.5 Historical evolution and interaction of symptoms and classifications
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There is an obvious problem with my argument. I accept classifications are built from 
symptoms but I also argue that symptoms are built from classifications. This appears a
chicken and egg argument, both relying on the other. Additionally, I have suggested 
formulating symptoms on classifications increases the epistemic strength of symptoms
but surely this epistemic strength is constrained by the epistemic strength of the 
classifications – which surely must be constrained by the epistemic strength of the 
symptom. So hypothetically from pre-psychiatric appearances we formulate bad 
symptoms but hope the classification could be used to improve those symptoms yet 
that classification itself is already built from those bad symptoms – a negative 
epistemic feedback relation. This argument might look convincing from certain 
philosophical armchairs, those looking for secure foundations or non-circular 
justifications. A closer analysis of scientific practice shows this not always to be the 
case. Woodward outlines how this can occur between phenomena and theory. 
“[T]wo sets of considerations [phenomena and theory] are [can be] in a 
positive feedback relation with each other. That P [phenomena] 
apparently obtains might in turn to be important evidence in favor of T 
[theory]. This is a case in which T figures in the overall process leading 
to acceptance of P in an important way and P in turn supports T... it is 
far from obvious that the process described is automatically viciously 
circular or that it fails to provide a legitimate basis for increased 
confidence in P (or T, for that matter) (Woodward 2011, p.178). 
Massimi and Kitcher emphasise that science is fundamentally a historical process, 
scientists taking one concept of the world, investigating and testing it, making 
modifications some of which work and some of which do not. Given time, they 
hopefully adopt the better supported parts, making improvements and eventually, 
providing the process works, we end up with something worthy of belief. Kitcher 
writes that 
“we begin with a haphazard collection of beliefs, and, in our epistemic 
maturity, we regenerate them in a more adequate fashion... it regards 
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the epistemic status of the beliefs of current subjects as dependent on 
the reliability of a social-historical process that extends into the distant 
past” (Kitcher 1993b, p.160). 
Massimi writes that 
“[i]t is not a God-given metaphysics of natural kinds that ultimately 
supports our inductive inferences but rather how well-entrenched our 
conceptual resources are in our cultural history. The resilience and 
historical evolution of our natural kinds testifies to how entrenched our 
scientific taxonomy must be to grant us comprehensible experience of 
nature” (Massimi 2014, p.438). 
She outlines how phenomena and theory are often modified in light of one 
another, mutually improving the systematisation. We do not simply 
systematise but systematise in light of what we already know, then modify 
what we already know in light of how well (or not) our systematization 
worked, and throughout this process we hopefully keep the parts that work, the
inductively reliable parts worthy of belief (Massimi 2007, p.260; Massimi 
2010, p.21).
I suggest autism has undergone an evolution in a manner that helps justify 
belief. Prior to the conceptualisation of autism symptoms were organised in a 
particular way. Then autism was introduced in 1943, systematising symptoms in a new
way but also symptoms were modified. Behaviour which was previously considered 
as low intellect was now seen, sometimes correctly, as aloneness or insistence on 
sameness. The symptoms were conceptually improved when applied to a particular 
population. In the 1950s Kanner's symptoms were applied to another two populations, 
older autistic people and schizophrenic children, resulting in the symptoms being 
formulated in a more general manner. In the 1980s Wing found the most important 
statistical factor within her classification was socialising. She found “severity  of  
social impairment  gave more  statistically  significant  associations  with  
behavioural,  psychological, and  medical  variables” (Wing & Gould 1979, p.25) than
earlier psychiatric classification which were employed. Having removed the older 
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classifications by formulating an autistic spectrum she then recast the symptoms as 
forming a triad of impairment of social communication, social interaction and social 
imagination. Having modified the classification the symptoms were then given new 
emphasis as relating to social defects. Symptoms and classification have been 
modified in light of one another in a manner which has resulted in symptoms being 
formulated with higher inductive reliability, being more relevant to the new 
population. 
5.6 Consequences
Many are dissatisfied with existing classification and think they should be 
reformulated. Let’s assess proposals to reformulate classification in light of my 
arguments over symptoms depending upon classifications. 
Statistical significance of symptoms depends upon populations, consequently 
modifying classifications may modify statistical significance of symptoms. We could 
reformulate existing classifications by adding or removing symptoms from a 
classification, by merging two classifications and by splitting a classification. 
Generally, it is assumed modifying classifications needs no modification to symptoms.
We just modify how we believe those symptoms cluster. Kendler & Zachar seemingly 
appeal to this picture when suggesting symptoms remain unmodified even when 
classifications undergo change. They write that 
“another way for researchers to protect themselves from the effects of 
diagnostic instability at the level of syndromes [classifications regularly
being modified] is to also study these underlying traits [symptoms]... 
formalised measures of traits will not change according to a 
programmed schedule like the DSM and the ICD” (2008, p.374). 
This picture can be mistaken. When symptom formulation depends upon populations 
then modifying the population may ideally require also modifying the symptoms. 
Factors relevant to one population may not be relevant to another population. Exactly 
what we consider statistically significant involves a level of choice but we should not 
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assume behaviour that passes that threshold in one classification will do so in another 
classification, potentially risking reducing epistemic strength of symptoms. 
5.6.1 DSM
This has important consequences for future DSM revisions. The current approach is 
conservativism, DSM not undergoing major changes across editions. Though not fully
endorsing this, Zachar (2012, p.31) and Kendler (2012b, p.320) seem quite 
sympathetic to this general approach, accepting that progress can often come through 
small incremental changes rather than radical changes. Poland argues cautious 
updating will not improve classifications if they are already sufficiently bad (Poland 
2014, p.50). My argument supports both sides. Modifying good classifications risks 
taking symptoms relevant to that classification and finding them less relevant in the 
new classification. Changes should be small and the relevancy of symptoms needs 
carefully checking within the new classification. However, if existing classifications 
are already bad, lacking strong reason to group symptoms, then formulating symptoms
relevant to that classification is no strong epistemic accomplishment. Imagine we 
abandoned the classifications of whales and octopuses, merging them into one species.
Relevant behaviour characteristics could be produced (they swim, they eat fish) but 
this relevancy here would not justify the new classification. Plausibly, a bad 
classification with relevant symptoms is better than reformulating that classification to
produce another bad classification but with less relevant symptoms. However, if bad 
classification constrains quality of symptoms then small incremental changes to 
classification risk being constrained by those conceptually weak symptoms. 
Consequently, for good existing classifications an incremental approach might be best 
whereas for bad classifications something more radical than cautious progressivism 
might be justified. 
5.6.2 RDoC
My argument also raises problem for RDoC which intends to investigate biological 
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causes of mental illness without reference to existing classifications, fearing 
weaknesses of existing classifications negatively effect biological investigation. They 
desire circumnavigating classifications by directly linking symptoms to biological 
findings. The RDoC aims to be “trans-nosographically organized” (Aragona 2014, 
p.39). No longer employing existing classification, alternative populations need be 
employed. Consider how RDoC founder Insel suggests choosing populations for 
biological investigation. Since the 
“group of individuals to be entered into the study... will not be identical
to a DSM or ICD diagnosis, other criteria will have to be applied. In 
some cases, this might simply comprise all patients presenting at a 
certain type of clinic, such as for anxiety disorders or serious mental 
illness” (Cuthbert & Insel 2013, p.5). 
A study might try correlating biology with symptoms of everyone at a particular clinic
rather than everyone with a particular classification. Other options include anyone 
attending a particular type of clinic (such as anxiety clinic), anyone displaying a 
particular symptom (rather than classification), anyone with particular risk factors and 
anyone with particular environmental causes (Stanislow et al 2010, p.635). Epistemic 
optimism surrounding RDoC is based upon existing classifications playing little role, 
seemingly based upon an image of symptoms out there waiting to be found. However, 
some symptoms have been formulated based upon existing classifications, as 
highlighted by my anxiety vs disliking unexpected changes example earlier. This 
means existing classifications still have influence upon RDoC process. Biological 
investigation will not simply link biology with symptoms but link biology with 
symptoms potentially formulated by classifications RDoC desire to circumnavigate. 
This suggests RDoC is more closely tied to existing classifications than realised, 
limiting the project. 
5.6.3 Symptom-based approaches to psychiatry
Some theorists advise completely abandoning all use of psychiatric classifications. For
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example, Boyle accepts people we call schizophrenic hear voices and have confused 
thinking, writing that we 
“acknowledge the person's behaviour and experiences and devote 
enormous energy and resources to trying to understand why these 
phenomena occur and what variables influence them, but without 
inferring unsupported concepts like schizophrenia” (1990 p.166). 
However, when symptoms are formulated on psychiatric classifications, abandoning 
all psychiatric classifications still likely entails employing symptoms possibly 
formulated partially based upon existing classifications. Symptom-based approaches 
to psychiatry underestimate the difficulty of removing all influence of existing 
psychiatric classifications. Where this situation is applicable then just diagnosing 
symptoms without diagnosing classifications will not escape the influence of current 
classifications, as highlighted by the anxiety vs disliking unexpected changes 
example. Additionally, since formulating symptom on classifications can increase 
epistemic strength, those desiring to abandon psychiatric classifications deny 
themselves an epistemic tool, disallowing themselves the possibility of improving 
existing classification which might also improve symptoms. This substantially limits 
symptom-based projects of abandoning psychiatric classifications.
5.7 Classification, systematisation and belief
My ultimate aim is arguing autism merits belief, so does the systemitisation process 
described increase belief? To many observers this process likely increases their 
concern. Some believe that “posited attributes [symptoms assigned to an individual], 
rather than being possessed by subjects, exist, so to speak, in the heads of researchers”
(Boyle 1990, p.223), just a bunch of psychiatrists making arbitrary decisions (Bentall 
1992b, p.293; Horwitz 2002, p.5). Throughout this chapter I have shown how 
psychiatrists have 'constructed' a new type of anxiety just for autistic people, even 
though that type of anxiety can also affect non-autistic people. This might raise fears 
psychiatrists are medicalising based upon their own personal preferences. A social 
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constructivist would quite likely take the process I describe as evidence psychiatrists 
are 'just making things up'. Such an approach to thinking about belief is extremely 
unhelpful. Psychiatric symptoms are constructed but, following Massimi, all 
phenomena in science is constructed. Also, they are constructed for good reasons, 
since literally accounting for every causal factor is likely impossible. Also, it would 
not be pragmatically wise to try and do since science can work without accounting for 
all causal factors. 
5.7.1 Enhancing Inductiveness
As chapter four showed, phenomena are employed inductively and we need decide 
which factors are relevant to phenomena and which incidental. Assume we knew all 
the factors causally influencing a specific instance of a phenomena. Formulating the 
phenomena to include all those factors would only increase inductiveness to the 
degree to which those factors are generally present in future instances of that 
phenomena whilst factors included which are rarely present actually decreases 
inductiveness. Remember that the factors which occur typically change from one 
instance to the next, so including some factors will reduce inductiveness. 
Consequently, formulating phenomena should be (as discussed in chapter four) 
constrained by “what could be modelled managably and reliably” (MacLeod & 
Nersessian 2013, p.545). More detail in phenomena often means less tractability 
(Batterman 2002, p.22), reducing generality (Rohwer & Rice 2013, p.336) and 
applicability to future situations (Myrvold & Harper 2002, p.137). We thus have a 
tension. Adding factors associated with a phenomena makes the phenomena more 
inductive if those factors occur regularly and less inductive if those factors occur 
infrequently. If unexpected changes are frequently a causal factor of anxiety then 
including unexpected changes within notions of anxiety increases its inductiveness. 
However, if unexpected changes are very rarely causal factors of anxiety then 
including them reduces the inductiveness. Adding unexpected changes to anxiety 
leaves anxiety less specific, covering a wider variety of factors, but whether this loss 
in specificity is made up for by applicability depends upon how often that additional 
factor is present in instances of anxiety. Regularly and anxiety becomes more 
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inductive, rarely and anxiety becomes less inductive. As I have argued, within the 
population 'all humanity' unexpected changes rarely cause anxiety, meaning notions of
anxiety would become less inductive if included with the general symptom anxiety. 
However, within the population 'all autistic people' unexpected changes often cause 
anxiety, meaning including unexpected changes within our concept of anxiety for that 
population increases the inductiveness of phenomena. The inductiveness of 
phenomena is improved by formulating phenomena of anxiety differently for different
populations demarcated by classifications.
Since some classifications are best thought of as scientific laws, strengthening 
the inductiveness of phenomena in turn strengthens the scientific law. Scientific laws 
describe probabilistic co-occurrences of regularities and regularities are inductively 
reliable occurrences conceptualised into phenomena depending upon our interests (as 
shown in chapter four). Making phenomena more inductive by making it more 
applicable means we strengthen the law describing probabilistic relationships of those 
phenomena. Conceptualising anxiety for autistic people differently than for non-
autistic people strengthens autism as a scientific law, contributing towards belief. This 
also increases the presence of the theoretical virtue unification. As discussed in 
chapter six, unification is where as few theories are employed to cover as much 
phenomena as stringently as possible, increasing the truth of theories. 
5.7.2 Systematisation and theory-ladenness
Symptoms being derived from populations set by classifications is related to the 
theory laden-nature of evidence. Specifically, employing one population (autistic 
people) or employing another (people suffering from anxiety) can result in the same 
person being seen as manifesting different symptoms. By employing a particular 
population scientists are more likely to focus upon particular aspects of patients and 
may conceptualize different symptoms for individuals within that population. Of the 
three types of theory ladeness discussed in chapter three, this is not perceptual 
loading. It does not change perceptions, at least in the examples I have provided. It is 
semantic theory loading and salience, giving emphasis to different behavioural 
manifestations when formulating symptoms. This is not particularly deep theory-
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ladenness. I suggest psychiatrists will likely often switch from employing one 
population to another. Also, if aware of this process, psychiatrists would not face 
massive challenges to actively formulating symptoms as statistically relevant to 
psychiatric classifications. Theory ladenness is only harmful when based upon bad 
theories and chapter six will show autism is a good theory. Therefore, when 
employing autism, theory-ladenness is not an epistemic threat, unlike potentially 
theories like psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology.
 
5.8 Conclusion
Many believe classifications are a necessary or unnecessary evil. Those who consider 
them unnecessary wish them dispensed with, those who consider them necessary 
desire new and superior classifications. Both approaches fail to recognise a role 
classifications can play, acting as a population to decide statistical relevancy. This 
previously unrealised epistemological role strengthens symptoms, making them more 
applicable to the world and thus more inductive.  Additionally, this means symptoms 
are more closely tied to existing classifications, limiting the possibility of radical 
reformations. All this means classifications are far more important than typically 
believed.
Symptoms are not ready-made, waiting to be found. Symptoms are abstracted 
behavioural manifestations and this abstraction involves choices. Symptoms are 
idealisations, missing many factors, and systematisation encourages this. Listing all 
factors is generally impossible and totally impractical for a predictive science. 
Systematisation aims to conceptualise symptoms based upon relevancy, typically 
substantially a statistical matter. We generally should formulate symptoms based upon
frequently occurring factors.
Statistical relevancy depends upon populations. Measuring on more specific 
populations can greatly enhance systematicity. Measured by all humanity, unexpected 
changes should plausibly not be included within symptom formulation because they 
are rarer than many other factors. Measured by autistic people, they are more 
common, increasing their relevance so plausibly should be included in symptom 
formulation. In this regard symptoms can depend upon classifications. Additionally, 
192
formulating symptoms on theories and ethics involves decisions over relevancy. 
Specific populations can increase relevancy of theoretical and ethical claims, also 
making applying them easier. Symptom attribution is improved by considering smaller
populations than all humanity.
The importance of classifications has substantial implications for 
reformulating psychiatry. Moving symptoms between classifications, splitting and 
lumping may involve symptoms formulated based upon existing classifications, 
meaning existing classification can play an influence, limiting any radical potential of 
such reformations. Also, RDoC aims to circumnavigate psychiatric classifications by 
directly linking causes to symptoms whilst some social constructivists advocate for 
abandoning psychiatric classifications to just focus on symptoms. However, some 
symptoms are formulated on existing classifications, reducing the possibility of fully 
avoiding existing classifications.
I have shown classifications sometimes play a more important role than 
previously considered. Some commentators see autism as arbitrary and not making a 
scientific contribution but the systematicity process allows psychiatric classifications 
to make non-arbitrary contributions. Additionally, this systematicity process 
strengthens autism as a law. This is significant because my argument for belief is 
based upon autism being a scientific law.
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6.0 Chapter six – Scientific Realism and 
Autism
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I describe criteria under which a psychiatric classification merits belief 
and show autism meets those criteria. Questions over scientific realism have huge 
ramifications for decisions over keeping or abandoning psychiatric classifications. 
Many scientific theories have been abandoned because they did not merit belief and 
“it is possible that [for example] schizophrenia is not a meaningful scientific concept 
and that it should be abandoned along with all the other meaningless concepts (for 
example, the four humours, phlogyton, the luminiferous ether)” (Bentall 1992a, p.24). 
Cushing and Timimi have called for autism to be abandoned. Scientific realism being 
justified over autism would be a good reason not to abandon autism.
Belief matters because we need psychiatric classification to have certain levels 
of adequacy to be useful. If psychiatric classifications merit belief, we could expect 
them to provide a good basis for helping people. Many do not believe in existing 
classifications and desire that we abandon them, completely modifying how we cluster
symptoms. Many see biological or psychological causes of mental illnesses as 
required for belief in a classification and desire to abandon classifications without 
identified or inferred causes. Successfully providing alternative means to belief than 
identified causes would be good reason to decide a psychiatric classification should 
turn up in DSM-6.
For belief about scientific claims to be justified involves three steps. First, an 
inference to the best explanation, establish how theoretically virtuous theories are. 
Secondly, the inference to the best explanation must be justified. We must assess if the
conditions under which the inference to the best explanation is made reliably generate 
true claims. Thirdly, the level of risk involved in the inferences must not exceed a 
personal limit on acceptable epistemic risk.
Philosophers of psychiatry commonly focus upon causation as a justification 
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for belief. I portray causation as a theoretical virtue. Causation can be a route to belief 
but other theoretical virtues can (under reliable circumstances) grant belief in the 
absence of causation. I suggest many philosophers making such arguments have 
adopted an implicit neo-Aristoleanism, whereas I provide neo-Humeanism, neo-
Kantianism and pragmatism as alternative underlying philosophies. 
I apply these arguments to autism. I argue autism strongly exhibits the 
theoretical virtue unification. It unifies together a whole set of otherwise seemingly 
unrelated symptoms in a stringent manner. I argue this assessment of theoretical 
virtues has taken place under reliable conditions. I appeal to epistemic conditions such
as high accessibility, having a short causal chain between autism and data, not 
requiring highly specialized experiments, not requiring highly precise results, not 
requiring high selectivity of data, not requiring precise demarcations, not requiring 
questionable theories and not requiring high idealization. These will be inapplicable to
some parts of psychiatry but is applicable to most, though not all, claims about 
symptoms and classification of autism. My discussion of what is required for belief is 
applicable to all psychiatric classifications; I employ autism as a case study showing 
an example where belief is justified.
I start by discussing scientific realism in greater detail, then I establish how 
autism passes an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), then I show how IBEs over 
autism are reliable and then I discuss issues relating to epistemic risk.
6.2 Scientific Realism
My measure of scientific realism is taken from Stathis Psillos, a central figure in 
modern philosophy of science on scientific realism. Let’s first establish some basic 
parameters. 
Psillos' central claim is “if scientific theories are true, then the entities posited 
by them are real” (Psillos 2009c, p.44). One might interpret this under typical notions 
of realism, translating Psillos' quote as 'when science discovers mind independent 
entities then our theories are true'. Notice, however, Psillos takes the opposite 
approach – true theories decide which entities are real, rather than real entities 
determine which theories are true. Psillos puts theories first and this has massive 
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ramifications for thinking about true psychiatric classifications. As I will show, this 
allows a neo-Humean regularity first approach to scientific realism rather than a neo-
Aristolean cause first approach to scientific realism. 
Scientific realism is quite metaphysically minimal, only requiring “whatever 
commitments are necessary for securing the Possibility of Divergence” (Psillos 2012, 
p.211). This is where the world might diverge from our scientific theories. Psillos 
takes a strong realism as, quoting Putnam, “some fixed totality of mind-independent 
objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is' ” 
(Putnam in Psillos 2012, p.197). In contrast, Psillos writes that 
“if it were rejected that there is such a fixed totality of objects and a 
fixed set to their intrinsic properties, it would still seem possible that 
we might be unable to represent the world and that the world might be 
independent of any particular representation we have of it” (2012, 
We do not need a metaphysics of a fixed set of mind-independent objects. We need 
sufficient metaphysics that our theories might make false claims, specifically, our 
inductive and causal claims might turn out false. As I will show, Psillos endorses a 
Humean scientific realism, rather than a richer metaphysics of causal powers for 
instance offered by neo-Aristolelians. 
Psillos demarcates between fundamentalism and scientific realism. A 
metaphysical fundamentalist believes certain facts are more fundamental than others, 
the less fundamental facts produced by more fundamental facts. Scientific realism 
aims to establish the facts, not which facts are fundamental. For example, logicism 
argues maths purely reduces to logic, making logic the fundamental facts. “But from 
the claim that '7 + 5 = 12' does not represent a sui generis mathematical fact it does 
not follow that it does not represent a fact. Reductionism does not show that 
something is unreal. It shows that is not sui generis” (Psillos 2009c, p.37, emphasis 
original). Failure to offer a reductionist account of autism does not entail anti-realism.
Finally, scientific realists aim for approximate truth rather than full truth. 
Scientific realism broadly argues for the approximate truth of laws, causes and entities
(Psillos 1999, p.277). The inexactness of science means only approximate truth is 
possible (Psillos 1999, p.276). Realism over scientific laws governing gases is realism
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over ideal gases only occurring in particular situations. Scientific realism means real 
gases behave just like ideal gases providing those real gases were in certain conditions
where other factors not accounted for by the law are non-existent. In other words, if 
real gases were placed in the same conditions as the ideal gases (which may never 
occur) then both would act the same (Psillos 1999, p.277). Scientific realism is realism
about scientific claims and therefore allows approximations and idealisations.
6.3 Existing approaches in philosophy of psychiatry
Belief in psychiatric classifications, both for philosophers and non-philosophers, 
usually relates to causation. We saw how Murphy values causal mechanisms and 
Cooper values determining properties. This seems similar to notions of validation 
employed in psychiatry. “The validity question is how 'good' are these symptoms at 
representing the hypothesised underlying illness” (Goodyer 2012, p. 335). Validity 
relates to ontological reality, questions about real entities or diseases (Pies 2008, p.49).
Most attempts at validation relate to causation, either directly found or inferred from 
family studies and treatment responses. Finding biological factors will help “identify 
actual neural or genetic mechanisms. . . actual causes” (Andreasen, 1995, p.162). In 
contrast, psychiatric classifications which lack identified or inferred causes are not 
typically considered as meriting belief.
Unfortunately, which notions of causation or belief is being employed is rarely 
described.  Murphy talks about “causes of mental illness [that] are genuinely out there 
in the structure of the world, waiting to be discovered” (Murphy 2014a, p.62). In 
contrast, other standards of assessing psychiatric classification such as reliability or 
questions over co-morbidity, do not relate to reality (Murphy 2014b, p.75). This is 
because psychiatric classification involves values, be them ethical or pragmatic 
values, and such values are not part of reality. Relatedly, Cooper sees clustering 
properties which are grouped into natural kinds as “reflect[ing] real structures in 
nature” (Cooper 2005, p.49). The clusters which allow groupings of natural kinds are 
themselves produced by determining properties. Cooper describes these determining 
properties as “[g]enuine properties, such as possessing negative charge, endow entities
with particular causal powers, and ground objective similarities” (Cooper 2005, p.52). 
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In contrast, such genuine determining properties are absent in non-natural kinds. 
Murphy and Cooper respectively emphasise identifying or inferring causation as 
routes to belief over psychiatric classifications. Unfortunately, none of this explains 
why causes relate to reality or explains what is accomplished when something is real. 
We need to more deeply explore notions of causation and reality.
6.3.1 Neo-Humeanism vs Neo-Aristoleanism
Psillos contrasts two major philosophical traditions, neo-Aristoleanism and neo-
Humeanism. Neo-Aristoleans see regularities as produced by causes whilst neo-
Humeans see causes as produced by regularities. Each approach gives a different 
status to causes and different status of how causes relate to reality. Let’s consider each 
approach.
Psillos characterises neo-Aristoleanism as having a 
“view of the deep structure of reality... [a] commitment to this rich 
metaphysics... a metaphysical accounts of causation and laws and 
dispositional essentialism about properties and natural kinds” (Psillos 
2014, p.91).
Neo-Aristoleans sees causal powers as fundamental and irreducible, being 
synonymous with properties of entities. Causal powers of entities interacting gives rise
to scientific laws. Psillos groups a wide variety of philosophers under the name neo-
Aristoleanism. They have some different commitments. For instance, Ellis believes 
natural kinds have dispositional essences, essential properties which give rise to laws 
through their causal interactions (Ellis 1998, p.22). Slightly different is Cartwright 
who believes the world consists of a patchwork of laws produced by capacities which 
can activate causally when in suitable environments (Cartwright 1999, p.50). They 
differ because Ellis sees dispositions as necessitated universals, the causal power 
always activating in certain situations (Ellis 1998, p.22), whereas Cartwright does not 
think capacities are universal or necessitated, the causal power often not activating in 
a suitable environment (Cartwright 1999, p.72). We can assign neo-Aristotelianism 
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two key claims – causal powers are real and they are not derived from anything more 
fundamental.
In contrast to neo-Aristoleanism, neo-Humeanism takes any talk of causation 
as parasitic on regularities. The neo-Humean world consists of regularities. Laws are a
special type of regularity, ones which form part of the best balance between strength 
and simplicity. To say one regularity caused another regularity means the second 
regularity occurred after the first. However, regularities often follow one another but 
causes are only those regularities which follow one another and are part of the best 
system balancing strength and simplicity. Causes which cluster in the world are 
conceptualised as properties of an entity. Entities having properties means causal 
relationships have clustered together. Both properties and entities are derived from 
causes and causes are derived from laws, therefore properties and entities are 
ultimately derived from laws. Psillos describes some divergent views as neo-Humean, 
considering Kitcher and Salmon (described in chapter 4) as neo-Humeans (note that 
Kitcher is a neo-Kantian but Psillos considers neo-Kantianism a variation on neo-
Humeanism). Kitcher sees science as building a systematised explanatory structure 
which subsumes regularities into a unified system of inter-connected phenomena 
(Kitcher 1989, p.476). Causes are derived from probabilistic relations between 
phenomena, showing how one phenomena can follow another. Causes are derived 
from efforts at unification (Kitcher 1993a, p.172). Salmon employs the common cause
principle to derive causes (Salmon, 1998 p.110). Events occurring with greater than 
chance frequency suggests a cause is present. Assigning causes depends upon 
regularities of events. Similarly, unobservable entities are derived to fill in gaps 
between observations, the entity giving a causal explanation of how one observation 
relates to another (Salmon, 1998 p.113). All these views are much more 
metaphysically minimal than neo-Aristoleanism, taking regularities as fundamental 
whilst causes, entities, natural kinds and dispositions are not fundamental but are 
dependent on regularities. We can assign neo-Humeanism two key claims – 
regularities are real and causes are derived from regularities. 
6.3.2 Murphy, Cooper and neo-Aristoleanism
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Murphy and Cooper have substantial similarities to neo-Aristoleanism. Let’s consider 
how well neo-Aristoleanism fits other parts of their general argument. 
Whether neo-Aristoleanism is suitable in the life science is debateable. Psillos 
thinks it is unclear that neo-Aristoleanism can be extended to biological species (2014,
p.93). Neo-Aristolean Ellis would agree, associating Aristoleanism with an essential 
unsuitable for biological species since “within a species, there is often a lot of genetic 
variation, and sometimes there are no sharp genetic distinctions between different 
species” (2001, p.169). In contrast, though he does not identify as a neo-Aristolean, 
Dupré's position resembles neo-Aristoleanism through his emphasis on causal powers 
and he considered biological species as natural kinds (1993, p.57). Even if it could be 
extended to biological species it would not easily deliver Cooper's or Murphy's 
position. They both suggest psychiatry could be improved to become more real. 
However, if causes make something real then Cooper's and Murphy's position is 
problematic. Remember that stronger causes are easier to find so we have probably 
found most of them already. This means Cooper's claim that modern classifications do
not reflect the causal structure of the world does not then entail a superior 
classificatory system would likely reflect the causal structure of the world. Psychiatry 
has likely found most determining properties, leaving us close to the limits of natural 
kinds modelled as biological species that we will discover. Most biological species 
have determining properties but we should not expect this picture replicated in 
psychiatry. Similarly, Murphy could no longer be an optimist about the future because 
most psychiatric classifications with strong causes have likely already been found. All 
this contrasts with biological species which have a strong genetic basis. Neo-
Aristoleanianism does not easily entail there being lots of real psychiatric 
classifications waiting to still be discovered.
6.4 Alternative approaches to scientific realism
In this chapter I outline various alternatives to neo-Aristolean approach to reality and 
apply them to psychiatry. Though they do not all identify as neo-Humean, all fall on 
neo-Humean side of the divide Psillos places between neo-Aristolean and neo-
Humean – each position thinks belief can be legitimated in the absence of finding (or 
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inferring) fundamental causes. The four positions are neo-Humeanism, neo-
Kantianism, anti-realism and pragmatism.
There are three stages to scientific realism. Firstly, an inference to the best 
explanation. Secondly, that inference to the best explanation must be reliable. Thirdly, 
the epistemic risk involved in the inference to the best explanation must not exceed 
ones position on epistemic risk. All three stages need passing, passing one or two is 
insufficient to attain scientific realism. I will outline each stage in turn. 
6.4.1 Inference to the best explanation
The fundamental challenge to belief in science is the underdetermination argument. As
described in chapter two, more than one theory can fit the evidence, therefore theories 
are underdetermined by the evidence. The evidence alone does not show which theory
is true. Therefore, something more is needed to decide a theory is true. 
Realists employ an inference to the best explanation (IBE) by taking 
competing explanations and deciding one is best on the grounds that is most 
theoretically virtuous. Alongside empirical adequacy, theory assessment need
“take into account several theoretical virtues such as coherence with 
other established theories, consilience, completeness, unifying power, 
lack of ad hoc features and capacity to generate novel predictions. 
These virtues capture the explanatory power of a theory, and 
explanatory power is potentially confirmatory” (Psillos 1999, p.171, 
emphasis original)
These theoretical virtues give reason to believe a scientific theory offers an 
explanation which merits belief, and allows scientists to decide which theory among 
competing theories merits belief. 
What is the status of these theoretical virtues? Why should we care about them 
and how do they relate to reality? The major issue relates to just how theoretical, 
rather than empirical, these theoretical virtues are. 
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“[R]ealists regard theoretical values as testable presuppositions about 
the world, and antirealists regard theoretical values as pragmatic 
constraints on theorizing. Realist acknowledge that the world might be 
simple or complex, unified or disunified (and thus explainable by 
theories of wide or narrow scope), hierarchical or self-organizing, and 
even best modeled by consistent or inconsistent theories (since humans 
may not be capable of exactly representing the world). Theoretical 
values are testable and, historically, evidence has disposed of 
theoretical values when they do not survive empirical tests. Thus, for 
the realist, theoretical successes are not only secondary to empirical 
success, but valued only when they bring empirical success” (Solomon,
Of the four position described below, two (neo-Humeanism and neo-Kantianism) see 
theoretical virtues as testable whereas the other two (anti-realism and pragmatism) see
theoretical virtues as pragmatic constraints. 
Let’s start with Psillos' neo-Humeanism. He believes the world has an 
objective structure and scientific theories have higher approximate truth the more 
accurately they describe it. For Psillos, 
“the world has an objective structure, in which (fully mind-
independent) regularities stand in certain relations to each other... 
explanatory relations are subjected to some external – and mind-
independent – standard of correctness: the nomological structure of the
world” (Psillos 2002, p.293 emphasis original). 
The regularities hold relationships and this can be captured by a system of laws. The 
system of laws “should be as informative as possible vis-a-vis the regularities that 
hold in the world” (Psillos 2002, p.149). The system of laws which best balances 
simplicity, strength and stringency (as discussed in chapter four and described again in
detail later) will maximise information. Theoretical virtues of simplicity, strength and 
stringency create the most informative system. Reality is nothing more than 
regularities (including the relationship between regularities) and greater belief means 
being more informative of those regularities. We connect laws to the mind 
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independent regularities by nested layers of models, the most basic model being 
phenomena which are then accounted for by higher models (Psillos 2011a, p.7). 
Theoretical virtues make a theory more informative of regularities and thus more 
worthy of belief.
Neo-Kantianism also sees truth as the most theoretically virtuous scientific 
description of regularities. However, neo-Kantianism differs from neo-Humeanism by 
denying the world has an objective structure of regularities. Kitcher's neo-Kantian 
aims for the most theoretically virtuous explanatory system but does not take the most 
theoretically virtuous explanatory system as being closest to an objective structure of 
reality (Kitcher 1993a, p.171; see also Psillos 2002, p.292). Rather, correct 
explanations are those which would be found at “the limit of the rational development 
of scientific practise” (Kitcher 1989, p.498). Similarly, neo-Kantian Massimi sees 
science as building mathematical structures accounting for phenomena but more than 
one structure can fit the world which undermines notions of an objective structure 
(2010, p.20). Despite this, theories merit greater belief the more they fit phenomena 
into unified mathematical models, effectively endorsing theoretical virtues (Massimi 
2010, p.21; Massimi 2011, p113). Neo-Kantianism sees science as a reliable means of 
turning appearances into phenomena through subsuming them under concepts, 
believing the world heavily constrains this process. The world constrains the data 
from which phenomena is constructed. It also constrains the background theories used
to formulate the phenomena since background theories were constrained by the world 
when themselves formulated from data and phenomena. It is this constraining process,
rather than closeness to an objective structure, which makes scientific theories worthy 
of belief to neo-Kantians (Kitcher 1993b, p.160; Massimi 2014, p.438).
Let’s now consider two positions which take theoretical virtues as pragmatic 
tools. Anti-realists typically accept that truth over unobservables is potentially 
possible but usually restrict belief only to empirical adequacy. They are not semantic 
anti-realists, they believe truth is potentially obtainable and scientists should seek to 
make their theories true (Laudan 1984, p.105; Stanford 2006, p.193; Van Fraassen 
1980, p.10). However, anti-realists typically doubt that theoretical virtues deliver true 
theories. Anti-realism is compatible with both a neo-Humean objective structure and a
neo-Kantian lack of objective structure; the difference is not over notions of truth but 
over whether truth has been obtained. Van Fraassen argues there is no rationally 
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compelling reason to believe in scientific theories except over their empirical 
adequacy (1980, p.99). Laudan believes scientists should aim for truth but doubts they
usually attain it (1984, p.136). Stanford does not believe in most unobservables but 
does believe in some, such as unobservable processes responsible for fossils of 
dinosaurs (Stanford 2011, p.893). Anti-realists can be characterised as believing truth 
is attainable but generally believe we lack evidence to believe science has obtained 
truth. They typically value theoretical virtues for their pragmatic benefits rather than 
for truth, whereas neo-Humeans and neo-Kantians value theoretical virtues because 
they deliver truth and pragmatic benefits.
The final position is pragmatism. Pragmatism sees truth as usefulness. 
Therefore, to the degree those theoretical virtues produce useful theories (and they 
generally do), theoretical virtues provide truth. Fine argues both realism and anti-
realism are mistaken, seeing assertions of truth as adding nothing above claiming 
something is scientific (Fine 1996, p.133). Unlike anti-realists, pragmatists cannot 
claim truth is possible but currently unattained, except for potentially claiming more 
useful theories might be obtained. Consequently, they cannot endorse an objectively 
true structure.  Also, anti-realists consider unobservables as useful but not true, a 
position unreconcilable with pragmatism. Neither neo-Kantians nor pragmatists accept
an objective structure but they disagree over notions of truth. The constraining process
neo-Kantians value may produce useful beliefs and therefore contribute to truth for 
pragmatists. However, usefulness is not synonymous with this constraining process. 
Potentially, some constrained beliefs might not be useful. Inversely, not all useful 
beliefs are constrained. Usefulness is different to constraint by subsuming appearances
under theories.
- 6.4.1.1 Ethics
Theoretical virtues help solve a problem relating to ethics. Some philosophers are 
unwilling to associate psychiatric classifications with truth, reality and belief because 
psychiatric classifications involve values whereas reality is considered value free. For 
these reasons Murphy (in his 2014a) denies that psychiatric classifications are 
amenable to belief. Discussing validity in terms of scientific realism, Murphy writes 
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“we can't validate a diagnosis. We can just correlate it with part of the world's 
structure” (Murphy 2014a, p.75). In contrast, “causes of mental illness are genuinely 
out there in the structure of the world, waiting to be discovered” (Murphy 2014a, 
p.62). For Murphy interest dependent classifications cannot be real whereas interest 
independent causes are. This view seemingly has echoes in notions of validation and 
in RDoC, both seeing belief in terms of finding causes. It seemingly also influences 
social constructivists and commentators like Cushing and Timimi et al who believe 
autism should be abandoned because it has no identified causes. Other philosophers 
do not consider this a problem, seeing values and reality as compatible through 
adopting moral realism (Loughlin & Miles 2014, p.151 ; Thornton 2007, p.179; 
Wrigley 2007, p.395). If values are part of the world then they are not incompatible 
with scientific realism. By applying the correct values to correct knowledge of 
symptoms and their clustering then psychiatric classifications would merit belief. I do 
not wish to specifically criticise either approach, only note that the causal approach 
has the disadvantage of not actually delivering realism over psychiatric classification 
while the moral realism approach requires the problematic stance of moral realism. 
Instead, I shall provide an alternative approach. 
Either approach can be avoided if we consider ethics as having the same status 
as theoretical virtues. Note that some philosophers demarcate between different types 
of values in science, such as hot cognitive values, cold cognitive values, internal 
factors, external factors and decision vectors (see Solomon 2001, p.54-55) but this 
need not trouble us. For convenience I still describe ethical issues as theoretical 
virtues, all that matters is showing that we can treat ethical values similarly to other 
theoretical virtues. This works slightly differently for different positions.
Thinking of ethical virtues as theoretical virtues easily fits pragmatism. 
Psychiatric classifications which accomplish the aims of pragmatists are useful and 
thus true. If providing a diagnosis to people who are suffering is a goal of psychiatry 
then psychiatric classification are theoretically virtuous when they pick out people 
who are suffering. Thus psychiatric classification exhibiting the theoretical virtue 
ethics is fully compatible with belief to a pragmatist. 
Ethics attains the status of a theoretical virtue to neo-Humeans and neo-
Kantians if they are testable, that being, we can gather information about whether they
are present in any specific instance. Theoretical virtues do not make a theory worthy 
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of belief because they provide some special property of belief. Rather, theoretical 
virtues are simply things scientists value which are sometimes present or are not. Thus
hypothetically scientists might decide they valued above all else 'things measuring 
exactly five metres' and build their theories around this. They design all their theories 
to be about things measuring exactly five metres. They then test each theory, finding 
very few theories actually do exhibit this theoretical virtue. Those few theories would 
attain the status of scientific realism not because things measuring exactly five metres 
has some special status which makes it more real than anything else. Rather, those 
theories attain scientific realism because those theories describe something which 
scientist’s value. On this picture we should not claim simplicity is a theoretical virtue 
because it is mind-independent whereas ethics cannot be a theoretical virtue because it
depends on our interests. Rather, both simplicity and ethical concerns are based upon 
our interests and theories incorporating these can sometimes describe the world. 
Sometimes the world is in a state which we describe as simplicity; similarly 
sometimes it is in a state we describe as suffering. Psychiatrists should test their 
classifications on ethical grounds. They would likely find that homosexuality is not 
associated with suffering thus does not display these ethical theoretical virtues, 
whereas some mental illnesses will. Ethics as theoretical virtues pose no special 
problem to neo-Humeans and neo-Kantians; ethical considerations are theoretical 
virtues, psychiatric classification need exhibit them to pass an IBE and psychiatric 
classifications lacking them will not pass an IBE. 
6.4.2 Justifying IBE
We have considered four stances on theoretical virtues. Let’s now consider different 
stances on justifying IBEs. All the above four positions consider theoretical virtues as 
important and as related to truth. Theoretical virtues are required for scientific truths 
(except perhaps for pragmatism, but they value theoretical virtues). However, 
theoretical virtues do not guarantee truth. We might believe something exhibits 
theoretical virtues when actually it does not, our beliefs that a theoretical virtue is 
present may be mistaken. IBEs are only successful in certain circumstances and we 
need independent reasons to justify why we believe in the IBE (Lipton 2004, p.139). 
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Similarly, employing IBE for scientific realism requires “a clear account of when 
scientific success argues for realism” (Day & Kincaid 1994, p.292). Antirealists also 
demand IBE's are reliable, but doubt we have such reliable means for truth inferences 
over IBEs (Lauden 1984, p.136; Stanford 2006, p.205). Let’s consider why IBE need 
justifying and how this is typically done. 
IBEs need justifying because scientists can be mistaken about when theoretical
virtues are exhibited. This can occur in two places, phenomena generation and theory 
generation. Claiming a theoretical virtue is present, as opposed to merely appearing 
present, is a substantial epistemic claim for neo-Humeans, neo-Kantians, anti-realists 
and pragmatists. I employ unifications in the below examples, since it is the 
theoretical virtue which I argue autism exhibits. Before going into detail, it is helpful 
to consider successful (i.e. generally taken as epistemologically reliable) unification, 
unsuccessful ones and some uncertain ones. 
Galileo unified terrestrial and astronomical phenomena whilst Newton unified 
terrestrial and astronomical motions (Maxwell 2014, p.136). Lavoisier's chemical 
revolution resulted in millions of elementary substances being replaced with around 
one hundred chemical elements (Maxwell 2014, p.136). These unifications largely 
survived centuries of further development and data generation. Additionally, these 
unifications seem made under good epistemic conditions; it seems unlikely that, for 
example, there are large areas of the earth where actually gravity does not apply but 
we have not noticed this, or that there are millions of chemical elements on earth 
which we simply have not noticed yet. 
Examples of unifications which once seemed epistemologically reliable but 
now no longer considered so would be the four humors, rational choice theory and 
behaviourism. In each case, the number of principles, entities or laws required to 
provide explanations is relatively low, providing substantial unification. However, 
each one is radically insufficient, only able to account for the evidence with very low 
stringency. Despite this, each theory was once very popular. These theories were taken
as epistemologically reliable but a positive epistemic stance towards these was 
unjustified; attribution of belief was not made under good epistemic conditions. Even 
theories which make extremely precise predictions, and whose predictions are carried 
forward into later theories, may turn out as bad unifications. The Ptolemaic model of 
the universe could make all the same predictions as the Copernican and accommodate 
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all the new astronomical evidence supplied by the telescope yet Ptolemaic model was 
inferior to the Copernican model because the process of adding more celestial spheres 
was so unconstrained (Forster & Sober 1994, p.14). Notions of an all pervading 
material ether appear unifying but its removal actually increased unification (Maxwell
2014, p.147). 
Unifications can often involve much uncertainty. Physics has moved from 
corpulses to particles with fields, then just to fields, then just to quantum fields and 
now moving towards strings, with each step unifying more phenomena under less 
entities (Maxwell 2014, p.144). However, so far there are no empirical predictions 
from string theory (Maxwell 2014, p.146). Similarly, superstrings and quantum 
gravity increase unification but their empirical content is not specific  (Falkenburg 
2012, p.333) and it is unclear if unifying entities like messenger particles are or are 
not adhoc in the manner of Ptolmaic astronomy (Falkenburg 2012, p.342). Also, 
quantum theory may turn out to be much less unifying than currently believed if a 
hidden variable were discovered, though this would depend upon the nature of the 
hidden variable. Trying to decide, in advance of future possible evidence, just how 
much these theories unify requires considerations of the epistemic conditions under 
which the evidence is gathered and how these evidence is then turned into theories.
  Let’s first consider phenomena generation. As described in chapter four, 
phenomena generation consists of reliably gathering data and reliably constructing 
phenomena from that data. Consider this hypothetical example. A data gathering 
process resulted in a phenomena being formulated. The theory which accounts for 
these phenomena is a simple theory, thus contributing to unification. However, assume
the data gathering process was unreliable and crucial data was missed. Had that 
crucial data been detected, the phenomena formulated would have been quite 
different, being formulated in such a way which did not allow a simple theoretical 
explanation. Alternatively, suppose instead the superior data gathering process 
resulted in a second, additional phenomena being formulated. Imagine the theoretical 
explanation could not cover both phenomena whilst still being a simple theoretical 
explanation, it needed all sorts of auxiliary extensions. In these hypothetical examples 
simplicity appeared to be present, strengthening the theoretical virtue unification, but 
simplicity is only attributed because an unreliable data gathering process missed 
crucial data which would produce phenomena incompatible with the simple theory. 
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Additionally, and independent of the reliability of data, flaws may occur in 
formulating phenomena from the data. Hypothetically, the gathered data might be 
interpreted badly, perhaps weighing some particular data too heavily without good 
reason. A superior process of formulating data from phenomena might produce 
phenomena which is incompatible with the simple theory. Alternatively, perhaps the 
phenomena interpretation is made via flawed background theories. The resulting 
phenomena might once again be compatible with a simple theoretical explanation but 
superior phenomena, interpreted via superior background theories, might not be. 
   Having generated phenomena, the next step is generating a theory which 
explains the phenomena. This process can be mistaken in two ways. Firstly, the 
relationship between the phenomena formulated and the theory which explains it 
could be flawed. Scientists might believe a theory accommodates particular 
phenomena when actually it does not. Alternatively, the way in which the theory 
accommodates the phenomena could be misunderstood. A theory may cover two 
different phenomena, thus the theory appears to contribute to simplicity. However, 
those two phenomena might contradict one another, being incompatible and best 
covered by two separate theories rather than one single simple theory. Similarly, a 
theory might be taken as simple because it covers certain phenomena, however, there 
might be other phenomena within the domain the theory covers which could only be 
accommodated by making the theory more complicated. Scientists should try to cover 
that other phenomena but perhaps theoretical or social bias mean they miss it. 
Secondly, theoretical explanations are typically formulated in light of background 
theories. Those background theories may themselves be false or unreliable. 
Alternatively, even if those background theories are reliable, errors could occur when 
employing those background theories to formulate a theoretical explanation of 
particular phenomena. Here we face theory-laden nature of evidence, though theory-
laden evidence is only epistemically problematic when weak background theories are 
employed or when good background theories are employed badly. A third reason for 
doubt is the pessimistic meta induction (PMI). Rather than looking at the specifics of 
reliability of inferences or upon the quality of a specific background theory, PMI takes
a broader view. As discussed in chapter one, a theory undergoing sufficient change 
across its history gives reason to doubt it. Rather than needing to specifically identify 
unreliable inferences or identify flawed background theories we instead look to 
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history to legitimately doubt modern theories. An unification may appear present but 
this was only due to flaws in producing a theory which accounted for the phenomena.
Philosophers counter such concerns by considering the conditions under which
the IBE attribute is made. Some situations are amenable to reliable IBE attributions 
whereas others are not. Philosophers need assess specific theories and establish if the 
situation under which the IBE attribution was made is reliable. The most well-known 
means of justifying IBE is the no miracles argument (NMA). NMA argues that there 
are only two explanations of the success of science, truth or a miracle. Miracles are 
not allowed in philosophy, therefore truth is only legitimate explanation. Psillos 
employs NMA to show that IBE is reliable, that “it tends to generate true conclusions 
when fed with true premises” (Psillos 2011c, p.24). NMA is a “grand IBE... [NMA] 
aims to defend the reliability of scientific methodology in producing approximately 
true theories” (Psillos 2011c, p.23). NMA argues the best explanation of miracle like 
predictively successful scientific theories is that those theories are true. Given this, 
and given that scientific theories dealing with miracle like evidence are typically 
established by an IBE, it follows that IBEs over theories producing miracle like 
evidence are reliable. We need reason to believe IBEs are reliable and Psillos offers 
the no miracles argument; those IBEs involving miracle like evidence are reliable, 
those without are not reliable. NMA ensures the reliability of inferences and 
background theories – they would not produce miracle like predictions unless reliable.
We thus only need know a theory makes miracle like predictions, rather than 
specifically show inferences and background theories are reliable.32 This position is 
popular. Chakravartty considers NMA an IBE (2007, p.5), Kitcher also employs the 
NMA as reliable means for belief (Kitcher 2001, p.166 and p.180 and, related, see 
Kitcher 1993b, p.160), Massimi sees miracle like predictions as providing “good 
epistemic conditions” (Massimi 2010, p.15) for further inferences, Giere focuses upon
the reliability of our methods (though not just the NMA) (Giere 1999, p.76). Most 
defenses of IBE focus upon NMA, an argument not generally available in psychiatry 
(difficulties with NMA in psychiatry are discussed in sections 6.5.2.1 and 6.5.2.4). We
32 I suggest here that NMA is a way to respond to PMI despite PMI historically being conceptualised 
to respond to NMA. A general PMI potentially threatens (when supported by historical evidence) all
theories. NMA can then be restricted to theories making miracle like predictions. PMI can respond 
by finding theories based upon miracle like evidence which did undergo historical change. NMA 
can then be restricted to theories making miracle like predictions and novel predictions (Psillos 
1999, p.105). The nature of PMI determines what sort of NMA is required to escape PMI. 
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discuss alternatives to NMA later. 
6.4.3 Epistemic Risk
The final step for belief over scientific theories is a stance on epistemic risk. Both 
everyday and scientific inference involve the possibility of error, they can turn out 
false. Consequently, those inferences are only legitimate if they do not violate a 
personal stance on acceptable epistemic risk. Even claiming a theory is empirically 
adequate involves risk, meaning anti-realists accept some level of epistemic risk. If 
belief in empirical adequacy is epistemically acceptable then, argue realists, belief in 
unobservables can also be epistemically acceptable. Anti-realists respond that 
unobservables involve more epistemic risk. A realist and anti-realist might fully agree 
about the level of epistemic risk a theory holds but disagree about whether the theory 
merits belief, each holding different stances on acceptable levels of epistemic risk. 
Both realists and anti-realists have discussed the importance of judgments over 
epistemic risk, such as Chakravartty (2014), Giere (1999, p.185), Kitcher (1993a, 
p.152) and Psillos, as described below. Epistemic risk has two components.
Firstly, not exceeding epistemic risk depends on the level of epistemic risk 
involved. Some inferences require much more risk than others. For example, Van 
Fraassen consider claims over observables to not to exceed his stance on epistemic 
risk, unlike claims over unobservables. There are other factors than observable vs 
unobservable which influence levels of epistemic risk. This partly relates to good 
epistemic conditions since these reduce epistemic risk. Consequently, inferences made
under good epistemic conditions are more likely to pass acceptable levels of epistemic
risk. 
Secondly, a judgement over how much epistemic risk an individual considers 
as warranted is required. Psillos argues belief in some unobservables only requires 
slightly more risk than belief in some observables. Since belief in observables is 
rational then potentially belief in unobservables can also be. In contrast, Van Fraassan 
argues restricting belief to unobservables is rationally acceptable (2001, p.162). This 
issue is fairly intractable, potentially down to a judgement which is not particularly 
amiable to argumentation. Relatedly, in relation to NMA, Psillos believes inferring 
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that truth rather than empirical adequacy is the best explanation of miracle like 
success involves a judgment (Psillos 2011b, p.31). He writes that “is truth or empirical
adequacy the best explanation [of the success of science]? Not much progress can be 
made on this front” (Psillos 2011b, p.31). Psillos' believes NMA has some “epistemic 
force” (Psillos 2011b, p.32) for favouring truth but nothing more. Similarly, Fine 
(1991, p.82) and Massimi (2012, p.37) claims IBE only provide truth if you assume 
they work. Realists are typically willing to make that assumption, anti-realists are not. 
We have concluded outlining my approach to the possible grounds of belief. 
Let’s apply this to psychiatry then autism.
6.4.4 Validity
Let’s now reconsider existing approaches to belief within philosophy of psychiatry in 
light of the above claims about theoretical virtues, justifying inference to the best 
explanation and attitudes towards epistemic risk.
Most psychiatrists approach questions over reality of psychiatric classification 
through notions of validity. What validity means is rarely adequately described but 
Kendell & Jablensky famously tried make explicit an account of what validation 
accomplishes. Kendell & Jablensky believe validity has two important qualities, both 
absent in non-valid psychiatric syndromes. Something is either valid or not valid, 
partial validity not being possible, also, validity is independent of context (2003, 
p.10). In contrast, utility comes in varying levels of degradation and can vary with 
context (2003, p.10). These notions seem intuitive, something either is true or is not 
true and truth is a product of the world rather than subjective human purposes. These 
ideas seem implicit in most accounts of validity employed by psychiatrists. Our above 
discussion and the discussion in chapter four undermines these claims, as I now show.
            Kendell & Jablensky argue a valid syndrome is fully valid, meaning it merits 
full rather than partial belief.  “Validity, as we define it, is an invariant characteristic of
a diagnostic category. There may be considerable uncertainty about the category's 
validity because the relevant empirical information is lacking, but in principle a 
category cannot be partly valid” (2003, p. 10). However, Kendell & Jablensky are 
mistaken to see validity as all or nothing. This notion of validity is untenable for two 
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reasons. As described above, theoretical virtues are required for belief in scientific 
concepts. More theoretically virtuous means greater belief is entailed. Unless a theory 
was as theoretically virtuous as conceivably possible (for neo-Humeans this is where 
it fully reflected the objective structure of regularities, for neo-Kantians it reached the 
absolute limit of rational inquiry, for pragmatists it reach absolute usefulness), then 
truth claims vary in degrees. Additionally, as chapter four shows, science deals with 
idealised models so only provides approximate descriptions formulated to our 
interests. Science cannot provide context independent absolute truth, only interest 
dependent approximate truths, as I now show. Psillos writes that “[d]emanding the 
exact truth in science would amount to demanding the exclusion of all 
approximations, simplifications, idealisations, approximate derivations, sources of 
error in measurement and calculation” (Psillos 1999, p.276). A strict dichotomy 
between valid and invalid is unsustainable. Truth in science is not invariant, the 
strongest scientists can achieve is degrees of approximate truth, even in principle. 
Similarly, we must consider classifications as having varying degrees of approximate 
validation, from very high to very low. Also, Psillos writes that “there is no reason to 
think that empirical evidence cannot lend a different credence to the several 
theoretical constituents of the theory.  Nor is there any reason to think that all parts of 
a theory are equally well supported by the evidence” (1999, p. 125). 1700's chemistry 
falsely postulated that an element named phlogiston was emitted during combustion. 
Most descriptions and predictions phlogiston theory entailed had strong evidential 
support even though the element phlogiston was weakly supported by evidence (1999,
p.291). The same is true of, for example, autism. Arguably, the idea that autistic 
people have weak social skills has immense evidential support and should be 
considered approximately true whereas the idea that there are theory of mind deficits 
in autism is conceptually questionable and weakly supported by the evidence (Maise 
2013, p.182), making it only weakly approximately true or potentially completely 
false. Establishing that a classification merits some belief does not then confer full 
belief to all symptoms, whereas Kendell & Jablensky take syndromes as either fully 
meriting belief or not meriting belief at all.
Kendell & Jablensky believe valid syndromes are context free. “Validity does 
not depend on the context” (2003, p. 10). However, validity must depend on context. 
Idealised models are simplifications, scientists reduce the number of causes by being 
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selective and this selectivity typically is based upon purpose.  Lipton writes that
 
“the causes that explain depend on our interests... take a particular 
eclipse.  The number of causal factors is enormous...  We do not 
explain the eclipse tout court, but only why it lasted as long as it did, or
why it was so partial, or why it was not visible from a certain place.
 Which aspect we ask about depends on our interests, and reduces the 
number of causal factors we need consider for any particular 
phenomenon, since there will be many causes of the eclipse that are 
not, for example, causes of its duration” (2004, p. 33). 
 
Which specific causes a model describes depends on what we explain. Imagine we 
identified the biological causes of low social skills in autistic people. This would not 
provide full causal information. Exactly how any autistic person manifests low social 
skills will be influenced by many other causal factors such as individual personality, 
previous experiences and, in specific manifestations, who they are talking to and why. 
The model needs describe only some rather than all causes, meaning the model 
provides only approximate truths about reality, and which causes the model describes 
depend upon our interests, as described in chapters four and five. The constraint is 
how greatly we maximise theoretical virtues, choosing theories based both upon how 
well they have the theoretical virtue of describing causes and how well they do on 
many other theoretical virtues. A theory is not automatically superior if describing 
causes; this depends upon the wider context of how much the theory adds to a simple 
system of laws. Dependence on a context is not a barrier to approximate truth. Kendell
& Jablensky seemingly see knowledge of reality as being of absolute reality whereby 
something is either true or is not and this is independent of our interests. However, 
science can only partially describe reality and which parts a theory describes depends 
upon our interests, leaving Kendell & Jablensky's claims over what qualities we 
should ascribe to valid psychiatric syndromes as untenable. 
6.5 Arguments for belief
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6.5.1 Autism and inference to the best explanation
I now provide my own arguments for belief over autism. Let’s take the first step, 
establishing autism as the best explanation, before later establishing reliability of IBE 
attributions. IBEs are established through appeal to theoretical virtues. Of various 
competing explanations we deem one as the best explanation because it exemplifies 
qualities that good explanations should have. Most IBE emphasise unification or 
causation (Day & Kincaird 1994, p.275), let’s start with unifications.33
- 6.5.1.1 Unification and laws
The most powerful IBE for autism is unification. Chapter four argued autism could be 
understood as unifying diverse phenomena. Symptoms co-occur and we explain this 
co-occurrence by appealing to autism. I discussed Kitcher's notion of unification, let’s 
consider a more general account. Lipton describes unification as covering scope, 
simplicity and consilience (Lipton 2004, p.138-139) whereas Psillos considers 
unification and parsimony as separate, though very similar, virtues (Psillos 2009d, 
p.184-185). Simplicity is simplifying our explanatory picture of the world. Rather than
appealing to multiple explanations we might instead be able to appeal to fewer or a 
single explanation for particular phenomena. However, we might simplify too much, 
grouping together much diversity under one theory. So we need more than just 
simplicity but also strength. This partially comes from scope of the claims. Newton's 
gravitation is universal so gains great strength from scope. This has obvious 
relationship with simplicity. However, this may lead to a single theory covering all 
phenomena. So the third criteria is stringency, the statistical strength of probabilistic 
relationships of phenomena. Some phenomena co-occur frequently, some less 
frequently. Additionally, the number of phenomena increases strength. The best 
balance between simplicity, strength and stringency maximises unity.
Let’s consider how this works in psychiatry. We ideally take all symptoms 
described by psychiatry and put them into a unified system, all symptoms being 
33 Lipton also lists mechanism and background belief (Lipton 2004, p.138-139) and Psillos also lists 
completeness, importance, parsimony and precision (Psillos 2009d, p.184-185). Many, though not 
all of these, are substantially related to unification and causation. 
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accounted for by a classification. We maximise simplicity by employing as few 
classifications as possible. We also wish those classifications to cover as many 
symptoms as possible since this increases strength. By employing fewer 
classifications each classification can cover more symptoms. Here reducing the 
number of classifications (simplicity) increases scope of the resulting classification 
(strength). However, this leads to classifications covering symptoms which co-occur 
weakly, lacking in stringency. Hence we need employ as few classifications as 
possible, those classifications need cover as many symptoms as possible and those 
symptoms should co-occur as strongly as possible. A psychiatric classification unifies 
well when it covers a very large number of diverse phenomena which co-occur with 
high stringency. Belief in a psychiatric classification, under unification, is where it 
contributes to a system of simple, strong and stringent classifications.
An individual classification has the theoretical virtue unification to the degree 
which it contributes to a unified system. Autism covers a very large number of 
symptoms, most of which are highly unrelated. Social-emotional reciprocity, low eye 
contact, deficient body language, abnormal, facial expressions, lack of shared 
imaginative play, stereotyped movements, idiosyncratic phrases, adherence to 
routines, excessively circumscribed interests, disliking unexpected changes, rigid 
thinking, extremely variable intelligence levels, sensory issues, clumsiness, difficulty 
with planning are all mentioned by DSM-5 (APA 2013, p50-55) whilst other 
symptoms associated with autism but are not mentioned by DSM-5 include obsessive 
interests, peculiar visual perceptions, arrogance and good memory.34 There are many 
classifications much worse at unifications. Social anxiety disorder has only two main 
symptoms, far less than autism. Also, the symptoms seem closely related. Being 
anxious in social situations and fear of social situations are highly related; fear and 
anxiety are very similar and one refers to an instance of socialising, the other to future 
socialising. Whilst not identical, they look like different aspects of the same symptom.
On both these grounds social anxiety disorder unifies weakly. Many other psychiatric 
classifications also do poorly on unifications, such as personality disorder and milder 
learning difficulties. Covering so few symptoms means they unify weakly. Some 
classifications do better than this. For example, depression has nine symptoms in 
34 Note that symptoms can causally influencing one another (Zachar 2014, p.131). Repetitive 
behaviour in autistic people likely causally contributes to low social skills but it seems implausible 
that one entirely causes the other without contribution from common causes.
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DSM, meaning depression has some strength. However, very diverse symptom 
patterns can be diagnosed as depression, as many complain. Depression is weak 
statistically since, Horwitz claims, any five symptoms grants diagnosis (2014, p.219, 
also p.222) though one of those symptoms must be depressed mood or loss of interest 
or pleasure (APA 2013, p.160). By contrast, diagnosis of autism require multiple 
symptoms from three different categories (now only two different categories since 
DSM-5), making diagnostic criteria for autism much more stringent than depression. 
Having ten random symptoms of autism does not mean someone is autistic unless 
some of those symptoms are very specific ones from multiple categories. By contrast, 
having five random symptoms of depression (providing one is depression or loss of 
interest) means someone has depression. Autism does well on unifications because it 
has strength, covering many symptoms, and it has stringency, being specific in how 
those symptoms must co-occur. 
Usually described in terms of validity or internal validity, statistical studies 
show interrelations between the multiplicity of symptoms of autism. Disagreement 
exists over exactly how symptom clusters correlate. DSM-IV autism had three 
domains, social, communicative and RRBI [repetitive, restrictive behaviours and 
interests] whereas DSM-5 has two domains, social communication (merging social 
and communication) and RRBI. Most studies favour a two domain approach: 
“studies give weight to the suggestion that social and communication 
symptoms should be combined conceptually into one core domain of 
impairment, distinct from the restricted/repetitive behaviour domain” 
(Kuenssberg, McKenzie & Jones 2011, p.2190; also Mandy, Charman 
& Skuse 2012, p.49) 
Some disagree, accepting that “social and communication impairments relate more 
closely together than either does with RRBIs” (Dworzynski et al 2009, p.1208) but 
“overlap between social and communicative impairments was not complete” 
(Dworzynski et al 2009, p.1208). Though debated exactly how symptoms relate, all 
studies show wide ranging symptoms do co-occur together. The theoretical virtue of 
unification has been tested and has passed, meaning neo-Humeans and neo-Kantians 
can see this part of the world as has having a degree of unity. 
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For a stronger correlation we would ideally desire autism maps onto a single 
factor, rather than two or three factors as described above. However, if reality takes a 
form where a set of behaviour (from which symptoms are derived) co-occur regularly 
when measuring many individuals, but which specific behaviour any given individual 
exhibits from that set has some variance, then reality might not best be modeled as a 
single factor. Also, autism is an idealised law which describes probabilistic co-
occurrence of symptoms which abstracts away many specific details of individuals 
with autism; for reasons of age, of environment, of how the specific symptoms an 
individual has interact together, of how the specific symptoms an individual has 
interacts with non-pathological traits, we should not expect manifestations of autism 
to correspond with the high level law. Consequently, we should not assume greater 
social and communicative impairment means greater impairment of RRBI. Thus, “it 
maybe unwise to think that severity of symptoms in autism is always highly correlated
with level of functioning” (Szatmari et al, 2002, p.472; also Dworzynski et al 2009, 
p.120;8 Kamp-Becker et al 2009, p.568). Despite all this, individuals are to varying 
degrees impaired in very different domains and autism can describe how occurrences 
of symptoms probabilistically relate. We only need autism as a high level model to 
have stringency, describing probabilistic relationships between symptoms which 
provide guidance on which symptoms an individual might exhibit.
Thinking autism need lie only on a single factor may stem from mistaken 
views on causation. If autism had a single cause then we might expect that when the 
cause is stronger then individuals will exhibit more autism, i.e. more symptoms or 
symptoms manifest more severely. However, modern causal investigation shows an 
inherently multi-factorial element. Notions of stronger vs weaker causes need 
replacing with notions that a wide variety of causes can result in a wide variety of 
symptoms. Maximising information is only best served by employing a single factor 
when the world takes particular forms, ones which rarely occur in psychiatry. 
The history of autism, rationally reconstructed, shows various ways of trying 
to balance strength, simplicity and stringency. We can see psychiatry of 1925 to 1943 
as having a set of laws, ones which inadequately described all phenomena by leaving 
a gap within the described probabilistic relationships. Consequently, Kanner created a 
new scientific law in the form of autism, covering part of that previously not described
phenomena. This increased strength and stringency, at an acceptable cost of simplicity
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by adding a new law. Between 1943 to 1978 there were two main approaches, those 
who employed childhood schizophrenia and mental retardation and those who just 
employed childhood schizophrenia, its subtypes (autism, children with circumscribed 
interests and symbiotic psychosis) and mental retardation. We can imagine this as a 
debate over strength, simplicity and stringency, psychiatrists each trying to get closer 
to the ideal balance. Both approaches had similar strength, since both approaches 
could diagnose the same people. Each approach differed on simplicity and stringency. 
Those employing the subtypes of childhood schizophrenia did so at the cost of 
simplicity, employing more laws than is needed. However, plausibly they gained in 
stringency, the additional classifications allowing more specific probabilistic 
relationships to be applied. Those just employing childhood schizophrenia and mental 
retardation gained in simplicity but lost in stringency. I make no judgements over who
was correct, merely that we can rationally reconstruct them as two separate subjective 
judgements attempting to reach that best balance between strength, simplicity and 
stringency. Kolvin's and Rutter's approach may have gained in simplicity but vastly 
lost strength, being unable to cover many people who were previously covered. It did 
gain in some stringency because the symptom pattern of early onset schizophrenia, 
quite different to that of the majority of childhood schizophrenia and its subtypes, is 
now associated with adult schizophrenia. DSM-III-R is quite similar to Kanner's 
approach, an overarching pervasive developmental disorders whereby PDD-NOS 
covers higher functioning individuals whilst autism covers more impaired individuals.
It thus combines simplicity and stringency. DSM-IV is even closer to Kanner's 
position, the overarching category pervasive developmental disorders with specific 
subtypes of PDD-NOS, Asperger's syndrome, autism, childhood disintegrative 
disorder and Retts disorder. Simplicity is lost but stringency is gained. DSM-5 
removed those subtypes, becoming similar to Bender's approach, an overarching 
category of autism without demarcating specific subtypes. Simplicity has been gained 




The other major theoretical virtue is causation. If one regularity follows another to a 
sufficient probabilistic degree then we consider the first regularity to cause the second 
one. For Psillos (and Salmon and Kitcher) causes are probabilistic relationships of 
regularities demarcated by laws. We establish the laws and then see which causes are 
derived. Finding causes is different to co-occurrence of regularities which I described 
above. Symptoms of autism co-occur together, but they do not seem to follow one 
another (i.e. the regularity low social skills are not followed by the regularity low eye 
contact). In contrast, causation of psychiatric classifications would be where one 
regularity (gene, brain structure, psychological state) precedes the co-occurrence of 
symptoms. Establishing the theoretical virtue causation, whereby certain types of 
relationships between regularities are established, increases belief in a scientific 
theory.
Some psychiatric classifications gain substantial belief from the theoretical 
virtue causation. Down's syndrome and Huntingdon’s have strong probabilistic 
relationships between one set of very regularly co-occurring regularities (symptoms) 
and biological regularities (the genes). These are considered so strong to make the 
gene a cause. These are good reasons to believe in Down's syndrome and 
Huntingdon’s.
Unfortunately, as discussed in chapter four, such causes are extremely rare in 
psychiatry. Very few psychiatric classifications gain much belief from the theoretical 
virtue causes. Imagine a psychiatric classification was associated with, say, a hundred 
genes all between 1% to 2% effect size. Depending on one’s stance towards belief, 
either these would provide no belief via the theoretical virtue of causes or they would 
provide very little belief. Given that modern evidence suggests most causes have 
extremely small effect size in psychiatry, establishing belief on causes through a 
theoretical virtues approach looks very unpromising except for a limited number of 
psychiatric classifications. 
- 6.5.1.3 Ethics
To pass an IBE a psychiatric classification must exhibit ethical theoretical virtues. I 
have previously outlined in chapter five how autism accomplished various ethical 
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goals of psychiatry. The diverse symptoms of autism make it a strong likelihood 
autism is not just a reaction to society, hence autism passes this IBE whereas 
personality disorders would struggle to do so. Psychiatric classifications need also 
cause suffering. Autism has a very high statistical probability of suffering meaning 
autism passes this criteria whereas some classifications would struggle to. Psychiatric 
classification must also not be variations on normal behaviour. The diversity of the 
symptoms means autism passes the IBE in a manner which mild learning disability 
would not. Note that this would not necessarily be so with boarderline cases of autism,
here I only refer to individuals who meet DSM criteria. Autism exhibits theoretical 
virtues of ethics more than many other psychiatric classifications.
- 6.5.1.4 Other inference to the best explanation arguments
There are other types of IBEs, usually considered an indirect way of establishing 
causes. Firstly, a psychiatric classification having very particular course, such as the 
progressive degeneration exhibited in Huntingdon's. In this case we value strength, 
showing how Huntingdon's changes. This links one state with another state, covering 
more phenomena. We also value stringency since Huntingdon's is extremely 
predictive. The course of autism can change as individual’s age, though nothing as 
striking as Huntingdon's. Secondly, response to drugs, specific response to specific 
drug allowing inference to shared biology. Here we value strength by linking drugs 
with end results, plus we value stringency though this depends upon the specificity of 
predictions. This is currently inapplicable to autism. Thirdly, family studies, whereby 
co-occurrence of psychiatric illness within families suggests underlying shared causes.
Here we value strength by furthering the web of probabilistic relationships. We also 
value stringency if those probabilities are strong. Such family studies plausibly should
contribute to belief since autism has a heritability of 80% (Lichtenstein et al 2010). All
these are potential means for IBEs though how strong each need be for IBE inferences
needs arguing for. We also might employ multiple IBE's for each psychiatric 
classification. However, each IBE is rare in psychiatry and, as discussed in chapter 
four, we should not assume reality is composed of currently undiscovered things 
existing in these forms. Additionally, the next section shows how valuing these can 
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sometimes reduce the IBE's strength. Finally, the IBE attribution needs justifying, as 
discussed in section 6.5.2. It would need be shown how these claims would be 
justified.
- 6.5.1.5 Balancing IBEs
Unification and causation are often in tension in psychiatry. A psychiatric 
classification has the theoretical virtue of unification if it covers many symptoms 
which co-occur stringently and it has the theoretical virtue of causation if it has an 
identified (or inferred) cause. Sometimes these are fully compatible, such as with 
Down's syndrome which has a very strong cause and relatively little variation in 
symptomatology. However, this is rarely the case in psychiatry. Most currently 
identified causes in psychiatry only have an extremely small effect size for existing 
psychiatric classifications. 
Psychiatry could strengthen causes by modifying classifications. We could 
split up and shrink psychiatric classifications, say split autism into numerous sub-
classifications and see if any genes have higher probabilistic relationships to each sub-
classification. Assume this worked, the causal basis of each subclassification being 
stronger than currently exists for autism, many genes going from 1.2% to, say, 5% or 
10% effect size. This strengthens the theoretical virtue causation, contributing to 
belief. However, doing this means employing more classifications, thereby decreasing 
simplicity. Remember that there is a tension since “simplicity and strength [including 
stringency] pull in opposite directions” (Psillos 2002, p.149). Simplicity demands 
fewer laws but this means those laws become more general, making them less 
stringent. By employing more laws, we can describe probabilistic relationships of 
phenomena (including causal connection) with higher stringency. So in our 
hypothetical example we need compare the strength gained (linked to more causes) 
and the stringency gained (strong probabilistic associations between those causes and 
the classifications) with how much simplicity has been sacrificed. All this depends on 
how many new classifications are created and how greatly (both number and degree of
probabilistic associations) they link to causes. Ideally, we would need formulate 
relatively few classifications and each linked to causes of relatively high effect size. I 
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shall not discuss precise figures, this all depends upon a judgment. Instead, I point out 
that focusing heavily on causes could result in reducing overall balance of theoretical 
virtues.
The same could occur when inferring causes from the form of the psychiatric 
classification. For example, Kendell & Jablensky famously argued that, in the absence
of identified causes, psychiatric classifications can be valid when “demonstrated to be 
an entity, separated from neighbouring syndromes and normality by a zone of rarity” 
(2003, p.8). A zone of rarity is where symptoms of a syndrome have little overlap with
other syndromes; a syndrome is valid if few symptoms in that syndrome are found in 
any other syndrome. This seems similar to notions of sensitivity and specificity. This 
then allows an inference that the psychiatric classification has a unique biology, 
different to other psychiatric classification (2003, p.8). However, trying to increase 
zones of rarity, trying to ensure all those diagnosed have similar symptoms and those 
symptoms do not occur in other psychiatric classification, can reduce unifications. 
Zachar writes that
 
“good diagnostic criteria are [typically seen as] both sensitive 
indicators of a disorder and specific indicators of a disorder.  For this 
reason a symptom such as irritability is not an ideal criterion for 
depression because it is sensitive to depression but not specific to 
depression. Highly anxious people are also irritable. . . overlapping 
symptoms contribute to our understanding of how complicated cases 
might develop.  When. . . [overlapping] symptoms are ignored the gaps 
between clusters look larger (or more real) than they are” (2014, p. 
 
Ignoring symptoms when modelling to produce zones of rarity reduces the number of 
symptoms employed and thus weakens the law. Placing irritability as a symptom of 
depression will increase the number of symptoms and thus increase the strength of the 
law (providing this does not negatively affect stringency). Scientists often prefer to 
capture more causes by not seeking strictly demarcated entities. Many scientific 
entities have zones of rarity only in an idealised sense, only having a unique set of 
causes if scientists ignore many causes. For example, systems biologists produce 
“models [that] try to ignore the complexities at the lower level, in order to capture the 
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general features of a system's dynamic” (MacLeod & Nersessian 2013, p. 553). The 
complexity means the model's power is increased by not seeking strictly demarcated 
entities. Attempting to maximise both laws and zones of rarity when formulating 
classifications will, in many situations, produce a conflict.  The strength of laws 
comes from the number, diversity and unrelatedness of statistically associated 
phenomena. Greater diversity often means greater overlapping causes, reducing the 
zone of rarity. Where establishing a zone of rarity requires ignoring many symptoms 
then enforcing zones of rarity will likely not be the best explanation. 
6.5.2 Justifying inference to the best explanation attributions
- 6.5.2.1 Reliability
We now need establish the second step of scientific realism, justifying IBE 
attributions. If we attribute autism as the best explanation then why believe such 
attributions are reliable? Specifically, we might decide a particular explanation is the 
best explanation when actually it is not. Therefore, we need reason to believe such 
attributions actually are the best explanation.
Many scientific realists employ NMA to justify IBE, a condition under which 
IBE attributions are reliable, but we need seek an alternative for autism. In some 
instances NMA is highly applicable in psychiatry. For instance, knowing someone has 
HTT gene means they either die early or develop Huntingdon's seems miracle like. 
Equally, the near perfect sensitivity and specificity of causes to Down's syndrome 
seems miracle like. Finally, perhaps sufficient responsiveness to a medication might 
be miracle like (Lithium might be a suitable example). Such situations are extremely 
rare in psychiatry. Beyond such instances, perhaps NMA could still grant some very 
weak form of approximate truth for since, referring to NMA, Kendler ponders, “would
these advances [measurement, psychopharmacology, neurobiology and genetics] have 
been possible if all our attempts as psychiatry were, at a fundamental level, deeply 
flawed” (Kendler 2012b, p.100). This argument has potential, especially if we also 
consider the success of classifications at systematizing phenomena. However, the 
level of success here is, with rare exception, far below miracle like predictions. Weak 
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success delivers weak realism, far below what most realists aim for (Lauden 1984, 
p.115). Perhaps many philosophers of psychiatry would welcome such weak realism, 
seeing it as better than existing high levels of scepticism. However, I will argue for an 
alternative to NMA which can deliver a moderate, rather than weak, scientific realism 
for autism. 
Perhaps the most secure basis for IBE attributions is observability. A traditional
battleground for scientific realism was observablility vs non-observablility, however, 
any divide between observable vs non-observable cannot be made on a-theoretical vs 
theoretical grounds (Feyerabend 1975, p.212; Hempel 1973, p.70; Kuhn 1996, p.4; 
Popper 1959, p.106; Quine, 1951). A more promising approach to observables is 
minimising epistemic risk. Van Fraassen seeks to minimise epistemic risk by 
extending belief only to empirical adequacy, scientific entities only accounting for 
observables rather than merit belief. However, 
“[i]n either case we stick our neck out: empirical adequacy goes far 
beyond what we can know at any given time. (All the results of 
measurement are not in; they will never all be in; and in any case, we 
won't measure everything that can be measured). Nonetheless there is a 
difference: the assertion of empirical adequacy is a great deal weaker 
than the assertion of truth” (Van Fraassen 1980, p.69). 
Claims about observables involve epistemic risk but less than realism, a claim realists 
agree on (Azzouni 2004, p.374; Magnus 2003, p.466; Psillos 1999, p.200). They 
disagree with Van Fraassen over exactly how much epistemic risk unobservables 
involve and how much epistemic risk is acceptable. Let’s consider why observables 
involve less epistemic risk. 
Psillos argues belief in scientific claims is justified by getting background 
theories correct (Psillos 1999, p.189). Observables need interpreting by background 
theories just like unobservables do (Psillos 1999, p.31). Inferences for observables are 
typically epistemically safe because observables have limited ontological options of 
what they can be, of the form they can take. Discussing why Bridge (a card game) 
players are successful in their inferences, Azzouni writes 
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“[w]hen we already have an ontological description of a collection of 
objects (cards, people, etc.) and a restricted range of properties we can 
attribute to them, inference to properties can be closely keyed to the 
success of the inferences... restriction to observable entities restrict 
ontological options – both of what things can exist, and what sort of 
properties they can have: we can trust inferences about distributions of 
cards – if successful – because we are severely constrained in the 
ontological options that it's reasonable to even consider” (2004, p.381 
emphasis original). 
Pointing to Azzouni's use of the work 'reasonable', Psillos in response writes “what 
options it is reasonable to consider when it comes to observables depends on several 
background theories and assumptions” (Psillos 2009b, p.97). Observables are 
epistemically justified because they are generally interpreted by good background 
theories and assumptions (Psillos 2009b, p.88) and sometimes this is also true of 
unobservables (Psillos 2009b, p.98). We must establish how good the background 
theories and assumptions employed for autism are.
There are two stages of epistemic risk, firstly inferring phenomena from data 
and secondly inferring theories from phenomena. Below I highlight epistemic risk 
found at both stages, it is a representative rather than exhaustive account of epistemic 
risk in science – different sciences face different challenges. I show how problematic 
epistemic risk is in physics (thus why Psillos needs NMA) and show how autism faces
vastly reduced epistemic risk. I start with the epistemic risk of inferring phenomena.
- 6.5.2.2 Phenomena
From phenomena we infer theoretical claims but these inferences often require 
phenomena take a very particular form, one requiring extremely high precision which 
is highly epistemically risky. For example, “getting neutrinos to produce records 
which are accessible to the human sensory system will require a great deal of subtle 
contrivance and that the causal chain running from the neutrinos to such records will 
be long and complex” (Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.320). Scientists do not simply 
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detect neutrinos but take very specific phenomena as, via a long causal chain, being 
produced by neutrinos. 
Establishing phenomena can involve very complicated experiments. For 
example, 
“in the neutral current experiments conducted at CERN, researchers 
followed the strategy of first getting the neutrinos to interact with 
matter to produce charged particles and then getting the charged 
particles to interact with a standard detector (in this case, a bubble 
chamber) in such a way as to produce records which were visually 
detectable” (Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.320). 
There is clear epistemic risk when building complicated experiments to study 
phenomena, ones not associated with many psychiatric symptoms. 
Relatedly is the need for controlling confounding factors. Phenomena are the 
product of multiple causes, many of which need controlling when seeking precision. 
Sciences like physics involve attempts to control these via complicated experimental 
set-ups. For example, when studying electrical activity in nerve membranes,
“[to] control the nerve's temperature and shield the recording 
equipment from ambient heat, Hill sealed them in the core of a double 
walled container. To see how the nerve behaved at 0C, he filled the 
space between the walls with crushed ice. For experiments at higher 
temperatures he used paraffin oil. To bring the inner temperature to 
within a desired range above 0C he pumped in air from the laboratory. 
For lower temperature experiments he used oxygen. When the core was
cooled slowly or when oxygen was introduced, the equipment 
sometimes recorded 'curious fluctuations' in nerve temperature. Hill 
supposed the fluctuations were artifacts of warming caused by little 
rainstorms in the chamber. The rainstorms occurred when the charge on
the wire he used to stimulate the nerve initiated condensation in the 
supersaturated air surrounding the thermopile. Assuming that the gases 
he used to manipulate the temperature inside the core contributed to 
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supersaturation, he took pains to remove moisture from his oxygen and 
adjusted the temperature of the room to keep the air he pumped into the
container from getting colder than the air in the core” (Bogen 2011, 
p.15). 
Once again, all this involves many epistemic challenges and we simply need not do 
this for most psychiatric symptoms. 
We need be selective over data when constructing phenomena. Physics often 
needs very high selectivity of data when producing phenomena. For example, 
“physicists successfully detected the phenomena of weak neutral 
currents in 1973... The data obtained at CERN consisted of 
approximately 290,000 bubble chambers photographs of which roughly
100 were thought to provide evidence for the presence of neutral 
currents... at NAL... 8 of approximately 330 records were interpreted as
evidence for neutral currents” (Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.315). 
The level of data which is discarded is immense and the level of data considered 
legitimate is tiny. This contains huge epistemic risk and there seems nothing 
analogous in psychiatry. 
All this creates great difficulty demarcating phenomena. For example, 
“identifying WNC [Weak Neutral Current], however, is highly 
problematic. In spark chamber experiments, where the production and 
detection of muons is spatially separated, wide-angle muons could 
escape the detector. In bubble chamber experiments muons could get 
stuck in the shielding of the chamber. If one didn't take extra care in 
estimating these undetected but nevertheless present muons, one could 
end up counting as WNC events what in fact were merely charged 
current events. Moreover, in bubble chamber experiments, incoming 
neutrinos could knock off neutrons within the shielding, which in turn 
would propagate into the chamber where they would scatter of hadrons,
thus emulating WNC events” (Schindler 2011, p.49). 
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This inference from data to phenomena here carries immense epistemic risk. There is 
very high possibility errors could be made when applying this process. There seems 
little analogous in psychiatry.
The phenomena scientists employ are often highly idealised, conceptually 
constructed from potentially questionable theories. The 
“phenomena scientists investigate are often the end product of these 
series of intermediate steps, at quite a distance from the original data. 
Not only can they be unobservable, as Bogen and Woodward have 
rightly pointed out; they may also require a significant amount of 
conceptual construction” (Massimi 2008, p.13 emphasis original). 
Heavily discussed in chapters four and five, phenomena are idealised regularities that 
only indirectly describe data, constrained by “what could be modelled managably and 
reliably” (MacLeod & Nersessian 2013, p.545), formulated on considerations like 
tractability, generality and applicability. Also, theories often heavily influence 
phenomena interpretation. The greater the idealisation and greater reliance upon false 
or heavily idealised theories means greater epistemic risk. 
Neutrinos are very inaccessible, a long causal chain lying between them and 
their effects. The causal path from neutrinos to their effects involves interaction of 
vast numbers of other causal factors. Consequently, we need account for these 
phenomena in two steps. Firstly, highly specialized experiments which minimize these
other effects. Secondly, since these effects can never be fully dispensed with, only 
some experimental results (data) are taken as relevant to the effects of neutrinos 
(phenomena). We typically need extremely precise measurements when deciding 
relevancy of data for precisely demarcated phenomena. We need produce extremely 
precise measurements and judge which precisely measured data is relevant for 
producing precise phenomena. “Quite plainly we are more likely to be wrong... when 
we attempt precise specification of magnitude” (Kitcher 1993a, p.140). Additionally, 
we may interpret phenomena using highly abstract, idealised and epistemologically 
insecure background theories when deriving phenomena. Phenomena can potentially 
have immense epistemic risk, as highlighted by examples from physics. Let’s now 
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consider psychiatry in detail. 
Entities and their laws are typically very imprecisely defined in psychiatry, 
removing the need for precise phenomena. The level of precise information indirectly 
gathered is radically lower for formulating low social skills compared to weak neutral 
currents. We might need considerable complexity for very specific types of memory or
very technical notions of thought disorders but not for most symptoms of autism. In 
psychiatry only rough figures are needed, low social skills covering a very wide range 
of behaviour. Rather than requiring the exact figure 4.82 on a particular scale to have 
low social skills the score merely need fall within a particular range. Consequently, we
can employ imprecise observations, interviews and statistical studies, rather than 
highly specialised experiments with associated high epistemic risk. Establishing 
phenomena for demarcating autism from schizophrenia need not be precisely 
formulated, does not need specialised experimental set-ups, need not discard ninety 
nine percent of data gathered, need not be so stringent over countering causal 
influence of unwanted factors. Minute causal factors need controlling for, including 
highly selectivity of data, when dealing with some of the phenomena studied in 
physics. In psychiatry we need not control for the individual being male, it being 
winter, he has four friends rather than five, is working class, he lives in Hull rather 
than Bristol. These factors can causally influence data but need not be controlled for 
when formulating symptoms.
Relatedly, we often have much greater access to phenomena in psychiatry than 
in physics. Consider social interaction. Most humans engage in many conversations 
throughout their day and speak with perhaps thousands of individuals across their life. 
These conversations can occur in many different environments (work, school, home), 
differ from lasting seconds to hours, occur among many different people and about 
many different subjects. Most conversations successfully transmit some portion of the 
information required. Doing so requires a whole range of assumptions about 
comprehensibility of language, shared semantic understanding, psychological states, 
intentionality and much else besides. However, none of these seem particularly 
problematic for most instances of conversations. Humans have an ability to “reliably 
and robustly sustain interaction with other's intensional states” (Michael & MacLeod 
2013, p.226). Sometimes, however, interactions are not sustained or are abnormal. 
Most humans will, given sufficient evidence, be aware this occurred. Most humans 
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can intuitively form conversations and intuitively detect abnormal conversations. 
Zachar argues this more generally. 
“Consider temperature, weight and length. We have some native 
abilities to detect these phenomena, however crude. Something similar, 
albeit more conceptually complex may be true for detecting aberrant 
behavioural patterns (supplemented by some widely shared 
assumptions about normal functioning)” (Zacher 2012, p.31). 
The role of empathy and intuitive understanding has been emphasised by Avramides 
(2013, p.279) and Potter (2013, p.302). Woodward argues causal reasoning is robust 
and reliable in everyday contexts (Woodward 2012, p.962), similarly so for social 
interactions. Much less conceptual construction or highly abstract idealisation is 
required than can occur in physics. Also, good access is still present when applying 
specialized interviews and questionnaires to increase the accuracy of our judgments. 
Additionally, evidence gathered under a wide range of circumstances is safer than 
single experiments (Stanford 2011, p.893). This level of access conveys substantial 
epistemic reliability. Also, we need only use implicit rather than detailed theoretical 
commitments to demarcate social skills. For low social skills, complicated theories are
rarely employed (Ochs et al 2004, p.160). The above problems might be inapplicable 
for some psychiatric phenomena. For example, most psychiatrists either never or 
rarely have hallucinations, meaning levels of access are far lower than social skills. 
Similarly, theories used for hallucinations are much more epistemically problematic. 
Additionally, demarcating hallucinations from delusions or thought disorders is 
difficult. However, the epistemic risk when constructing the phenomena low social 
skills is much lower than for many phenomena in physics.
- 6.5.2.3 Entities
We have considered symptoms (phenomena) in psychiatry. I have argued that some 
phenomena in psychiatry involve far less epistemic risk than can occur in physics. 
Let’s consider the second inference, from phenomena to theoretical entities. 
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Indirect access of scientific entities increases epistemic risk. For example, “the 
causal chain running from the neutrinos to such records will be long and complex” 
(Bogen & Woodward 1988, p.320). Kitcher observes, “[q]uite plainly we are more 
likely to be wrong when we… make claims about things that are causally remote from
us” (Kitcher 1993a, p.140). In contrast, inference from symptoms (phenomena) to 
autism (theory) seems much smaller, the causal chain between theory and phenomena 
being much smaller than often present in physics. 
The inference from phenomena to theory can involve high epistemic risk. We 
need theories to differentiate electrons from neutrinos (Psillos 1999, p.256). Here 
instances of phenomena have only very minor differences to which we apply very 
highly idealised theories, claiming each almost identical phenomena is (via a long and 
abstract causal chain) the product of two different particles. Also, there may be 
plausible alternative ways of demarcating entities. Eliminating alternatives will often 
depend upon assumptions, often highly questionable ones (Stanford 2006, p.41). For 
example, modern physics often relies upon very specific notions of causation but there
may be alternatives not yet conceived of (Stanford 2006, p.171). In contrast, 
psychiatric theories are loose probabilistic relationships, much less precise than 
probabilistic claims typically found in physics. Psychiatric classifications as 
probabilistic theories tells us certain behaviour regularly co-occurs and from this 
common causes (typically in an INUS sense) can be assigned. Providing the co-
occurrences are strong then this is a relatively uncontroversial way to do science. It 
merely infers an entity consisting of a loose collection of unknown co-occurring 
properties (biological, psychological) which cause the symptoms. Also, imagine if the 
rough statistical probabilities assigned to autism were slightly, though not massively, 
false. This means the classification is less ideal at systematising the world than 
possible, reducing the level of approximate truth over the entity. Contrast this with 
physics where we demarcate one very precise electron from another very precise 
neutron, requiring very precise theories and assumptions. Mistaken laws in physics 
could be utterly fatal for demarcating electrons from neutrons given the specificity of 
the claims involved. The epistemic barrier in psychiatry for entity inference is much 
lower compared with physics.
We need also conceptually construct entities. In psychiatry we consider entities
responsible for a range of behaviour. By specifying a very loose range of behaviour 
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we equally can specify a very loose entity. In physics we believe very specific entities 
are responsible for very specific phenomena. This typically involves very high levels 
of idealization and assumptions. For example, extremely high levels of idealization 
and selectivity of data creates difficulty “confidently ascertain[ing] what its [physics'] 
basic quantities comprise” (Wilson 2010, p.994). Additionally, closeness to common 
sense is epistemically advantageous (Stanford 2006, p.200) but physics is often 
radically different to common sense. Huge conceptual construction increase epistemic 
risk that we have idealized or abstracted away something crucially important that, if 
accommodated, would produce a radically different alternative. The looseness of 
psychiatric entities carries much less epistemic risk compared to the specificity of 
entities in physics. 
Whilst epistemic risk is lower in parts of psychiatry this does not entail 
psychiatry has more truth than physics. Firstly, plausibly physics accomplishes more, 
i.e. psychiatry might rarely meet the lower bar whereas physics might sometimes meet
the higher bar. Secondly, psychiatry typically deals with imprecision whereas physics 
deals with precision. This means that approximate truth is typically higher in physics 
when obtained, whereas the easier to obtain approximate truth in psychiatry is a lower 
approximate truth. All this is case by case and depends on judgments over epistemic 
risk; I merely show how parts of psychiatry can potentially deliver truths when parts 
of physics fail to without implausibly claiming psychiatry is scientifically superior to 
physics.
- 6.5.2.4 Pessimistic Meta Induction
Where applicable, PMI is good reason to doubt reliability of IBE attributions. If 
previous IBE attributions appeared reliable yet turned out false then we have reason to
doubt IBE attributions. Chapter one argued autism had not undergone sufficient 
change to hold substantial epistemic risk. Let’s consider my claims in light of the 
above arguments.
Most symptoms associated with autism involved good epistemic conditions. 
This would be undermined if PMI was applicable to symptoms, if psychiatrists had 
been mistaken about symptoms in earlier notions of autism. However, we saw that 
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many symptoms of modern autism are recognisable in autism historically, from 
around 1950, if measured by childhood schizophrenia and its subtypes. Kanner 
describes symptoms like social imperceptiveness, excessive literalness, obsessiveness,
narrow interests and low intellect (Kanner & Eisenberg 1956, p.558-559) whilst 
Bender describes preferring structured environments, intelligent, enjoying academic 
study, disliking new situations, rigid in approach, little awareness of self, fearing 
social situations, restricted range of actions and being obsessive (Bender 1959b, 
p.506). Many symptoms of modern autism are not at risk from the PMI but there are 
some exceptions. Following PMI, we cannot trust modern claims about thought 
processes of autistic individuals; we might be missing something which earlier 
psychiatrists were getting right. This claim is enhanced when we consider the salience 
aspect of theory-laden nature of evidence. Modern psychiatrists may have their 
attention directed away from such abnormal thinking. Consequently, the possibility 
that modern science misses such abnormal thinking places a limit on the approximate 
truth of modern autism. The same may also be true of age of onset, though I suggested
in section 2.7.1. that age of onset is less worrying because it describes what age 
symptoms occurred rather than which symptoms occurred, plus modern psychology 
has much more information about age which symptoms manifest than was available in
the 1940s to 1970s. 
The psychiatric classification autism has undergone substantial changes but not
generally in a problematic way. PMI is not applicable to the first step to belief of 
assessing theoretical virtues. We desire the balance of theoretical virtues to be as 
informative as possible. Scientists can disagree about which is the most informative 
balance. This does not entail one scientist is wrong and the other correct, only that one
might be more correct than the other, i.e. a theory might be more theoretically 
virtuous, be more informative and therefore have higher approximate truth. Rationally
reconstructed, Kanner and Bender adopted two different approaches to unifications. 
This type of disagreement does not entail PMI. Rather, PMI applies to the second step 
to belief, justifying IBE attributions. PMI generates epistemic worries when earlier 
versions of a theory lacked theoretical virtues, inductively suggesting scientists are 
mistaken about the presence of theoretical virtues in the modern theory. PMI against 
unifications would require earlier versions of autism which lack unification. Bender 
taking one all-encompassing childhood schizophrenia and Kanner preferring narrow 
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subtypes does not deliver PMI because both approaches exhibit the theoretical virtue 
unification. We lack reason to believe PMI is applicable. 
Another problem is claims regarding causes are highly amenable to PMI. 
History of psychiatry is replete with psychiatrists being mistaken about causal origins 
of psychiatric classifications. Kanner's 1935 textbook is an excellent source of 
mistaken causal claims, Kanner wisely withholding judgment on which were true 
(1935, p.9). Bovet remarks that “the hope of imminent understanding [of psychiatric 
causes] has always been with us” (2015, p.134). Even very broadly there has been 
considerable change, social factors were emphasised a hundred years ago and now 
biological factors are emphasised (Horwitz 2002, p162). Horwitz wonders if “future 
historians of early twenty first-century psychiatry might ask: “why didn't they realise 
that poor social relationships, not neurochemicals, create distress” ” (Horwitz 2002, 
p.206). Here I only raise general concerns, likely applicable to many psychiatric 
classifications, applying it to specific psychiatric classifications requires specific 
evidence from that classification's history. 
Strategies for escaping PMI involve restricting which theories are counted. 
Scientific realists only consider theories from mature sciences as candidates for NMA 
(Psillos 1999, p.105). Large scale, well-funded research into causes of psychiatric 
classifications under a modern biopsychosocial framework using modern techniques 
like neuroscience started around 1980, so arguably prior disproved theories can be 
ignored when assessing reliability of causal IBEs. Unfortunately, in 2006 Murphy 
picks theory of mind as an example of how we might define autism causally (Murphy 
2006, p.319). However, theory of mind is highly problematic (see Volkmar et al for 
review of evidence showing limitations with theory of mind (2004, p.142-144), 
Peterson for contradictory experimental evidence (2002, p.1456) and Maise for a 
philosophical criticism (2013, p.182)). Murphy's recommendation does not just have 
risk, here is a clear instance where we have good reason to believe theory of mind is a 
false causal claims. Similarly, the dopamine hypothesis has been the major causal 
theory of schizophrenia since the 1960s. After some initial successes it was repeatedly 
modified in face of contrary evidence when it should have been abandoned, though 
Kendler thinks it will be abandoned soon (Kendler 2015, p.293). Also, some theories 
are arguably insufficiently developed. The mechanisms assigned to neuroscience are 
likely to change as neuroscience develops which likely means substantial modification
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of any psychiatric classifications formulated on current neuroscience (Sullivan 2014, 
p.276). Consider how this quote highlights how the field of genetics is undergoing 
regular development. 
“inheritance patterns of ASD [Autism Spectrum Disorders] could be 
due to gene–gene interaction, but not simply to a few genes of major 
effect, even if they interacted to generate risk. Research in the past 
decade has begun to uncover numerous genes and loci and the 
mechanisms that govern their action, but there are hundreds of other 
ASD risk loci estimated to exist [20,38,80–82] that await further 
genetic and functional characterization. Moreover, there has been 
rudimentary progress in identifying multiple ‘mutations’ in single 
individuals [95–97], suggesting possible multigenic threshold models 
for ASD. These variants include multiple CNVs [95,96], smaller 
sequence-level changes [97], variants affecting apparent non-coding 
regions of the genome [20,72], and combinations of each [24,72], all of
which are predicted to be etiologic due to both the rarity in populations 
and the presumed damaging effect on the genes. An approach with 
significant promise is to apply informatic tools and databases, or to 
perform laboratory based interaction or expression mapping, to link 
apparently discrete ASD genes into common functional pathways or 
convergent networks [98,99]. Such heuristic genetic patterns may 
correlate with ASD endophenotypes and/or overlap with other brain 
and developmental disorders” (Devlin & Scherer 2012, p.233-334)
When is the field sufficiently developed to demarcate new classifications? Taking this 
step in 2000, or 2005, or 2010 would have risked the initial evidence for subdivisions 
being soon disproved. This risk remains present today and judging when this risk will 
sufficiently diminish is difficult. 
PMI seems much less successful against causal claims involving miracle like 
evidence. Undermining PMI over miracle like genetic prediction requires historical 
evidence of scientists being mistaken about miracle like genetic prediction. 
Consequently, I raise no concerns over the reliability of IBE attribution via causes 
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over Down's syndrome. 
- 6.5.2.5 Theory Laden Evidence
Where applicable, theory laden evidence would also be good reason to doubt the 
reliability of IBE attributions. Reliability of IBE attribution requires good epistemic 
conditions. When data to phenomena inference (including production of data) or 
phenomena to theoretical explanation inferences are based upon bad theories then the 
reliability of those inferences is undermined. 
Chapter three considered the two main candidates for epistemically uncertain 
theories applicable to autism, cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis. If many 
symptoms or the classifications rested upon either theory then, where applicable, we 
would have reason for epistemic doubt. I argued both pose relatively little risk to the 
symptoms and classification of autism. Neither the majority of symptoms nor the 
classification appeared particularly theory laden by psychoanalysis or cognitive 
psychology except when those theories were explicitly employed or except for causal 
claims. Above I have suggested the theories involved in psychiatry are often much less
controversial, sitting on a much stronger epistemic basis. 
Chapter five provided an in depth discussion of how theory laden evidence can
have a positive epistemic effect. Justifying IBEs requires good epistemic condition 
and one aspect of this is ensuring the background theories involved are good. I 
showed how some symptoms of autism were theory laden by autism itself. I have also 
argued that autism is a good scientific theory. Therefore, autism can act as a 
background theory for formulating symptoms. Where applicable, this means those 
symptoms have been generated under good epistemic conditions. This then conveys 
reliability to the IBE attribution over autism.
Of course, this is clearly a circular argument. Autism is a good theory because 
the IBE attribution over autism has been made under good epistemic conditions, 
whilst those good epistemic conditions partly reply upon autism being a good theory. 
There is no good reason to automatically assume this type of circular argument is 
negative. Massimi has provided detailed case studies showing how such circular 
justifications can strengthen scientific theories. She outlines how data to phenomena 
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inferences and phenomena to theory inferences can merge together to produce 
statistically strong theories (Massimi 2007, p.260; Massimi 2010, p.21). The data to 
phenomena inference is made to get it closer to the phenomena to theory inference, 
whilst the theory to phenomena inference is also made to get it closer to the data to 
phenomena inference. Relatedly, Psillos thinks scientific realism rests upon an 
unharmful circular argument. The realist claims IBE is a reliable method and as proof 
offers the history of science to show that IBE generally produces truths, therefore IBE 
is a reliable means to truth. However, those scientific theories in the history of science 
which are taken as evidence that IBE is successful have themselves typically been 
proved via IBE. Therefore, IBE is being used to prove IBE, a seemingly circular 
argument (Psillos 1999, p.81). Psillos argues many common arguments are circular, 
such as modus ponens and induction (Psillos 1999, p.81). Circularity alone is 
insufficient to doubt previously successful uses of IBE (or modus ponens and 
induction). 
We saw in chapter one how Kanner derived a new classification from the 
existing classification scheme, filling a gap. We then saw how Kanner effectively 
modified autism around the 1950s, keeping the diagnostic criteria the same but 
associating it with new symptoms. Similarly, childhood schizophrenia incorporated 
elements of Kanner's 1943 autism and two other subtypes were developed, children 
with circumscribed interests and symbiotic psychosis. Both Kanner's and Bender's 
approach exhibited the theoretical virtue unification. Wing's modifications produce a 
different unification, one based around level of social functioning. From this she gave 
symptoms a different emphasis, formulating them as part of a triad of impairment of 
social communication, social understanding and social imagination. All this suggests 
employing autism as a background theory is a good epistemic condition for inferences
over symptoms. This looks like a
“positive feedback relation... it is far from obvious that the process 
described is automatically viciously circular or that it fails to provide a 
legitimate basis for increased confidence in P [phenomena](or T 
theory], for that matter) (Woodward 2011, p.178).
There is certainly no reason to believe it has a negative impact.
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6.6 Epistemic Risk 
All inferences need not exceed a personal limit on epistemic risk to merit belief. This 
depends upon both the level of epistemic risk involved and the level at which the limit
has been set. I have identified three areas which might carry worrying levels of 
epistemic risk, let’s consider each in turn in relation to autism. 
Inferences over phenomena carry epistemic risk. I have shown above how 
many problems which challenge scientific realists in physics are absent over the 
symptoms of autism. The scale of the inferences, the reliance upon such idealised and 
speculative theories is not present. On this basis the epistemic risk is generally much 
lower than in physics. All this is case specific but we should not be excessively 
worried here. This position does not seem particularly controversial, most people 
would accept that accurately diagnosed autistic people do have low social skills and 
low eye contact. For autism the psychiatric skeptic would need look elsewhere to 
justify their concerns.
Inferences over entities carry epistemic risk. I have shown that epistemic 
conditions in psychiatry  are sometimes superior to epistemic conditions under which 
such inferences over entities are made in physics. Also, claims about entities are 
weaker in psychiatry. The weakness of the claims has seemingly lead some to doubt 
psychiatry. Remember how Cushing (2013, p.41) thinks autism needs be associated 
with a thing, whilst Timimi (2011, p.139) considered autism arbitrary because it was 
not biological. This may stem from a flawed understanding of what 'things' are. To say
something is an entity is to assign it a role in a theory (Psillos 1999, p.294). Psillos 
writes that “theories traffic in abstract entities. They assume their existence. They 
describe them and not concrete objects” (Psillos 2011a, p.8). Even neo-Aristolean 
Chakravartty argues that there is no way to know how many properties are needed for 
something to be an object (2007, p.65). In this regard, we see entities in physics and 
psychiatry as involving the same type of commitment, but in differing degrees. The 
major difference between psychiatry and physics is that statistical probabilities in 
physics are extremely high, consequently the properties cluster together very closely, 
whereas in psychiatry the statistical probabilities cluster together in a much weaker 
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manner, therefore properties cluster together in a much weaker manner. Since the 
probabilities are so precise in physics there is greater room for error, therefore greater 
epistemic risk. Of course, sufficiently low probabilities in psychiatry means 
unification will not be applicable. Where probabilities are sufficiently strong that 
unification applies, but not sufficiently strong to carry high epistemic risk, then 
psychiatric entities will not have high epistemic risk. I have argued autism meets these
criteria.
The pessimistic meta induction does carry some risk but not excessive 
amounts. The history of autism shows three areas of substantial change. Firstly, the 
period between 1943 to around some time between the late 1940s to mid-1950s. Here 
autism was a very specific diagnosis which was not associated with social impairment 
or low intellect. We can appeal to the maturity clause to accept that a theory may 
undergo substantial changes in its early phases of development. By accepting this 
provision we reduce epistemic risk. Secondly, we have seen how various child 
psychiatrists took varying stances on how they formulated their classifications (i.e. 
just childhood schizophrenia or childhood schizophrenia and its subtypes or a 
spectrum covering childhood schizophrenia and much else, or an autistic spectrum). I 
have portrayed these as varying attempts at unifications. If we take there as being an 
absolute best unification then each attempt varies in degree of approximate truth to 
that best balance. Multiple credible ways to formulate unifications does not entail each
option is not unifying. Lack of knowledge of which is closest to the best unification 
only entails that we do not know which of the various, quite similar approaches to 
autism has highest approximate truth. This does not result in high epistemic risk. PMI 
is largely problematic because of Kolvin and Rutter's late 1970s and early 1980s 
modifications. Their approach was very different from what went before and came 
after. This strengthens the PMI but child psychiatrists quickly reverted their approach. 
The level of historical discontinuity is not large. DSM-III autism strengthens PMI and 
thus epistemic risk but not in my judgment to fatal levels.
Autism does a good job at unifying diverse symptoms and is thus, in my 
judgment, the best explanation for the symptoms of certain individuals seen by 
psychiatrists. This is not something I can prove, only show the evidence for and 
appeal to the reader to make their judgement based upon their own stance on 
epistemic risk. At most, I suggest autism is acceptable to a moderate position on 
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epistemic risk. A sceptic might put the standards so high no existing psychiatric 
classification passes an IBE. An optimist might put the standard so low all existing 
psychiatric classifications pass an IBE. Now imagine a moderate position between the 
sceptic and the optimist where most DSM psychiatric classification does not merit 
belief but a small number do. Let’s grant that causally based IBE's allow 
Huntingdon's, Down's syndrome, Rett's and Williamson's to occupy many spaces on 
the small list of psychiatric classifications meriting belief. Unless this is the only type 
of IBE we epistemically commit to then unification IBEs are possible. Above I argued
autism does substantially better on unifications than many other psychiatric 
classifications. Autism would be among the most plausible candidates for the 
remaining few psychiatric classifications meriting belief offered by the position 
between the sceptic and optimist. I judge the position between the sceptic and optimist
a plausible stance on epistemic risk whilst offering evidence autism is a strong 
candidate for that position. 
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I outlined criteria for considering a psychiatric classification as 
meriting belief, meaning it is not in need of replacement. I have employed a three step 
argument, IBEs via theoretical virtues, justifying IBE attributions and not exceeding a 
personal limit on epistemic risk. These steps fit three approaches to belief, neo-
Humeanism, neo-Kantianism and pragmatism. I have presented these as alternatives to
neo-Aristoleanism, which (until shown otherwise) appears to have limited 
applicability in psychiatry.
IBE is establishing the best explanation via theoretical virtues. The two main 
theoretical virtues are unifications and causation. Most psychiatric classifications do 
badly on causation. I give autism as an example of a strong unification, showing it 
unifies a vast range of phenomena and does so in a stringent manner. Modifying 
classifications to make causes stronger can reduce the strength of the unifications, 
potentially leaving a classification less theoretically virtuous. 
The IBE attribution needs to be reliable, made under good epistemic 
conditions. The main tool employed for this by philosophers of science is the no 
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miracles argument but this is difficult to mount in psychiatry, including for causal 
claims. However, many conditions carry much less epistemic risk in psychiatry for 
inferring phenomena from data and inferring theories from phenomena. The major 
advantages are higher accessibility and no requirement for precise specification of 
entities or phenomena, conditions that are not applicable to all psychiatric 
classifications but are applicable to autism. I also show PMI and theory laden 
evidence are means to doubt IBE attributions. Neither is problematic for autism but 
PMI is problematic for some causal claims. 
All inferences involve risk but inferences are still justified providing the level 
of risk does not exceed a personal limit on epistemic risk. I show the epistemic risk 
over autism is not great. The strongest challenge is from PMI but this is not large. 
Autism does involve some risk but this is insufficiently high to exceed plausible levels
of epistemic risk.
Lets summarize how each anti-realist argument relates to each step of belief. 
Theoretical virtues could be undermined by underdetermination but autism has 
sufficient theoretical virtues to counter underdetermination. Good epistemic 
conditions could be undermined by PMI and theory-laden evidence. Autism largely 
avoids these, however, modern beliefs about abnormal thinking is affected by both 
these and, too a much lesser degree, modern belief about age of onset is affected by 
PMI. This does put some limit on approximate truth. Epistemic risk could be 
undermined by PMI, underdetermination and theory-laden evidence (i.e. the stronger 
these are the greater the epistemic risk). These largely generate little epistemic risk, 
with the exception of some, though not massive, epistemic risk generated by PMI for 
the classification due to DSM-III autism. 
Passing an IBE and that IBE being made under reliable circumstances means, 
given plausible levels of epistemic risk, autism merits scientific realism. This acts as 
an example which highlights a new route to belief potentially available for psychiatric 




7.1 Aim and novel contributions
My principal aim is establishing a new route to belief for psychiatric classifications 
and to provide an example of a psychiatric classification which attains belief via that 
route. I have made three novel contributions. Firstly, I re-orientate discussions of 
reality away from implicit neo-Aristoleanism towards neo-Humeanism, neo-
Kantianism and pragmatism. Secondly, I showed an example of how three arguments 
against belief in psychiatry can be either undermined or showed as inapplicable. 
Thirdly, I showed limitations of existing arguments for belief whilst providing a novel 
positive argument for belief. Let’s consider all this in turn.
7.2 Reality
Philosophers of psychiatry typically associate reality with causes but without fully 
explaining why. They typically argue that directly finding causes of a psychiatric 
classification can make a psychiatric classification merit belief. Alternatively, the 
causes can be inferred through psychiatric classifications being corroborated with 
family studies or drug responses, through psychiatric classification resembling 
biological species or through psychiatric classifications having a zone of rarity. Why, 
however, do these philosophers value causes so much? Almost no details here are 
provided, beyond statements like “causes of mental illness are genuinely out there in 
the structure of the world, waiting to be discovered” (Murphy 2014a, p.62) or claims 
of “real structures in nature” (Cooper 2005, p.49). Which philosophical account of 
causation and reality do these philosophers employ? Unfortunately, such discussions 
are near absent. They appear to be adopting something like an implicit neo-
Aristotelianism, with a metaphysics of mind-independent causal powers. From here a 
division between such causes (or things produced by such causes) and groupings 
based only in subjective opinion seems clear. Sometimes our subjective opinions 
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group psychiatric symptoms in ways reflecting those causes and sometimes they do 
not. From here, we have a clear principle for demarcating real psychiatric 
classifications from unreal ones. Additionally, applying this principle suggests most 
current psychiatric classifications are not real. Also, this principle suggests we should 
reformulate psychiatric classifications to reflect such causes. It is debatable what the 
prospects are for making neo-Aristoleianism, or some other philosophy similarly 
emphasising mind independent causal powers, explicit to adequately show it allows 
true psychiatric classifications. To retain Cooper's and Murphy's position, the adopted 
philosophy must entail classifications ultimately are made true if they reflect the 
causal structure of the world. Also, there must be many other undiscovered psychiatric
classifications out there waiting to be found. If these cannot be accomplished then 
Cooper's and Murphy's picture will not survive fully intact. Regardless, all this is 
unconcerning to me because I provide an alternative account of what causes and 
reality are. Additionally, the alternative account I offer does not simply provide 
philosophical justifications for existing approaches to belief over psychiatric 
classifications, rather, it opens up new epistemic arguments.
Seeking to establish a scientific realist account of autism, I formulated an 
alternative account to neo-Aristoleanism, one applicable to neo-Humeanism, neo-
Kantianism and pragmatism. For neo-Humeans and neo-Kantians causes are not 
mind-independent in any strong sense. Rather, regularities are mind-independent. 
From regularities phenomena, which are models of regularities, are derived. Causes 
are then derived from laws. The laws, and therefore the causes, are derived from 
attempts to build the most informative theories. This is accomplished by building a 
system of theories which best balance strength, simplicity and stringency. Deciding 
which theories are most informative is based upon theoretical virtues. The two main 
theoretical virtues are unifications and causation. Unifications are where theories are 
strong, because they cover lots of phenomena, and stringent, because they accurately 
describe probabilistic relationships between those phenomena. Stronger and more 
stringent theories means more phenomena have been covered. This contributes to 
simplicity because fewer theories are required. The other main theoretical virtue, 
causes, is where   one regularity follows one another probabilistically (rather than 
simply co-occur probabilistically). From this new picture of reality we can see that 
causes are important but not all important; the best balance between strength, 
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stringency and simplicity may not involve causes. From this new picture of reality 
let’s consider arguments over belief in psychiatric classifications. 
7.3 What are psychiatric classifications?
Psychiatric classifications sometimes are taken as not making any contribution, as 
arbitrary or even harmful. Unfortunately, exactly what making a contribution would 
consist of or what a non-arbitrary psychiatric classification would be is rarely stated. 
Such arguments seemingly have metaphysical and epistemic routes. If assuming an 
implicit neo-Aristoleanism then sceptics could claim psychiatric classifications 
contribute nothing because they do not reflect the causal structure of the world, and 
hence are inductively unreliable. For truth, a neo-Aristolean could demand psychiatric
classifications have identified causes or could infer psychiatric classifications have 
causes because they take a form resembling biological species, have a zone of rarity, 
or are correlated with factors like family studies or treatment responses. We may have 
psychiatric classifications which meet neither criteria. Additionally, we may have 
psychiatric classifications which appear to meet either criteria but we still doubt 
causes are present because of the pessimistic meta induction, underdetermination or 
theory laden nature of evidence (when bad theories are involved). If psychiatric 
classifications do not reflect the causal structure of the world then psychiatric 
classifications must have been formulated on other grounds, such as arbitrary factors 
like personal opinion, dubious ethics, speculative theories or socio-political concerns. 
Unfortunately, this image does not fit psychiatric classification well. The neo-
Aristolean image seemingly rests upon an image of stable unified causes producing 
sets of stable, unified symptoms. Whilst this can happen in psychiatry, such as with 
Down's syndrome, such situations are rare. Also, since strong causes are easier to find,
we have likely already found most of them already. The notion that the domain of 
psychiatry consists of many strong causes waiting to be found is not supported by 
current evidence. Consequently, Cooper's metaphysical picture of mental disorders 
existing on the model of biological species seems largely inapplicable. Murphy's 2006
metaphysical picture is less problematic, willing to be realist over psychiatric 
classifications which lack strong causes. However, his epistemic optimism about a 
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future psychiatry seems based upon a metaphysical picture he rightly rejects. He 
implicitly treats psychiatric classifications epistemologically as though they have a 
similar status to biological species, something untenable unless endorsing something 
like Cooper's metaphysical picture. Since causal disunity is more prevalent in 
psychiatry we should not demand causal unity when assessing epistemological 
arguments. 
I have outlined a new metaphysical picture for psychiatry. The world consists 
of regularities and probabilistic relationships between those regularities. Sometimes 
the nature of the world is where one regularity follows another with high probabilities,
sometimes the nature of the world is where one regularity follows another with very 
low probabilities. Under my picture, both situations are equally real. Reality on my 
picture can involve causal disunity whereas Cooper assumes (and Murphy's epistemic 
arguments implicitly assume) that real things must be causally unified. Such causal 
disunity would be insufficient for realism for Cooper, perhaps also for Murphy. 
However, though weaker, these causes may still legitimate belief over psychiatric 
classifications; we should not demand stable causes to match up with stable symptom 
profiles when deciding what is real, rather, reality in psychiatry generally is disunity 
between symptoms and causes. From here we can judge psychiatric classifications as 
true regardless of causal disunity.
Moving away from neo-Aristoleanism means we need seek an alternative 
notion of what psychiatric classifications accomplish. I portray psychiatric 
classification as scientific laws, understood as idealised models guiding regularity 
attributions. Scientific theories seek to account for phenomena. Similarly, psychiatric 
classifications seek to account for symptoms. The world contains regularities, call 
these behaviour. Some behaviour which occurs sufficiently frequently is, for a variety 
of reasons, of interest to psychiatrists. They take this behaviour, these regularities, and
formulate them into more general regularities that we call symptoms. We then notice 
these symptoms co-occur. Consequently, we group them together into a scientific law, 
the psychiatric classification. Too the degree which symptoms have been adequately 
formulated from behaviour and to the degree which the psychiatric classification 
accurately reflects co-occurrence of symptoms, a psychiatric classification is more 
informative of regularities. At one level of abstraction symptoms co-occur with certain
probabilities and psychiatric classifications seek to describe these. This higher level 
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model can be turned into a lower level model, probabilistic relationships becoming 
more accurate as more detail is added. The psychiatric classifications, when combined
with more information, guides assigning symptoms to specific individuals, creating 
less abstract models. These less abstract models can then be made even less abstract, 
guiding predictions about how an individual will act in specific situations. Thus, 
through varying levels of abstraction, psychiatric classifications can potentially be 
inductive by giving an idealised description of reality. There is nothing automatically 
arbitrary about a psychiatric classification which simply accounts for such regularities.
Those regularities are real and thus a psychiatric classification reflects reality to the 
degree it accurately describes them. 
We may then notice probabilistic connections between the occurrence of the 
psychiatric classification and other regularities, such as genes, neurobiology, 
psychology or a variety of environmental factors. If the probabilistic relationships are 
sufficiently high then these may be causes. Accounting for these makes the psychiatric
classification more informative of reality. On this basis describing such causes 
increases how much information a psychiatric classification covers, thus increasing 
how much it merits belief. However, causes are not required. Firstly, a psychiatric 
classification can still be informative of the world without causes, thus giving it some 
partial truth. Secondly, since unifications and causes often pull in different directions, 
the best balance may be one where psychiatric classifications do not reflect unified 
causes. Causes could help psychiatric classifications form a good balance of strength, 
simplicity and stringency but good balances can be obtained without causes.
I also showed how psychiatric classifications can be employed to formulate 
symptoms. Science systematises by taking data, conceptually turning them into 
phenomena and explaining phenomena by theories. Autism is one of many theories for
interpreting symptoms. When turning data into symptoms we need decide which 
factors are relevant and which are incidental. Relevancy depends upon populations. In 
one population a factor is incidental, in another the factor is statistically relevant. 
Some factors are so rare to a particular population they are not worth mentioning 
whilst being sufficiently common to be worth mentioning for another population. 
Autism can set the population, producing symptoms formulated relevantly to a 
population, assisting systematisation. Psychiatric classifications help increase the 
statistical relevancy of symptoms, thus strengthening psychiatry inductively. Being 
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more inductive then in turn strengthens psychiatric classifications. Additionally, 
classifications can assist with many problematic philosophical issues surrounding 
ethics and background theories. Classifications can play a far more crucial role than 
previously understood. Replacements to existing classifications need also play this 
role.
Having portrayed an alternative account of what psychiatric classifications are,
let’s now consider how to establish if a psychiatric classification merits belief. 
7.4 Belief
The approach to belief which I adopt contains three steps. Firstly, an inference to the 
best explanation is required, assessing the strength of theoretical virtues. Secondly, 
that IBE attribution must be made under epistemically reliable situations. Thirdly, the 
inferences must not pass a personal limit on epistemic risk. This three step approach is
an alternative to neo-Aristoleianism. It is compatible with neo-Humeanism, neo-
Kantianism and pragmatism, and is also acceptable to anti-realism (though they doubt 
certain steps are usually attained).
7.4.1 Anti-realist arguments
Underdetermination argues that any particular set of evidence can be accounted for by 
more than one theory, therefore there is no way to establish which theory is the correct
one. Under a neo-Aristolean picture, the claim is effectively that we cannot establish 
which theory reflects the mind-independent causes. On my three steps of belief, 
underdetermination casts doubt over the first step to belief, the establishing IBE step. 
Underdetermination claims we have no reason to believe either theory is the best 
explanation.  Under neo-Humeanism and neo-Kantianism, we respond by assessing 
each theory for theoretical virtues. Here we might find no theory under consideration 
exhibits much theoretical virtues. However, if one theory is much more theoretically 
virtuous than another then that theory is the best explanation. I have argued this was 
the case when comparing historically continuous autism (autism and childhood 
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schizophrenia from the late 1940s to late 1970s, then autism from the mid-1980s 
onwards) with DSM-III autism. If two theories make quite similar claims and are 
roughly equally theoretically virtuous then underdetermination also fails. Whilst we 
cannot tell which the correct theory is, we do know both theories are both good 
candidates for the best explanation. I suggest this is the situation with DSM-IV and 
DSM-5. 
The pessimistic meta induction argues historical examples of scientists 
mistakenly believing in theories based upon good evidence inductively suggests 
scientists today who believe in theories based upon good evidence will also be 
mistaken. Under neo-Aristoleanism, PMI gives reason to believe psychiatric 
classifications do not reflect mind-independent causes. Psychiatrists may believe they 
have directly identified a cause or believe a psychiatric classification reflects causes 
but PMI may challenge this. Under my three stages to belief, PMI seeks to undermine 
the second step of belief, the reliability of IBE attributions. Scientists might have a 
theory which they believe is a good one but could be mistaken. Previous scientists 
being mistaken about a theory exhibiting theoretical virtues would give reason to 
doubt scientists are correct about the presence of theoretical virtues in later instances 
of the theory. The PMI is largely not applicable to the psychiatric classification 
autism. From around the late 1940s, many symptom patterns of autism and childhood 
schizophrenia were described which bare strong resemblance to symptom patterns 
associated with modern autism. Kanner, Bender and Wing disagreed over how to 
account for the symptom patterns, effectively offering alternative methods of 
unification. Different approaches to unification across the history of a psychiatric 
classification are only problematic if one is much less theoretically virtuous but here 
each approach unifies well. Each approach effectively tries to form the best 
unification, each exhibiting various degrees of approximate truth. Believing in any of 
them means a level of approximate truth has been obtained. DSM-III autism creates 
some concern, showing the historical continuity of autism is not fully complete. 
However, many child psychiatrists did not properly employ DSM-III notion of autism,
diagnosing children as autistic who did not meet the criteria. Also, the DSM-III 
changes were partially reversed in DSM-III R. PMI gains some limited strength from 
DSM-III autism but not vast amounts. This makes inferences to belief over autism 
more risky but not excessively risky given reasonable levels of epistemic risk. 
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However, some aspects of modern autism differ from pre-DSM-III autism and 
childhood schizophrenia, specifically earlier psychiatrists sometimes described 
children with abnormal thinking and late onset. The presence and then absence of 
these allows a PMI, leaving modern beliefs about abnormal thinking not meriting 
belief whilst some lesser doubts are raised about age of onset. 
Theory laden nature of evidence argues that evidence needs interpreting via 
theories and this can, when bad theories are involved, provide a false understanding of
the evidence. For neo-Aristoleanians, if the real causal powers were not, for example, 
poor mothering then it would be a considerable coincidence if a psychoanalytical 
approach formulated autism in a way reflecting the real causal powers. Under my 
three stages to belief, this is a problem for the second step. Inferring phenomena and 
inferring theories to account for phenomena will typically involve background 
theories. Weak background theories mean such inferences may be unreliable, leaving 
IBE attributions unreliable. I have considered the two background theories which best 
resemble a classic theory-laden picture, psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology. 
Some causal claims seemingly are theory laden in a negative way by these. I have 
shown that very similar symptoms were reported under both theories. Additionally, the
psychiatric classification turns out similar under both theories unless specifically 
formulated on those theories. I have also shown how psychiatric classification can 
themselves be used as theories to interpret phenomena, improving the statistical 
relevancy of symptoms and therefore improving them inductively. Reliability of IBE 
attributions can be increased by employing good theories and autism is a good theory 
for interpreting symptoms.
7.4.2 Inference to the best explanation
Belief in scientific theories requires an inference to the best explanation whereby 
theories are assessed for theoretical virtues. The two main theoretical virtues are 
unification and causation. Either theoretical virtue, or both in combination, can 
legitimate belief over psychiatric classifications. Those taking an implicit neo-
Aristoleanism are correct to suggest causes are a route to belief. However, such 
instances of strong causal unity are rare in psychiatry and we should not expect there 
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to be many undiscovered strong causes which may one day be discovered. 
Consequently, I have appealed to unifications as an alternative approach, a means of 
establishing belief in the absence of unified causes. 
Unifications are where a set of phenomena is accurately accounted for using as
few theories as possible. Seemingly unrelated phenomena are shown as 
probabilistically co-occurring and this is accounted for by a unifying theory. Using as 
few theories as possible, whilst retaining accuracy, maximises information about those
regularities. In terms of psychiatric classifications, this is where as few psychiatric 
classifications are employed as possible to accurately account for as many symptoms 
as possible, including accounting for the probabilistic relationships between 
symptoms. I provide autism as an example of where unifications can be employed to 
attain belief. Autism shows very many diverse and seemingly otherwise unrelated 
symptoms co-occur. Additionally, these symptoms do not simply co-occur but cluster 
under each triads of impairment and those triads co-occur. This makes autism very 
stringent. Measured by unifications, autism is extremely theoretically virtuous. I make
no claims that unifications will be widely applicable in psychiatry. 
I have also shown how focusing on causes, at the cost of unifications, can 
decrease approximate truth. We could split up autism to make it more specific to 
causes but this would reduce the unification. The best balance between strength, 
simplicity and stringency may be one from which we cannot demarcate causes. The 
strength gained by demarcating causes may not compensate the strength lost by 
reducing the number of symptoms covered. Where the strength from unification is 
already low then this might be worth doing. However, autism has strength from 
unification and subdividing on causes would vastly reduce that strength from 
unification. In the absence of very specific types of causes, subdividing on causes 
would leave autism less theoretically virtuous and no longer the best explanation.
7.4.3 Justifying IBEs
Scientific realism needs another component beyond IBE. We need also justify our IBE
attributions since such attributions may be unreliable. We may consider something as 
unificatory when actually it is not. Hence scientific realism requires two separate 
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steps, an IBE and justifying IBE attribution. Both steps are required, meeting just one 
step is insufficient. We justify IBE attributions by considering epistemic conditions 
under which IBE attribution is made. Some IBE attributions are made under reliable 
conditions. Let’s consider justifying an IBE attribution over autism. 
Justifying IBE attributions requires considering the conditions under which the
IBE is made. Some aspects of psychiatry do extremely well here. Psychiatric 
classifications rarely deal with entities vastly remote from us which we find out about 
by making very precise things happen under very specific situations. We have much 
greater access to autism than the Higgs Bosen, vastly reducing epistemic risk. There is
a short causal chain between autism and data, meaning we do not require highly 
specialized experiments, highly precise results, high selectivity of data, precise 
demarcations, questionable theories or high idealization. Extremely specific 
conditions or extremely specific results are not needed to demarcate the symptom of 
autism or their clustering. Many challenges present in other science are absent in 
autism, meaning symptoms and classification carry much less epistemic risk. 
Additionally, as described above, PMI and theory-laden nature of evidence can be 
reasons to doubt IBE attributions but they do not affect most symptoms and the 
classification. IBE attributions involving those symptoms and the classification are 
much more likely to be reliable. 
Existing accounts of realism of psychiatric classification seem unaware of this 
second step. Down's syndrome and Huntingdon's genes plausibly make miracle like 
prediction so pass this second step. This is not the case with most causes in psychiatry.
Many causes involve extremely high levels of inference, sufficiently so that they carry
high levels of epistemic risk, additionally, they are at great risk to PMI so have high 
epistemic risk. Philosopher's employing non-miracle like causes need show such 
causes pass this justifying IBE step but this faces major challenges. 
7.5 Scientific Realism
The realism established is not full truth but only approximate truth. Notions of full 
truth differ between different philosophical approaches. Neo-Humeans see absolute 
truth as the best balance of simplicity, strength and stringency which is closest to the 
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objective structure of regularities. Neo-Kantians see absolute truth as the limits of 
rational inquiry, best balancing strength, stringency and simplicity. Pragmatists see 
absolute truth as absolute usefulness and best balancing strength, simplicity and 
stringency would help reach this. Autism makes a substantial contribution towards 
attaining the best balance of strength, simplicity and stringency, therefore it attains 
some approximate truth. I have not argued autism is the absolute best unification. 
Neither have I argued that modern autism is the only good unification. I suggested 
Kanner's approach (childhood schizophrenia with autism as a sub-type), Bender's 
approach (childhood schizophrenia which includes the symptoms of Kanner's autism) 
and Wing's approach (the 1987 DSM-III-R notion of an autistic spectrum) all do well 
as unification. Kanner's approach, Bender's approach and Wing's approach all have 
substantial approximate truth. Not all approaches will do so well, as we saw with 
DSM-III autism. Also, psychiatric classifications involve many idealisations and 
approximations, both over evidence for IBEs and over what is inferred from the IBE. 
Additionally, we often deal with imprecision. This makes justifying IBEs much easier,
since we do not require extremely precise conditions. However, such IBEs convey less
approximate truth than those involving more precision. IBE in physics may be harder 
to obtain but once obtained they involve greater approximate truth than present over 
psychiatric classifications. 
Establishing which notion of autism is best depends on two substantial uncertainties.
Let’s take Kanner's approach, Bender's approach, DSM-IV and DSM-5 as all good 
unifications made under reliable situations. We can claim DSM-IV and DSM-5 are 
superior to Kanner's and Bender's approach because they do not cover late onset 
hallucinating individuals. Given how different these are to typical autistic people this 
increases stringency. However, modern autism places much less value on abnormal 
thinking than occurred during Kanner's and Bender's era. If modern autism is missing 
out on these symptoms then potentially Kanner's and Bender's approach was superior. 
Further scientific studies are required to establish this, ideally through modern 
psychiatry and psychology placing much more emphasis on the subjective psychic life
of the individual. On this basis, DSM-IV and DSM-5 have one clear advantage over 
Kanner's and Bender's approach, removing hallucinating individuals, but there is one 
substantial uncertainty which may leave Kanner's and Bender's approach superior, 
questions over whether more focus should be placed upon abnormal thinking. In 
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relation to DSM-IV and DSM-5, we need give DSM-5 much longer to be 
implemented, for the strengths and weaknesses to come out both in the clinic and 
through scientific study. Until then, I cannot commit to claiming one is superior to the 
other. What can be established is that Kanner's approach, Bender's approach, DSM-IV 
autism and DSM-5 autism all have substantial approximate truth and DSM-6 should 
include a classification which strongly relates to these four approaches to autism.
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